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Higher Education Revolutions in 
the Gulf
Over the past quarter century, the people of the Arabian Peninsula have wit-
nessed a revolutionary transformation in higher education. In 1990, there were 
fewer than ten public universities that offered their Arabic- language curricula in 
sex- segregated settings to national citizens only. In 2015, there are hundreds of 
public, semi- public and private colleges and universities. Most of these institu-
tions are open to expatriates and national citizens; a few offer gender- integrated 
instruction; and the language of instruction is much more likely to be in English 
than Arabic.
 Higher Education Revolutions in the Gulf explores the reasons behind this 
dramatic growth. It examines the causes of the sharp shift in educational prac-
tices and analyses how these new systems of higher education are regulated, 
evaluating the extent to which the new universities and colleges are improving 
quality. Questioning whether these educational changes can be sustained, the 
book explores how the new curricula and language policies are aligned with offi-
cial visions of the future. Written by leading scholars in the field, it draws upon 
their considerable experiences of teaching and doing research in the Arabian 
Gulf, as well as their different disciplinary backgrounds (linguistics and eco-
nomics), to provide a holistic and historically informed account of the emer-
gence and viability of the Arabian Peninsula’s higher education revolutions.
 Offering a comprehensive, critical assessment of education in the Gulf Arab 
states, this book represents a significant contribution to the field and will be of 
interest to students and scholars of Middle East and Gulf Studies, and essential 
for those focused on higher education.
Fatima Badry is Professor of Linguistics in the Department of English at the 
American University of Sharjah in the UAE. Her research interests include lan-
guage acquisition, bilingualism, education policy and globalization and the 
impact of global English on Arab identity.
John Willoughby is Professor of Economics at American University. After 
teaching at the American University of Sharjah, he has devoted his time to 
studying labor migration and educational issues in the GCC.
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Preface
Our interest in writing this book ultimately stems from personal experiences. We 
both joined the faculty of the American University of Sharjah (AUS) just as it 
was beginning in the late 1990s. One of us is still there 17 years later.1 The 
establishment of AUS and University City was the dream of the ruler of Sharjah, 
Dr. Sheikh Sultan bin Muhammad Al- Qasimi. This dream became a reality in a 
remarkably short period of time.2 Both the AUS and the University of Sharjah in 
University City opened in the fall of 1997 even before all buildings were com-
pleted. The faculty who arrived in September 1997 had to be housed in hotels 
and share the campus, still under construction, with roaming camels for the first 
few months.
 Both students and faculty were well aware that they were participating in a 
risky venture. It was not at all certain that the AUS would succeed, and the sense 
of entering into uncharted territory led us to label ourselves “Pioneers” and “Set-
tlers.”3 Those who arrived in the first year were the pioneers. The settlers fol-
lowed in the second year. The divisions between the two cohorts seemed rather 
stark at first. Indeed, the settlers often joked that our edgy veteran colleagues 
suffered from PTSD – Pioneer Traumatic Stress Disorder.
 As this lame witticism indicates, the beginning years at the AUS were diffi-
cult. We on the faculty had uprooted ourselves and traveled long distances to 
what seemed like a remote location. All of us wanted this experiment to succeed. 
On the other hand, we found ourselves struggling with important questions of 
education policy as well as being involved in conflicts related to the distribution 
of power and authority. The uncertainty and riskiness of our decision to relocate 
only added to the fraught work environment.
 Part of this anxiety was no doubt caused by our own perceptions of the location 
in which this high- stakes educational experiment was taking place. The societies 
of the Arabian Peninsula have not been known as places that are open to social and 
intellectual experimentation. Most of us wondered to what extent a new and dif-
ferent university devoted to the promotion of critical thinking would have the 
political support necessary for its survival. What would happen if the ruler who 
sponsored the university withdrew his backing for this controversial project? 
Would we be able to create a meritocratic academic culture that would allow us to 
judge student accomplishment according to academic quality and not pre- existing 
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social standing? Would the integration of the sexes in the classroom and on 
campus prove too controversial? Would our willingness to move away from our 
home academic base doom us to living in an educational backwater? Could we 
survive the heat? Could we raise our children in this new environment?
 The sense that a GCC polity would not welcome an ambitious academic 
enterprise staffed by foreign newcomers did not just stem from orientalist stereo-
types. Some Western faculty considered students’ weak English proficiency and 
their insufficient knowledge about Western culture a sign of lack of sophistica-
tion and, sometimes worse, a sign of stupidity. Many Arabs from other countries 
had their own stereotypical misconceptions. The view from Egypt, Lebanon and 
many other countries was (and is) that the Gulf States are culturally backward, 
but lucky enough to be endowed with great, but somehow undeserved, wealth. 
These perspectives often bred a condescending attitude to the surrounding 
society not that different from the way many European intellectuals view barbar-
ian America. In any event, there we were – an assortment of faculty with dif-
ferent backgrounds, prejudices and expectations, working together in a new, 
unformed institution, in a remote territory, in a society of which most if not all 
of us had limited and inaccurate knowledge. Participating in the creation of any 
institution is always stressful; however, our situation was unusually unique.
 Despite or perhaps because of these difficulties, we in the faculty had the 
mandate from the president of the university to create a liberal arts undergradu-
ate institution on the American model. Our first task was to establish a remedial 
educational program for beginning students whose language and study skills 
required them to take special foundation courses before being allowed to take 
university- level courses.4 At the same time we were all involved in formulating 
a general education curriculum, creating majors, establishing reasonable and rig-
orous standards of academic quality, supporting a robust but regulated student 
life, developing a Faculty Organization Plan to create a faculty senate, instituting 
rules and procedures that would permit the non- arbitrary retention and termina-
tion of faculty; and establishing a library that could support the academic work 
of students and faculty alike. Many felt that it was necessary to develop these 
institutions quickly, and this gave rise to inevitable conflicts and frequent admin-
istrative restructurings. Finally, it is important to note that geopolitical crises 
increased the uncertainty of working on this project in the Gulf. The 9/11 cata-
strophe revealed fissures within the faculty and student body.5 For some, Sharjah 
became an uncomfortable place to live and work.
 The sense that we were standing on a precipice that could give way at any 
moment, along with the prospect of losing a tenured academic position at Amer-
ican University in Washington, DC, caused one of the co- authors (John 
Willoughby) to resign his associate professorship at the AUS and return to the 
United States. The other co- author (Fatima Badry) remained at the AUS, became 
chair of the department of English while serving on important faculty and admin-
istrative committees. In both cases, our experiences at the AUS generated an 
academic interest in the study of GCC societies. Our own research increasingly 
explored issues related to education in the Gulf. One author (Fatima Badry) 
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began to examine the opportunities and threats posed by the increasing insist-
ence of educational authorities that nearly all higher educational instruction had 
to be delivered in English. Her discussions with students led her to examine the 
impact of a Western higher education model in English on the identity of Arab 
millennials. The other author (John Willoughby) started to investigate the links 
between the AUS experience and higher educational transformation throughout 
the region. There were similarities in our two research projects. While support-
ing the principles of liberal arts higher education, both of us were (and are) 
uneasy with the authoritarian ways in which educational reform has often been 
implemented. Both of us were (and are) worried about the educational and geo-
political implications of an uncritical adoption of Western educational models. 
Because our own research raised as many questions as answers, and because we 
thought our different analytical frameworks could be usefully combined, we 
decided to join forces to write this study.
The goals of higher education revolutions
The main title of our book, Higher Education Revolutions in the Gulf, underlines 
our belief that the changes we have observed in the organization and delivery of 
higher educational services constitute a revolution in the tertiary educational 
system of each GCC state. Although the policy changes and institution forma-
tion processes in Oman, the competing emirates of the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain and 
Kuwait are distinct, all are significant and deserve the revolution label. The com-
petitive environment in which higher education is offered, the regulatory 
environment that organizes and evaluates university and college operations, and 
the curricula that confront incoming students have profoundly changed through-
out the region. On the other hand, countries and emirates have not implemented 
identical programs. Both available financial resources for educational restructur-
ing and educational philosophies differ significantly across the region, and any 
study of higher education in the Gulf must take account of this heterogeneous 
reality. There is no single GCC revolution in higher education. Rather, the 
changes we observe are interconnected, but significantly different to warrant the 
term revolutions rather than evolution.
 The subtitle of our book, Globalization and Institutional Viability, signals that 
we have decided to embark on two distinct, but interconnected research projects. 
The first is providing an analytical account of the recent history of higher educa-
tion in the five small GCC states. When did governments begin to implement 
higher educational reforms in response to globalization pressures? What new 
institutions began to form? What is the best way to describe the changes we are 
observing? This contemporary historical account required us to develop appro-
priate categories that would allow us both to describe clearly how higher educa-
tion has changed and to explore the distinct evolutionary tendencies embodied in 
these institutional changes.
 The second research project uses the history we have developed to consider 
the viability of the new worlds of GCC higher education. Not all revolutions 
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work; not all radical reforms are well designed. As the first section of the intro-
duction suggested, the political and social environment in which these educa-
tional changes were implemented is challenging. Although the experience is 
recent, we believe we have enough information to make a preliminary assess-
ment. On the other hand, what do we assess? The appropriateness of the new 
curricula? The quality of the educational services? The financial stability of the 
new institutions? The governance systems of universities and colleges? The 
quality of the regulatory environment? The social legitimacy of these new educa-
tional projects? The implications of using many Western and expatriate adminis-
trators and faculty to implement these policy changes? The educational and 
social meaning of requiring English to be the sole language of sophisticated aca-
demic discourse? As the list of questions suggest, the term viability has many 
different meanings.
 We chose to be ambitious, rather than restrained. To the extent possible, we 
have tried to answer as many of these questions as we can. Our goal is to provide 
a comprehensive overview of the changes and challenges that have occurred 
within the higher education sectors of the GCC, and we hope that this effort is 
useful for policy- makers and academics alike. While initially we planned to limit 
this book to the smaller GCC states of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the 
UAE, because we felt higher education developments in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia were somehow different from those developments in the rest of the GGC, 
a paper presented by Professor Amani Hamdan, from the University of 
Dammam, KSA, at the Conceptualizing the Global University conference, held 
at the American University of Sharjah, in May 2014, made us realize that there 
are many parallel developments. We invited Professor Hamdan to contribute a 
chapter to this book to give the reader a comprehensive representation of higher 
education developments in all of the GCC.
 Just as our interest in the formation and organization of the American Univer-
sity of Sharjah led us to place this experience in a regional context, our study of 
educational reform in the GCC as a whole has forced us to consider the global 
context of higher educational transformation. While there are many distinctive 
features of GCC society that give the establishment of new universities and col-
leges in the region specific characteristics and problems, the same claim could 
be made for many other regions of the world that are creating new tertiary educa-
tional policies and institutions. The GCC shifts have clearly not taken place in a 
vacuum. What we observe in the region are not idiosyncratic expressions of 
exotic societies. For this reason, we decided to begin our book with a considera-
tion of recent global trends in higher education.
 It is our hope that this ambitious project allows scholars, educational policy- 
makers, and, indeed, the students who have experienced and are experiencing 
the new educational institutions being developed in the GCC an opportunity to 
reflect on and assess the transformed educational institutions of the region. When 
we began working in the American University of Sharjah, we did not realize that 
we would be part of an important historic movement to remake higher education 
in the Arabian Peninsula. The 17 years that now separate us from the launch of 
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that ambitious initiative put us in a position to make a first comprehensive 
assessment of the revolutions in which we have participated.
Notes
1 During these 17 years, the AUS has undergone several changes to become one of the 
leading universities in the region. A major factor in its success should be attributed to 
its president and patron, the ruler of Sharjah, Dr. Sheikh Sultan bin Muhammad Al- 
Qasimi. An avid historian and playwright himself, he has given the AUS the space to 
grow to achieve his vision of developing higher education and culture in the region.
2 The university opened less than one year after construction began.
3 Badry arrived in January 1998 and was thus a pioneer. Willoughby arrived in fall 1998 
and joined the second- year cohort of settlers.
4 During the first two years, faculty teaching English were more than 50 percent of all 
faculty.
5 In the aftermath of 9/11 some faculty became very apprehensive about living in an 
Arab country and abruptly resigned from their positions. American faculty felt gener-
ally uneasy in the classroom not knowing whether or not to discuss the issue with their 
Arab/Muslim students.
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1 Introduction
The political and socio- economic 
emergence of the Arabian Gulf
The present- day Arabian Gulf states of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) share a common history, geography, social struc-
ture, culture and language. The peoples of the region were among the first to 
embrace Islam, and this religion continues to play a major role in shaping the 
practices and evolution of Gulf societies. In addition, the region is subject to 
similar environmental conditions of little rain and extreme summer heat. This 
has meant that, with the exception of parts of Oman, most of the Arabian Gulf 
region does not have a history of pre- capitalist settled agricultural production. 
Instead, many of the Gulf peoples were semi- nomadic herders, pearl divers and 
traders organized around different tribal groups. In addition, small trading 
centers on the Gulf and Indian Ocean played an important role in organizing pre-
 modern oceanic trade between Persia, South Asia, East Africa and the Arab 
world. Finally, the annual Haj pilgrimage meant that a relatively large number of 
religious pilgrims regularly passed through the region. Despite this openness to 
trade and the movements of people, unfavorable climatic conditions meant that 
this region remained very poor and lacked much of the physical and social infra-
structure that could promote development.
 The poverty of the Arabian Gulf territories was further exacerbated by the 
period of European imperial domination. With the important exceptions of what 
is now Saudi Arabia and Oman, representatives of the British Empire forged a 
series of treaties with the ancestors of the contemporary ruling families of the 
region. In return for the acceptance of British hegemony in the Gulf, the British 
rulers recognized the authority of these tribal leaders. The result was the 
increased political and economic isolation of the Arabian Gulf region. For much 
of British imperial rule, the present- day Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states 
or “trucial states” were overseen by the colonial government of India.
 The advent of oil production, the rise of Arab nationalism and the decline of 
British influence have led to profound economic, social and political transforma-
tions in the last 65 years. Living standards improved at an unprecedented rate, as 
revenues from oil exports funded the construction and maintenance of an impres-
sively modern physical infrastructure. This led to the importation of vast 
numbers of skilled and unskilled expatriate labor from the rest of the Arab world, 
Asia and, to a lesser extent, Europe and North America. In addition, all of the 
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Arabian Gulf states attained independence and established a unique form of 
absolutist monarchical governments that maintained their power and popular 
legitimacy through aggressive development programs and the distribution of oil 
rents to their tribal/national constituencies.
 The GCC region is the wealthiest region in the Arab world and enjoys some 
of the highest per capita GDPs worldwide. Its wealth is tied to its oil and gas 
natural resources, although some regions such as the Emirate of Dubai have suc-
ceeded in diversifying their economy as their oil resources started to dwindle. 
Although oil exploration and exploitation began in the early twentieth century, 
most of the benefits went to British and American oil companies. It was not until 
the 1970s that the Gulf states began to reap the benefits from their oil wealth, 
which by the early 1990s became under total state control (Metz, 1993). Today, 
the economies of the six member states of the GCC are heavily reliant on the 
hydrocarbons industry. Oil and gas exports account for a large proportion of 
total exports in all of the GCC states and play an even more crucial role in 
financing government activity (see Table 1.1).1
 The nations of the Arabian Gulf that evolved from this process are not ident-
ical. A key factor differentiating the countries from each other is their degree of 
wealth. Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE (especially the Emirate of Abu Dhabi) have 
very high per capita incomes, while Bahrain and Oman are poorer. Because of 
these important economic differences, Bahrain and Oman are somewhat less 
dependent on expatriate labor and have relatively more nationals working in less 
remunerative jobs in the private sector (see Table 1.2).
 Until the early 1980s, Arabs outside the Arabian Peninsula held a stereotypi-
cal view of Gulf Arabs as nomads living a life of camel herding and pearl diving 
in tribal sheikhdoms under harsh desert conditions. The centers of the Arab 
world were cities such as Algiers, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Cairo, Casa-
blanca or Tunis that stood for the image of modernity in the Arab world. Oil 
wealth in the Gulf region changed all that. Today, cities such as Dubai or Doha 
represent the image of what Arabs could achieve if they could only get their 
house in order. Dubai holds world records for the tallest buildings, largest 
Table 1.1 Economic indicators of the GCC (2010)
Country GDP per capita 
(PPP, US dollars)
Export revenue of 
oil and gas as % of 
total export revenue
Revenue from oil 
and gas exports as 
% of total 
government revenue
Bahrain 23,101 72.3 69.0
Kuwait 41,240 81.7 86.2
Oman 22,390 86.1 65.6
Qatar 136,248 64.7 74.8
Saudi Arabia 20,189 81.8 83.1
United Arab Emirates 60,175 80.6 30.5












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 firework displays, biggest screen and busiest airport in the world. It has won the 
right to host the World Expo in 2020 and Doha, Qatar will host the World Cup 
in 2022. The UAE, Qatar and Kuwait, are at the forefront of providing financial 
help to their poorer, less fortunate “Arab brothers” and in so doing yielding tre-
mendous influence on the politically aware Arab scene, despite their relatively 
small populations.
 The tribal groupings have become modern nations and their cities are “world 
hubs for transnational flows of people, goods, and capital.” The new political 
entities of the Gulf are “each carved out of shared tribal territory and identical 
histories” (Cooke, 2014: 5) that are gradually being differentiated by the adop-
tion of national symbols taken from the common past (an oryx, a pearl, a coffee 
pot, a dhow or an incense burner, or a falcon). In embracing modernity and glo-
balization, the GCC states attempt to maintain their tribal heritage as part of their 
modern identity. The need to highlight their past signals their uniqueness and 
serves to assert their prestigious standing in societies where they have become 
minorities. As Cooke puts it, the return to tribal identity: 
signals racial privilege, social status, and exclusive entitlement to a share in 
national profits. Indeed, the rubbing up of the tribal against the modern in 
today’s Gulf states does not represent a clash of conflicting values, but, 
rather, the desired effect of common aspirations. 
(Cooke, 2014: 10)
There are many ways that this return is accomplished through preserving the 
national dress for both women and men in public spaces, national museums and 
heritage villages, traditional sports, national celebrations with appeal to tribal 
ceremonies and symbols, to promoting local dialects. An iconic representation of 
this combination of the tribal and the modern is best captured in women’s dress. 
Young Gulf women wearing the latest Western designer fashions being revealed 
under the “Sheela” (long, black, cape- like traditional dress) with the latest 
makeup, and luxury brand accessories. While some have interpreted these com-
binations in dichotomies as engendering some sort of “cognitive dissonance” 
young women see their behaviors as a marriage of the two worlds they are part 
of. A Saudi writer aptly captures this convergence when she says “where the old 
world and the new are tight as two lovers” (Alim, 2007: 217, as cited in Cooke, 
2014).
The birth of the GCC and the contemporary challenges 
facing the region
The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, generally referred to as 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), was established in 1981 as a regional 
intergovernmental union. Its members are the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate of Oman, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the 
State of Kuwait and the Emirate of Qatar. They are all located on the Arab side 
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of the Arabian/Persian Gulf. The council was formed in reaction to the Iranian 
Revolution and aimed to establish institutions that would facilitate cooperation 
between its members in political, military, economic and social domains. Its ulti-
mate goal was to unify member states’ economic, monetary, commercial and fin-
ancial policies. The GCC has accomplished some of its goals, as there are no 
custom duties among GCC states, citizens do not need a passport to travel across 
state boundaries and GCC businesses enjoy equity investments and have special 
access to all GCC ports (Metz, 1993). The monetary union, however, has proved 
more difficult and has been put on hold. Politically, the GCC members are not 
always in agreement, as witnessed by the 2014 rift between Qatar and the rest of 
the GCC members in response to political events in Egypt.
 Due to its strategic location and oil wealth, US interests in the region have 
intensified sometimes at the expense of the United Kingdom. The Palestinian–
Israeli conflict, the Iranian Revolution, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and sub-
sequent Gulf Wars, the 9/11 attacks and the resulting US- led Afghanistan and 
Iraq wars have all impacted the GCC (Peterson, 2014). In addition, the events 
surrounding the Arab Spring led to mass protests in Bahrain, which awakened 
and intensified sectarian strife. Oman also experienced smaller protests, and 
most of the GCC governments responded to these political challenges by increas-
ing social benefits while cracking down on some dissident groupings. Finally the 
failures of the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings against the autocratic and authorit-
arian regimes in the rest of the Middle East and North Africa region have further 
unsettled the Arabian Gulf and led the surviving regimes to find ways to tighten 
their grips on power even more. In particular, the collapse of state authority in 
much of Syria and the Arab Sunni regions of Iraq have allowed xenophobic 
“Islamist” movements to establish a presence that clearly threatens Gulf rulers’ 
efforts to intensify liberal political economic intercourse with the world economy 
while maintaining the region’s distinct political and cultural practices. 
 Despite these shocks, there is reason to believe that the monarchies of the 
region will maintain their authority. Bank et al. (2014) discuss four major factors 
which may explain the longevity of the monarchies in the Arabian Peninsula. 
These include external political and military support from Western powers, 
mainly the United States, the United Kingdom and France; the oil wealth that 
allows the rulers to perpetuate a rentier economy by distributing rents to privi-
leged groups/tribes and ensuring their continued loyalty; the inclusion of family 
and elite tribal members in their cabinets (Shoura system); and the reliance on 
religion and other tribal traditions to maintain legitimacy. 
 A key factor promoting the stability of the region is that oil wealth continues 
to improve material living standards, health and educational outcomes. The 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) reports that all but one of the 
GCC countries are classified in the highest category of human development, and 
the exception, Oman, has experienced one of the most rapid improvements in 
material living standards, health and education in the world. One further indica-
tion of the dramatic social transformations of the region has been sharp changes 
in demographic behavior. In the mid- 1980s, a large number of adolescent women 
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were bearing children. By 2013, the proportion of young mothers between the 
ages of 16 and 19 had dropped sharply. The shrinkage in the rate of adolescent 
pregnancy is especially dramatic for Oman, the UAE and Saudi Arabia (see 
Table 3.1). This means that the youth bulge which is presently a feature of many 
of GCC societies will eventually recede. Although more than 50 percent of the 
population of Oman and Saudi Arabia is under 25, and the figures for the other 
GCC countries are in the 30 percent range, most of the data indicate a rise in the 
marriage age for women and a fall in family size. Present trends indicate that the 
GCC family will look more like the small nuclear families of advanced capitalist 
societies in the next generations.
 A major demographic challenge facing all countries of the GCC is the con-
tinued reliance on expatriate labor. Indeed, the decade of relatively high oil 
prices that has just come to an end (2005–14) increased most of the GCC’s reli-
ance on expatriate labor. In other words, what was supposed to be a temporary 
measure to promote development has become a quasi- permanent feature of the 
GCC. Moreover, the extensive use of foreign labor has tended to “de- Arabize” 
much of the region, since the relative number of South Asian workers (as 
opposed to workers from other parts of the Arab world) has steadily increased. 
Tens of thousands of professional expatriate families now call the GCC their 
home. They have formed families, raised children, and seen their adult children 
now work and form families of their own in the region. Thus, the GCC countries 
are increasingly diverse, but remain highly segmented. Only national citizens 
can gain direct access to the revenues from oil and petroleum exports through 
state welfare programs and government employment, although the incomes of 
the whole region remain dependent on these essential energy exports. As we 
shall see, this dual reliance on exports from a very narrow set of petroleum- 
based commodities and “temporary” migrant labor has unleashed political and 
social anxieties that are very important to our understanding of the transforma-
tion of higher education in the region. A Booz & Co. report which is based on 
the Arab organization of labor reveals that in 2007, the GCC countries still relied 
heavily on foreigners despite attempts to nationalize the workforce. Figures of 
this dependence vary depending on the source consulted and the year but they 
remain very high, ranging from 91.6 percent in the UAE, 82.2 percent in Kuwait, 
Table 1.3  Changes in the rate of adolescent pregnancy (number of births to women aged 
15–19 per 1,000)
Country 1985 2000 2010
Bahrain 51.6 18.3 14.7
Kuwait 67.6 26.6 15.1
Oman 117.2 43.5 13.6
Qatar 71.5 22.8 15.1
UAE 116.8 27.6 29.9
Saudi Arabia 118.1 37.3 11.6
Source: UNDP (2014).
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75.8 percent in Bahrain, 74.5 per cent in Oman and 62.3 percent in Qatar (Al 
Munajjed and Sabbagh, 2011). By 2014, and despite all the efforts of nationali-
zation of the workforce, dependence on expatriates shows no sign of weakening.
The evolution of education
The transformation in the region is especially evident in the spheres of educa-
tion. Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar attained near universal attendance of children in 
primary and secondary education by 1985, while Oman and the United Arab 
Emirates made rapid progress to reach this benchmark by 2013. In Oman today 
the expected years of formal education is 13.6 years and literacy rates are 
between 80 and 95 percent. In the UAE, literacy rates are around 90 percent.
 Most GCC states had to develop their educational system from elementary to 
university in the last 40 years. Before independence there were hardly any 
schools in the GCC. The very few schools that existed in Bahrain and Kuwait 
were focused on Islamic education. By the 1970s early educational systems were 
focused on eradicating illiteracy and spreading basic education to reach all 
citizens with the help of teachers and administrators from Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, 
Palestine, Jordan and Egypt (see Table 1.4).
 In the last four decades more attention has been given to the quality of educa-
tion and the establishment of the first national universities. By the beginning of 
the millennium all states emphasized the role of education in meeting the chal-
lenges of the twenty- first century and helping them to become knowledge soci-
eties. GCC governments launched their first national universities modeled on 
other Arab universities and staffed by Arab academics that were open to their 
citizens only. The end of the twentieth century witnessed mounting criticisms of 
the “Arab university” as being unable to produce graduates equipped with the 
twenty- first century skills required by the labor market.
Analyzing the higher education transformations of the GCC
Because the small GCC states supply crucial energy commodities to the world 
economy, are highly open to trade, investment and labor flows, have unusual 
royalist political systems, and appear to maintain distinct practices, there is a 
Table 1.4 Educational attainment in the GCC: expected years of schooling
Country 1985 2000 2013
Bahrain 13.0 13.6 14.4
Kuwait 12.2 15.5 14.6
Oman  5.9 10.9 13.6
Qatar 12.5 12.6 13.8
UAE  9.8 12.0 13.3
Source: UNDP (2014).
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tendency to view the region as an idiosyncratic world unto itself. We argue, on 
the contrary, that Gulf society should be interpreted through a comparative 
framework that links the socio- political practices to that of the rest of the world. 
Most of our analysis focuses on the small states of the GCC (Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar and the UAE), although we do include a chapter on Saudi Arabia 
contributed by Professor Amani Hamdan. In some chapters, we tend to pay 
somewhat more attention to developments in the United Arab Emirates. This is 
necessary for several reasons. First, the higher education reform efforts largely 
began in Dubai and Sharjah. Second, university and college enrollments have 
grown most rapidly in the UAE. Third, the different emirates of the UAE have 
engaged in a great variety of experiments that are part of all the models of educa-
tional reform that we explain and analyze. And finally, the availability of data on 
higher education released by the private and public institutions of the UAE allow 
us to develop a more complete and accurate assessment of the higher education 
reform process for the whole region.
 We begin our study of the dramatic transformations in GCC higher education 
by placing these developments in the broader context of global educational 
trends. Chapter 2 documents the rapid quantitative expansion of higher educa-
tion throughout the globe and notes that an increasingly large proportion of 
college students receive their education outside of the advanced capitalist world. 
There is no reason to think that this growth will slacken. We show that there is a 
consensus amongst policy- makers that a dynamic and good society requires a 
robust tertiary education system. We conclude Chapter 2 by exploring the dif-
ferent economic, sociological and political perspectives that explain why 
national commitments to higher education are so strong and uniform. This ana-
lysis alerts us to the reality that higher education reform takes place on a con-
tested terrain, since different stakeholders place contradictory demands on their 
national universities and colleges.
 Chapter 3 continues our comparative framework by examining the process of 
educational globalization. In the first part of this chapter, we define the quant-
itative and qualitative aspects of globalization. This analysis leads us to highlight 
the crucial importance that educational developments in Asia play in intensify-
ing the influence of Western academic institutions. The second part of this 
chapter applies this analysis to the GCC. We show that the higher education 
systems of the Arabian Gulf are unusually extraverted. Large numbers of stu-
dents travel across borders to earn their academic degrees, and the nations (and 
emirates) of the GCC have aggressively adopted many of the educational pol-
icies and practices of Western universities and colleges.
 In Chapter 4 we argue that this drive to adopt American and British academic 
practices lies behind the extraordinary expansion in the numbers of private and 
semi- private universities and colleges over the past two decades. In this chapter, 
we provide a comprehensive country- by-country survey of the emergence of the 
non- state educational sector. (In the case of the United Arab Emirates, this ana-
lysis is done on an emirate- by-emirate basis.) This historical review allows us to 
identify distinct models of educational transformation. We demonstrate that 
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while the drive to restructure and privatize parts of higher education is common 
to the whole GCC, the results are regionally distinct because of the distinct regu-
latory choices that national and emirate ruling authorities have made.
 Chapter 5 chronicles the birth of public higher education institutions in the 
GCC and provides a general overview of the major GCC national universities. 
The purpose of the chapter is to analyze the impact of the reforms that public 
universities and colleges have undergone in the last decades to assess their 
potential for achieving stated national visions. The assessment reveals that 
national universities’ reforms share several characteristics. Most GCC public 
institutions have attempted to follow an American model of higher education 
from its structure to its curricula and language without aligning themselves with 
secondary education outcomes. They have relied on foreign experts to plan, 
implement and assess the reforms and set utilitarian goals based on a human 
capital approach to education that emphasizes professional education. The top- 
down approach to education reform is based on short- term politico- economic 
considerations that have in fact resulted in universities as teaching institutions 
rather than centers of research, thus falling short of the nations’ visions to trans-
form themselves into leaders among the advanced knowledge societies.
 In Chapter 6 we continue our analysis of the quality of higher education in 
the GCC by highlighting the issues of accreditation and regulation. We argue 
through the use of institutionalist economic reasoning that the establishment of a 
competitive system of private higher education institutions requires the creation 
of robust, governmental regulatory practices. With the exception of those GCC 
states that have encouraged the importation of “turnkey” branch campuses, the 
governments of the region have implemented their accreditation and supervisory 
institutions by adopting Western standards of higher education regulation. We 
demonstrate that almost every state has created an intensive accreditation process 
that involves institutional self- studies and site visits and reports by outside 
experts. In Bahrain and Oman, these assessment documents are publicly avail-
able, and this has allowed us to offer a preliminary evaluation of the higher 
education quality. We are able to examine issues related to governance, faculty 
working conditions, and student preparation. We find that the quality of some of 
the smaller colleges that focus on providing business and information techno-
logy degrees is often low. On the other hand, those institutions that make a 
serious commitment to establishing multi- disciplinary liberal arts education are 
more likely to be successful.
 In Chapter 7, our guest author, Dr. Amani K. Hamdan, describes the excep-
tional growth of higher education in Saudi Arabia during the last decade. She 
discusses the achievements, challenges and opportunities inherent in a booming 
higher education sector, with emphasis on analyzing the viability and alignment 
of recent educational reforms with national goals (be they economic, socio- 
cultural or linguistic development). Many of Dr. Hamdan’s arguments and criti-
cisms parallel our own; the higher educational challenges the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia (KSA) faces are similar to those we have outlined in our analysis of the 
other GCC states. On the other hand, the Saudi experience is institutionally 
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 distinct. We cannot assume that the educational advances and setbacks we 
observe in the smaller GCC states will be associated with similar developments 
in Saudi Arabia.
 In Chapter 8, we address the reasons behind the low status of Modern 
Standard Arabic (MSA) in education and its declining use among millennials for 
academic purposes and in written communication. The chapter analyzes lin-
guistic, socio- economic and globalization factors interfering with the promotion 
of MSA as the medium of knowledge production despite numerous policy deci-
sions and official statements affirming that Arabic is a central component of 
national and Pan- Arab identity. We argue that efforts to improve Arabic literacy 
development in MSA must recognize and deal with the diglossic feature of 
Arabic and associated attitudes, unify its language planning efforts, modernize 
its teaching methodologies based on the specific typology of the language and its 
writing system and aim for a balanced dual language policy that places equal 
value on Arabic and English in society.
 In our concluding chapter, we revisit the main question that led to the writing 
of this book: can the extensive educational reforms, by themselves, lead to the 
societal, economic and political transformations of the GCC countries to become 
leaders in the twenty- first century? There is no doubt that today’s GCC educa-
tional systems have opened the doors to education for many groups in the GCC 
societies that otherwise would have had limited access to higher education (e.g., 
women and resident expatriates). In addition, the introduction of private institu-
tions has forced public institutions to become more accountable in order to 
remain competitive in a rapidly changing environment. At the same time, the 
nature of the reforms adopted raises important questions as to whether they can 
achieve the goals stated in the GCC countries’ visions of the future, namely in 
terms of their ambition to become leaders in the knowledge economy, their claim 
to be at the vanguard of protecting and developing the Arabic language and their 
desire to preserve their Arab traditions and cultural identity. Based on our ana-
lysis of the reforms, we argue that the Western- directed reforms rest on assump-
tions that limit their capacity to achieve their expected long- term goals because 
these substantial changes in higher education are not grounded in their local con-
texts and are not embedded in a comprehensive transformation of the socio- 
political environments in which they are implemented.
Note
1 The petroleum reserves of the six GCC member states were estimated by the US 
Department of Energy to be 500.5 billion barrels, or about 30 percent of the world’s 
total reserves in 2010. These six nations also possessed 21 percent of the world’s 
natural gas reserves (US Energy Information Agency, 2014). According to the BP Sta-
tistical Review (as cited by Cherif and Hasanov, 2014), the expected lifetime ranges 
from six years for Bahrain, to 63 years, 79 years and 89 years for Saudi Arabia, the 
United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, respectively (Cherif and Hasanov, 2014: 46). Other 
sources reported in Table 1.1 give slightly lower figures but within the same ranges.
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2 The global expansion of higher 
education
Alternative perspectives
The century- long expansion of higher education
Higher education is one of the most rapidly growing sectors of the world 
economy today. Between 1815 and the period shortly after World War I, there 
was very little growth in the number of young adults attending colleges or 
universities, but starting in the 1920s, the number of students began to expand at 
an intensifying rate in the advanced capitalist world. By 1940, there were 
approximately five million university students worldwide. By 1960, this number 
had doubled to ten million (Schofer and Meyer, 2005). Fifty years later, in 2010, 
more than 177 million students were attending colleges and universities in all of 
the world’s regions (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2012: 228). This increase 
represents a 5.9 percent annual growth rate in enrollments. If this rate of growth 
continues, the tertiary education population of students will nearly double every 
12 years. To highlight the extraordinary nature of the trend, Schofer and Meyer 
point out that, today, there are approximately as many students attending col-
leges and universities in Kazakhstan as there were in the entire globe a century 
ago (Schofer and Meyer, 2005: 3).
 It is important to stress that nearly all regions of the world have been a part of 
this process. Western Europe, North America and Japan have the most tertiary stu-
dents per capita – approximately 350 students per every 10,000 people – but 
Eastern Europe, after experiencing relatively slow growth in college education 
during the Communist period, has largely caught up to its Western neighbors. 
After the major OECD nations, Eastern Europe, the Arab world and Latin America 
have the highest share of college and university students in the total population. In 
addition, the student population of the East Asian and Pacific region is growing 
very rapidly. According to UNESCO, the student body in China has expanded by 
19 percent per year during the first decade of this century. There are exceptions to 
these trends. India, Pakistan and Bangladesh’s student bodies have grown more 
slowly, and sub- Saharan Africa has the lowest proportion of college students in its 
population, although growth is so rapid that UNESCO estimates that the number 
of students will double every 8.4 years (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2009).
 This growth is associated with significant regional changes in the composition 
of the university student body. There has been a sharp rise in the share of students 
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outside the advanced capitalist world but what is particularly noteworthy is that the 
East Asian and Pacific region now have the largest number of college and univer-
sity students in the world. The Arab world’s share of students has increased from 3 
to 5 percent, which in itself represents a significant increase for a region with a rel-
atively small share of the world’s population (see Table 2.1).
 An examination of a country’s level of development is equally revealing. 
College education is no longer limited to high income countries. Indeed, the 
fastest growth of students is in countries with lower middle income status. These 
regions of the world economy have, in general, experienced sharp rises in educa-
tional attainment at the primary and secondary level. Thus, it is not surprising 
that such changes have led to an explosion in the size of the tertiary student 
population. Having said this, there is little doubt that within each region under 
consideration, a disproportionate share of tertiary students comes from more 
privileged economic backgrounds. Thus, while global educational expansion 
suggests a certain levelling across nations, class divisions within societies are 
often widening (see Table 2.2).
 Another way to consider the expansion of higher education is to consider 
enrollment rates. UNESCO uses the term gross enrollment rates to determine the 
proportion of university- age students in the total relevant age group. It is difficult 
to devise a precise measurement of enrollment rates from country to country, 
since the appropriate age range can differ from region to region, and students 
sometimes take multiple courses of study. Nevertheless, these tables show the 
Table 2.1 Share of students in tertiary education by region (1970–2007)
1970 1980 1990 2000 2007
Sub-Saharan Africa 1 1 2 2 3
Arab states 2 3 4 6 5
South and Southwest Asia 10 8 9 12 12
East Asia and the Pacific 14 15 21 24 31
Latin America and Caribbean 6 10 11 11 12
Central Asia 3 3 2 2 2
Central and Eastern Europe 18 18 14 13 14
North America and Western Europe 48 42 37 29 23
Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2009: 12).
Table 2.2 Share of students in tertiary education by income status of country
1970 1980 1990 2000 2007
Low income 4 4 4 5 6
Lower-middle income 22 24 29 35 42
Upper-middle income 17 22 21 21 22
High income 57 50 46 39 30
Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2009: 13).
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same trends we have already considered, while also revealing that the advanced 
capitalist world has a much higher share of young adults participating in tertiary 
education. The Arab world gross enrollment rate is slightly below the world 
average, even though the per- capita share of college students is somewhat 
higher. This is because of the much higher share of young adults in the total 
population of this region (see Table 2.3).
 Finally, the other striking feature of the expansion of higher education is the 
increasing participation of women in most of the world’s regions. Indeed, the 
faster college enrollment is growing, the more important is the rising share of 
female students. For example, the number of female and male students in col-
leges and universities in the Arab world is approximately equal, while in slower- 
growing areas such as India, there is still a significantly larger presence of male 
students in higher education institutions. For the world as a whole, 51 percent of 
all higher education students are women (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2010: 
69). In 1970, female enrollment in colleges and universities was only 80 percent 
of male enrollment. In the Arab world, this was less than 40 percent (UNESCO 
Institute for Statistics, 2010: 69). Given the region’s reputation as an area trou-
bled by extreme forms of male domination, it is significant that women’s parti-
cipation in post- secondary education mirrors this global trend. This is especially 
true for the Gulf, often thought to be the most patriarchal sub- region of the most 
patriarchal region of the world. Higher education data, at least, should lead us to 
re- examine this stereotype.
 Unless there is a sharp disruption in the trajectory of the world economy, it is 
reasonable to expect that this intensive growth in university education will con-
tinue. The poorer countries of the world lag significantly behind the richer coun-
tries when one examines the share of young adults who are attending 
post- secondary institutions. As income levels rise and perhaps begin to converge 
with those of the West, we can expect that student participation will rise as well. 
Moreover, more rapid population growth in most regions of the non- Western 
world (with the notable exception of China) should further fuel the growth of 
university education in lower middle income countries.
Table 2.3 Gross enrollment rates in tertiary education
1970 1980 1990 2000 2007
North America and Western Europe 30 37 49 64 71
Central and Eastern Europe – – – 41 62
Latin America and Caribbean  6 13 17 23 34
Central Asia – – – 23 31
East Asia and Pacific  3  5  7 15 26
Arab states – – – 20 23
South and West Asia  4  4  6  9 11
Sub-Saharan Africa  1  2  3  4  6
World  9 12 13 19 26
Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2009: 14).
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Different perspectives on the mission and purpose of higher 
education
The extraordinary growth in higher education everywhere in the world suggests 
that contemporary socio- economic evolution creates both an intensifying 
demand for higher education and pressures to create institutions that are roughly 
similar to universities and colleges in the advanced capitalist world. Most 
 governments, international governmental organizations (IGOs) and non- 
governmental organizations (NGOs) view the establishment of a robust system 
of universities and colleges as an essential part of a credible economic develop-
ment strategy. Today, increasing proportions of national adult populations 
groups subscribe to this approach and link their children’s social and economic 
advance to receiving recognized higher education credentials. This near uni-
versal consensus on the value and importance of university training can best be 
understood by reviewing the social scientific literature on the roles of higher 
education in contemporary society.
 There are four distinct arguments that we need to consider in order to obtain a 
full picture of the roles that higher education is hypothesized to play in today’s 
society. The dominant claim is economic and bases itself on neoclassical eco-
nomic growth theory. The second two are social and political and focus on the 
connection between higher education, the socio- economic integration of com-
mercial societies and the imperatives of a capitalist world order. These three per-
spectives concentrate on different social processes, but taken together, provide a 
coherent analytic description of the assumed purposes of higher education and 
the reasons for both its stunning growth and the tendency for its institutions to 
converge. Finally, the fourth framework articulates a humanistic vision of higher 
education as a good in and of itself rather than as an instrument that facilitates 
the achievement of some other socio- economic goal. The argument that higher 
education has intrinsic value has ancient roots. It deserves consideration because 
the perspective has helped create an academic culture which, even if under 
attack, still plays an important role in guiding policy- makers and academic 
administrators.
Higher education as a producer of human capital and 
enhancer of economic growth: an economic perspective
In today’s supra- territorial/global world, higher education reforms are subject to 
different and sometimes conflicting pressures. These pressures are both global 
and local but are all aimed at improving university graduates’ chances of “suc-
cessful participation in a global knowledge- based economy” (Rhoads and Liu, 
2009: 272) and empowering them to contribute to their nation’s development 
(Farag, 2010; Hennock, 2010). The assumption that education is the motor of 
economic and social development is generally taken for granted by development 
experts as well as by lay persons (Farrell and Fenwick, 2007; Olssen and Peters, 
2005; Zaher, 2009). International government organizations (IGOs), such as the 
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Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID), the World Bank (WB), 
and high- profile think- tanks such as the RAND Corporation play an important 
role in setting education agendas at national levels and “have become policy 
activists in their own right” (Rawolle and Lingard, 2008: 736). For example, the 
OECD’s PISA tests have become an internationally accepted standard in assess-
ing educational outcomes. As Spring (2009: 57) points out, “by becoming an 
international standard, PISA has the direct potential for determining the curric-
ulum content in the areas tested.” Another OECD goal is to develop a world 
culture of education by encouraging sharing of ideas on all matters relating to 
education from building designs, to research and policy. The influence of IGOs 
is felt worldwide. Even for high income countries such as those in the Arabian 
Gulf that do not need international financial aid, the “World Bank’s comparative 
advantage as both a knowledge broker and an observer of international experi-
ence” remains influential (Salmi, 2009: 68).
 Underlying the focus on education as a motor of development, is human 
capital theory and neo- liberal policy. This framework posits a strong correlation 
between education and development (Fagerlind and Saha, 1989; Farrell and 
Fenwick, 2007; Mazawi, 2007). Human capital theory emerged as a dominant 
paradigm in development studies in the second half of the twentieth century, 
partly through the work of Nobel prize laureate economists Theodore Schultz 
(1961) and Gary Becker (1964). Schultz states the case most dramatically when 
he concludes one of his most famous articles with the statement: “Truly, the 
most distinctive feature of our economic system is the growth in human capital. 
Without it, there would only be hard manual work and poverty except for those 
who have income from property” (Schultz, 1961: 17).1
 The economic growth and progress made by the “emergent” countries of East 
Asia are often cited as evidence to validate the link between investing in educa-
tion, human labor productivity and development. As a result of this widespread 
belief that investing in education is like investing in the creation of technologi-
cally sophisticated capital goods, developing countries have been allocating 
significant percentages of their budget to improve both the quantity and quality 
of their educational systems. The argument is that the benefits of education influ-
ence both individuals and their societies. At the individual level, education offers 
several advantages, including better employment opportunities, social mobility 
and knowledge acquisition, which ultimately lead to economic gains. At the 
level of society, education helps in generating new ideas and technologies neces-
sary for progress, encouraging research and development, and creating new 
products.
 It is important to realize that this view of higher education as a promoter of 
rapid economic growth and social advancement is relatively new. The link 
between formal higher education and rapid economic growth was not always 
obvious. It can be traced back to the aftermath of World War II and the Cold 
War period when the importance of developing scientific–military–industrial 
complexes that relied heavily on highly educated scientific and technical workers 
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was clear to nearly everybody. If anything, the link between economic dyna-
mism and higher education in the early twenty- first century has intensified. Pro-
duction and innovation centers in Silicon Valley or Bangalore, India depend on a 
steady stream of academically trained, technologically savvy workers – even if 
some of the important founding entrepreneurs of software or social media com-
panies dropped out of college.
 It is also important to point out that the pressures of economic globalization 
have intersected with human capital theory, leading to calls for the development 
and reform of higher education worldwide. The reality of intensified inter-
national competition and the need to keep up with and develop new technologies 
have led many commentators to support the development of a modernized higher 
educational system that can produce creative workers. Without this capability, 
policy- makers fear that countries or whole regions will fail to adapt to technolo-
gical imperatives and become economically irrelevant. We witness this anxiety 
everywhere, from the politically fraught efforts to reform education in the United 
States to critics of Arab societies who also focus on real and alleged failures in 
the delivery of education. This is one reason why the first Arab Human Develop-
ment Reports stressed the need to improve the education system in general and 
the higher educational system in particular in order to create a dynamic know-
ledge economy (United Nations Development Programme, 2002).
 Is this consensus about the economic importance of higher education well- 
founded? As our earlier empirical review of the growth of college and university 
enrollments indicated, the expansion of economic activity and education attain-
ment are closely connected to each other. College graduates consistently earn a 
wage premium over workers who stopped formal education after primary or sec-
ondary school. The most recent comprehensive study of this issue argues that 
individuals who receive a college degree get a higher return on their or their 
families’ investment than college graduates of earlier generations. This does not 
mean that all regions of the world get benefits from educational attainment in the 
same way. This same comprehensive study provides evidence that suggest that 
countries which rely on natural resource exports receive a smaller economic 
return from educational investments than equivalent investments in other coun-
tries (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2010: 112). The Middle East and North 
Africa region, for example, experiences the lowest rate of return for educational 
investments in the globe.2
 With respect to promoting economic growth, universities are also often asso-
ciated with stimulating the agglomeration of scientific and technical workers 
who cluster in those regions where economic innovation is most dynamic. These 
empirical observations, however, do not necessarily prove the validity of the 
specific claims of human capital theory. This is because the actual direction of 
causation is not clear. Is higher education improving the prospects for growth or 
is growth causing the expansion of higher education?
 A further ambiguity in human capital theory is that the actual higher educa-
tion systems we observe are normally not structured to maximize economic 
growth. One common finding in the economic development literature, for 
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example, is that many societies systematically under- invest in primary education 
and over- invest in the tertiary sector. An efficient allocation of investment funds 
across educational levels should lead to an equal social rate of return across all 
sectors (primary, secondary and tertiary).3 Economists measure rates of return by 
estimating the increases in income generated by educating future workers with 
respect to the public and private costs associated with creating and maintaining 
these educational institutions (Psacharopolous and Patrinos, 2010).
 As we pointed out earlier in this chapter, increases in income can accrue to 
those who receive the education and to those who receive higher incomes as a 
result of the presence of more highly educated and productive workers. Thus, it 
is by no means easy to determine the correct level of net benefits caused by 
investments in education. Nevertheless, most studies of returns from education 
have reached similar conclusions. Primary education normally generates the 
highest rate of return, followed by secondary education, which is, in turn, fol-
lowed by tertiary education. This implies that there is a stronger case for the 
public funding of basic education of children than there is for the more advanced 
education of young adults, and that there is a bias in favor of the professional- 
managerial class when governments allocate educational expenses.4 It is 
important to note that this analysis does not necessarily imply that public funding 
for tertiary education should be cut. On the other hand, it does suggest that the 
expansion of this type of funding should be associated with an even greater com-
mitment to the financial support of elementary and high schools.
 An additional resource allocation issue concerns the choice of degrees by uni-
versity students. A common complaint throughout the world is that too many 
students choose liberal arts majors rather than specializing in STEM (Science, 
Technology, Engineering and Mathematics) degrees. One might expect that the 
problem of students choosing the “wrong” degree concentration would correct 
itself over time. The higher incomes offered by technical occupations would 
overcome students’ desires to take less mathematically demanding subjects. In 
reality, this adjustment to market signals seems to be glacial. In the first place, 
many entry- level college students might be unable to major in applied scientific 
subjects because of inadequate primary and secondary education or a personal 
disinclination to study mathematics and science.5 In the second place, the flow of 
professional workers across national borders can make it less urgent to train indi-
genous scientific personnel. High income societies can recruit talented workers 
from other parts of the world to fill skill gaps, and immigration policy is often 
structured to encourage the recruitment of such workers from the developing 
world (Cervantes and Guelleo, 2014). Even if local workers are available in 
higher income countries, the opportunity to hire workers more willing to accept 
a lower salary is a further impediment to the sort of domestic market- based 
adjustment we have discussed.
 This problem can lead to a global under- investment in scientific training 
within higher education institutions, since poor countries can lose their most tal-
ented students to rich societies, and rich governments can put less funding into 
the scientific training of their best and brightest. Unless there are countervailing 
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factors, economic globalization might not lead to an optimally constructed 
higher education system.
 This critique implies that the actual ways in which higher education is expand-
ing are not completely explained by the requirements for skilled technical workers 
suggested by human capital theory. Given well- documented employment problems 
in the labor market for college- educated workers in many different countries, it 
seems likely that universities and colleges are both more and less than institutions 
that promote the effective expansion of value or the accumulation of capital. They 
are less than servants promoting the maximization of economic growth because 
national education policies and universities do not always produce workers in the 
“correct” mix of skills. They are more than pro- growth capitalist institutions 
because the purposes of the university cannot be limited to the promotion of eco-
nomic growth. As economist Nicholas Barr notes, one key problem associated 
with human capital theory is that we still are unable to measure what good higher 
education is (Barr, 2008). While human capital theory contains important insights, 
we clearly need to go beyond economic theory to understand higher education’s 
actual purposes in contemporary society.
Higher education and the construction of the meritocratic 
nation: a sociological perspective
The last section suggests that human capital theory has an important but limited 
ability to explain the expansion of the university system. While there is undoubt-
edly a strong case to be made for specialized training in order to promote eco-
nomic development and while one can also draw on standard economic theory to 
explain why the state must be involved in organizing and promoting such train-
ing, it does not follow that the university system we observe today efficiently 
produces the trained workers that a modern economy needs (Meyer et al., 2006). 
To be more precise, human capital theory does not seem to have an explanation 
for the mismatch between the occupations available and graduate qualifications 
that universities regularly produce throughout the world.
 One can go back to the beginning of the university system to note that the 
initial purpose of the University of Al- Karaouine in Morocco or Al Azhar Uni-
versity in Egypt or the University of Bologna, the first medieval university of 
Europe, was to train clerics, theologians and legal scholars (CollegeStats.org., 
2009). While this imperative had little to do with developing new productive 
technologies, it had much to do with promoting social and political integration. 
Spreading the same belief systems and state- sponsored legal system throughout 
a political entity can create greater cultural unity and thus had clear political 
utility for political leaders who wished to consolidate a region under their rule. 
Moreover, training highly educated workers who would be able to interpret and 
implement a unified legal system could facilitate the expansion of commercial 
activity and allow some talented students from humble backgrounds to enter into 
the elite. Thus, even the non- scientific universities of this pre- modern period 
could promote economic growth by facilitating the expansion of trade.
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 The mission of the university evolved with the emergence of more secular 
states during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which, based on 
the “imagined community” of the nation, stimulated an expansive phase of 
higher education formation (Anderson, 1983). Universities began to slowly dis-
tance themselves from their religious foundations, but not their legalistic origins. 
They became locations where professionals like lawyers, doctors, business 
people, scientists and engineers could be trained to build the modern nation and 
economy. This transformation in the university’s mission meant that relying on 
aristocratic and mercantile elites became less and less viable. Modern nation- 
state building required the creation of a meritocratic society of a greater number 
of qualified professionals who could both organize increasingly complex produc-
tion and distribution systems and use rationalist techniques to mediate conflict 
and legitimate new social practices.
 Increasing numbers of individuals who did not have the social legitimacy of 
nobility needed to communicate and cooperate with each other. They needed to 
be accredited as worthy members of an educated elite, and universities were 
uniquely placed to provide this service. Accrediting a graduate’s understanding 
of rationalist methods of inquiry and certifying the acquisition of particular skills 
is not just important for internal national development, but the construction of 
the international economy as well. Higher education both responds to populist 
demands for social mobility within the nation and global demands for the cre-
ation of knowledgeable workers who can communicate effectively with similarly 
trained workers. Thus, higher education promotes both national integration and 
the integration of the nation with its international surroundings even if the skill 
sets produced by this education do not optimize economic growth.
 It is important to note that this analysis suggests that university formation is a 
transnational process. Although the oldest universities in the world began in the 
Arab world and Iran, modern, secular universities first emerged in Europe and 
North America, then spread to other outposts of the advanced capitalist world, such 
as Japan, then moved onto the colonized and semi- colonized periphery, to become 
a truly global phenomenon in our “post- modern,” globalized world. The nation- 
building process did not produce unique higher educational systems, but rather ones 
that are surprisingly similar or isomorphic. “Clearly there are world- wide models 
for higher education, and these models render higher education as essential to the 
successful nation- state. And in fact higher education spreads in rather standardized 
forms where the nation- state system spreads” (Meyer et al., 2006: 15).
 The attraction of this perspective is that the decision to develop higher educa-
tion institutions by the state or elites and the decision by individual families to 
send their sons and daughters to tertiary educational institutions are not just a 
product of economic calculations. Obtaining a university education comes to be 
associated with social legitimation, prestige and the projection of individual 
power. For parents and students, successfully completing a degree signals that 
the graduated student can use high- level symbolic discourse to make their way 
in the professional world. For a government, sponsoring the formation of inter-
nationally recognized educational institutions within one’s territory signals to the 
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global community that the nation or region is able to participate successfully 
in the global economy. For elites, sponsoring a prestigious university confirms 
one’s position in society today and associates one’s name with future genera-
tions of successful professionals. If the human capital framework emphasizes 
the importance of capital accumulation, this perspective on the university as a 
social institution which promotes national and international integration 
emphasizes the importance of communication and display (Veblen, 1899). 
Given the central need to prepare a new professional- managerial class for the 
complexities of a commercial society, it is not surprising that higher education 
might be “too large” from the perspective of human capital theory or that stu-
dents choose those specializations that improve their ability to communicate 
with other members of the elite, rather than enhance their understanding of 
science or engineering.
 This framework also provides an explanation that human capital cannot 
provide for the rise of those disciplines such as music or literature or philosophy 
or sociology that have little to do with improving commodity production. Higher 
education provides a framework for members of the academy to create and com-
municate meaning and purpose for society as a whole. Higher education gives 
legitimacy to those who wish to analyze and critique social structures and social 
practices, and there is no reason to think that such activities are always compat-
ible with the prevailing social order, even if that order helps create the conditions 
that allow the university to prosper.
Higher education and the reproduction of the global 
capitalist order: educational globalization as the extension of 
Western domination
The economic and sociological perspectives outlined in the previous two sec-
tions argue that colleges and universities are institutions that both provide skills 
and social legitimation. They provide credentials that signal to employers and 
others that this graduate is a worthy member of society. Moreover, this assess-
ment does not just depend on the acquisition of particular skills, but also on the 
association of the graduate with a rationalist worldview that facilitates commu-
nications within and across societies. College students throughout the world 
experience the life of studying, reasoning and exploring social and cultural 
limits. This creates a transnational social stratum that can perhaps understand 
each other more easily than they can members of their own society who do not 
gain access to universities. The expansion of university education creates a new 
and powerful mechanism of national and global social differentiation.
 Not only do graduates carry specific knowledge and a general worldview, but 
they also occupy a specific social position as the monitors and managers of the 
key political economic organizations of society. This insight introduces a class 
theoretic and world systems framework inspired by authors such as Marx and 
Wallerstein to our understanding of the purpose and role of university education 
(Ginsburg et al., 1990). The emphasis is not only on the appropriate acquisition 
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of technical and social skills useful for the management of sophisticated produc-
tion and distribution systems, but also on the more difficult to quantify need to 
manage and legitimate the increasingly complex set of hierarchical social pro-
cesses associated with more sophisticated and interconnected economies. More-
over, the meritocratic ideology permits children from the “lower orders” to 
become part of the middle class that manages and enjoys a part of the surplus 
created by an increasingly productive capitalist workforce, which includes 
themselves.
 According to this view, educational institutions in general and higher educa-
tional institutions in particular reproduce and legitimate class structures by facilit-
ating the differentiation of the population. The original class analysis of Bowles 
and Gintis, for example, contrasted the emphasis of teachers of middle class 
schools to foster creativity to the tendency of teachers in working class schools to 
emphasize discipline (Bowles and Gintis, 1977). Within higher education, the 
same could be said of less prestigious colleges and trade schools that concentrate 
on training students for technical occupations, while those higher- order univer-
sities focus on inculcating the more general worldview and symbolic reasoning 
skills necessary for the management and legitimation of the social order.
 When examining higher educational institutions in the Third World or on the 
periphery of the world capitalist system, one can combine world systems theory 
with this class analysis (Wallerstein, 2005). Globalization creates a dynamic in 
which the needs of a developing country are subordinated to the demands of an 
evolving capitalist order. This might not only be true for indigenous production 
processes which are deemed too inefficient or backward to compete effectively 
within the world economy, but also for national educational institutions that do 
not teach in the appropriate language or resist the offering of Western degree 
programs or disdain the use of Western expert consultants.
 Not only does this dynamic mean that universities organize themselves in a 
similar manner, but also that the actual education content becomes more and 
more similar. The point is not to maximize national economic welfare or even 
economic growth, but to insert a nation more effectively into the world system 
of capitalist production by creating a similarly educated, but subordinated, tech-
nocratic elite.
 Theories that legitimate higher education because it enhances human capital 
actually relegate national educational institutions to “consumers status in the 
global knowledge economy” (Collins and Rhoads, 2009: 186) and perpetuate 
their dependence on the West rather than transform them into producers of 
emancipatory knowledge.6 As Olssen and Peters argue: 
The premise of knowledge as capital . . . universalizes policies and obscures 
country and regional differences. It also denies the capacity of local tradi-
tions, institutions and cultural values to mediate, negotiate, reinterpret and 
transmute the dominant model of globalization and the emergent form of 
knowledge capitalism on which it is based. 
(Olssen and Peters, 2005: 330)
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The Marxist/world systems critique of human capital theory carries within it a 
claim that higher education should not exist to serve the dominant political eco-
nomic order.
 This critique of actually existing higher education institutions as a tool for 
intensified political economic subordination to the global capitalist order has 
important policy implications. Fagerlind and Saha (1989) discuss how the 
success of investment in education depends on the objectives it sets for itself. 
When outcomes are evaluated in terms of instrumental goals, such as preparing 
the citizen to be economically more productive, data may be interpreted as sup-
porting the achievement of these goals. However, when education is assessed in 
terms of knowledge production, values and attitudes consistent with a nation’s 
strategic aspirations, the results are open to debate (Pennycook, 2000). Others 
argue that educational reforms sometimes serve “a new form of western imperi-
alism that has as its purpose the incorporation of populations within the formerly 
called ‘Second and ‘Third worlds’ into a regime of global government” to yield 
“docile” populations (Tikly, 2004: 173).
Higher education, the disinterested pursuit of knowledge and 
the creation of more capable global citizens
Less radical discussions of the place of higher education would not accept this 
critique of higher education. Nevertheless, there are many advocates for the 
expansion of higher education who similarly argue that higher education is good 
in and of itself because it is a location where emancipatory knowledge and truth 
can be produced. Indeed, it is claimed that the intellectual practices of higher 
education should be spread to society as a whole so that critical thinking and a 
commitment to rationalist discourse becomes pervasive.7 Students (and espe-
cially advanced graduate students) are supposed to absorb an ethos that stresses 
the disinterested pursuit of knowledge, the sharing of research findings with the 
rest of the academic community, the extensive and detailed use of references to 
acknowledge the work of other scholars, and the adherence to rigorous standards 
of proof that include the use of logic and evidence to validate one’s arguments. 
Finding the truth is, within the academy, the ultimate goal motivating academic 
workers, and the highest academic awards are received by those scholars and 
intellectuals who are judged to be the most rigorous and original researchers in 
their fields. Moreover, higher institutions that receive the highest ranks normally 
include those scholars who do the most high- profile research, whether or not 
these investigations promote economic growth, facilitate national integration, or 
more effectively respond to the needs of the global economy.
 An educational institution that promotes the disinterested pursuit of know-
ledge often fits uneasily within the established order.8 A wide range of fields in 
the liberal arts do not directly facilitate commodity production, directly support 
the development of technocratic professional classes, or legitimate current struc-
tures of global inequality and class differentiation. While a majority of pro-
fessors are not particularly politically engaged, the culture of academic freedom 
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means that it is expected that institutions will protect and tolerate those scholars 
who provide political, social or cultural critiques of the world around them.9 Stu-
dents, as well, often take advantage of their new- found autonomy to embrace 
ideas and movements which place them in opposition to the status quo. Thus, we 
often observe the paradoxical protests of students who – as a result of their 
higher education – are likely as adults to become part of the elite against whom 
they struggle.
 A good case can be made that this idealized picture of academic culture has 
never really existed and is, in any event, under threat by globalization (we will 
be exploring these issues in future chapters). Nevertheless, it is also the case that 
the culture of the academy we have outlined still influences the practices of con-
temporary universities and colleges. The argument for the promotion of liberal 
arts and critical thinking can be justified either as a necessary general investment 
for the production of skilled labor, or as a necessary step in creating more 
capable, intelligent and moral citizens who can affect change in their own soci-
eties and have deeper appreciation of what it means to be human. These different 
perspectives do not necessarily contradict each other, but they are not identical. 
The human capital approach, for example, argues for the more perfect integra-
tion of the university into the global capitalist system, while this humanist altern-
ative asserts that the university makes its own independent contribution to social 
welfare that does not necessarily contribute to the maintenance of our present 
economic system.
 Any analysis and evaluation of higher education reforms should take note of 
the fact that there is often no universal consensus over the purpose of higher 
education. Whatever its goals and intentions, it is likely that a revivified higher 
education system will produce “outputs” that were not intended by the reform-
ers. Training a larger number of professional workers, for example, who can 
innovate and fulfill the demands of a modern society might also inadvertently 
produce a core of “non- productive” critical thinkers who have the ability both to 
contribute to and to destabilize a society. For these scholars, the function of 
higher education is not to allow students to become more productive workers or 
legitimate their social standing or consolidate and stabilize an unequal national 
and global order. Rather, the practices of higher education are seen as encourag-
ing social practices of rational scholarship that are good in and of themselves. 
The production of competent students and rigorous creative investigations into 
all realms of the natural and social world needs no extrinsic justification.
A brief conclusion
These different explanations of the purposes of higher education suggest that 
universities and colleges remain contested terrains throughout the world, since 
government officials, business interests, advisors in international organizations, 
university administrators, faculty, students and parents all attempt to impose 
their contradictory visions on the inevitably embattled academic institution. The 
struggle over the future of the university will take different forms in different 
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parts of the world. Thus, we postpone our discussion of this issue until we 
analyze more deeply the particular of these alternative explanations of higher 
education’s purpose in the Arabian Gulf context.
 What is clear, however, is that – despite the inevitable controversies – social 
support for the continued expansion of higher education remains strong. Having a 
robust system of universities and colleges is associated with a prosperous, well- 
ordered society; a dynamic, technologically advanced economy; and a more crea-
tive, fulfilled population. On the one hand, these ambitious expectations place 
unreasonable political pressures on all academic institutions. On the other hand, 
these desires for a good society do not signal a disenchantment with college educa-
tion, but rather a desire for its continual restructuring and expansion.
Notes
1 Thomas Piketty in his recent work, Capital in the Twenty- First Century (2014), argues 
that human capital is distinct from capital since the ownership of human skills cannot 
be transferred in the same way that physical and financial assets can. This alerts us to 
the possibility that students acquire knowledge for a variety of reasons, some of which 
are not based on market- based cost–benefit analysis.
2 This might not be related to natural resource abundance, but instead to poor quality 
investments and dysfunctional job markets for college graduates.
3 The most recent data from Psacharopoulos and Patrinos tells us that the social rate of 
return for primary education was 18.9 percent; for secondary school completion, 13.1 
percent, and for tertiary or higher education, 10.8 percent (Psacharopoulos and Patri-
nos, 2010).
4 As Psacharopoulos and Patrinos note, “The degree of public subsidization increases 
with the level of education, which has regressive income distribution implications” 
(Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2010: 112).
5 This is not just a matter of lacking mathematical skills. A bigger problem is the cre-
ation of mass science phobia amongst young students. It is common, for example, for 
young Emirati adults to claim that they (the national Arab population) are bad in 
science, while Asians are better. This opinion is especially pronounced in women, who 
have somehow been made to think they are not smart enough to do well in these sub-
jects. This argument is based on one of the author’s personal encounters with students 
while teaching at Zayed University.
6 See review of this research perspective in Tikly (2004); Ensor (2004); Fagerlind and 
Saha (1989); Farrell and Fenwick (2007); and Olssen and Peters (2005).
7 There are many authors who make this argument, and the political visions of the 
authors who maintain that universities should promote rigorous discourses which 
promote virtue and scientific rigor are wide- ranging. See Bloom (2008), Bok (2003) 
and Aronowitz (2000) for conservative, corporate liberal and radical versions of this 
humanistic argument.
8 Many academic administrators are very aware of the conflict between the promotion of 
commercialized knowledge and the development of general knowledge that is often 
critical of the social and cultural order (see Stein, 2004). Recent studies suggest that the 
higher education institutions in the United States are becoming more influenced by 
commercial imperatives. See Slaughter and Rhoades (2004), Aronowitz (2000) and 
Rhoads and Carlos (2006).
9 Pierre Bourdieu was particularly well known for championing those academics who 
used their analytic powers to critique the political economic order being created by glo-
balization (see Bourdieu, 2003).
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3 Globalization of education and 
the GCC
This chapter has two purposes. In Part I, we define more precisely what we mean by 
the globalization of higher education. We examine whether or not there are intensify-
ing international flows of students and academic personnel in the present period, and 
whether or not higher educational institutions or practices are becoming more 
uniform throughout the world. These investigations allow us to engage in more spe-
cific regional comparisons as well as to consider more precisely the role of the West 
and the United States in particular, in this globalization process. In Part II, we demon-
strate that the GCC region’s universities and colleges have become unusually extra-
verted and that American and Commonwealth higher education institutions are 
important drivers of this educational opening to the West. We conclude by explaining 
why the GCC has placed so much emphasis on Western- oriented educational reform.
Part I: conceptualizing and describing the global 
globalization of higher education
The international growth of higher education and globalization
The presence of common global conditions promoting the growth of higher 
education does not necessarily imply that tertiary education is becoming glo-
balized. We need to carefully consider what we mean by educational globaliza-
tion and how we might measure this phenomenon. When we use the phrase 
globalization of education, we are referring to at least two processes:
1 The increasing intensity in the flow of students, faculty and educational 
administrators across international borders.
2 The tendency for this commerce to create similar educational institutions 
through:
a the adoption of Western models of higher education as benchmarks; and
b the acceptance of Western quality assessment standards to measure 
educational outputs.
The assumption that that the intensifying flow of students and faculty must lead 
to social homogenization is similar to the claims of postwar modernization 
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theory as well as Marx and Engel’s prediction in The Communist Manifesto that 
the chaotic and violent rise of European capitalism would create “a world after 
[Europe’s] own image” (Marx and Engels, 1969). Thomas Friedman has more 
recently celebrated this hypothesis with his pronouncement that “The world is 
flat” (Friedman, 2007).
 These dramatic, sweeping hypotheses can both clarify and obscure. On the 
one hand, our discussion of the different social scientific frameworks that explain 
the global rise of tertiary education revealed that administrators overseeing the 
establishment of new universities and colleges will normally attempt to replicate 
the policies and practices of successful higher educational establishments that 
already exist. On the other hand, the decision to allow the creation of new higher 
education institutions is always political. Colleges and universities cannot exist 
without the approval and regulation of the state, and it would be surprising if the 
structures and processes that organize political life had no effect on the educa-
tional practices of the university. Global forces might explain the expansion of 
higher education throughout the world, but they do not by themselves explain 
the institutional characteristics of the actually existing universities and colleges 
in each region of the world.
Have international exchanges of students and academics intensified?
We begin this discussion by considering intensified international educational 
exchange globally. This phrase refers to changes in the share of students and 
other academic personnel moving across borders in order to receive or provide 
educational services. Given the enormous growth in the number of college stu-
dents in all parts of the world, we would expect that there would be more inter-
national students and more faculty and administrators working in countries that 
are not their own. There are three possible scenarios we could consider: growth 
and global educational introversion; growth and global education extraversion; 
and growth and globally neutral growth. The first category refers to the possib-
ility that higher educational growth is associated with a decline in the share of 
students and academics participating in academic institutions outside their 
country. The second refers to the possibility that internal educational growth is 
associated with an increase in the share of “globalizing students and academics.” 
Finally, globally neutral higher educational growth describes a situation in which 
the numbers of students and academics studying and working in institutions 
outside the country expands at a similar rate to the domestic growth of colleges 
and universities.1 All of these scenarios are plausible. Higher education enroll-
ment could be growing so rapidly in some countries that the share of students 
able to be absorbed in external exchange programs actually declines. On the 
other hand, it may be that the creation of new institutions is intimately connected 
to the establishment of international educational alliances that facilitate the flow 
of a higher proportion of students and faculty across borders. Expansion, 
however, does not necessarily mean that the flows of students and academic per-
sonnel are intensifying. To examine this question, we examine whether or not 
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there is an increasing proportion of students and academics attending and 
working for foreign academic institutions.
Students’ and academics’ mobility
There are no comprehensive data sets that track the movements of academic per-
sonnel across national borders. On the other hand, UNESCO does collect 
considerable information on the movements of students. The overall results on 
student mobility suggest that higher education growth has been globally neutral. 
As the UNESCO Global Education Digest of 2009 states:
The global outbound mobility ratio was 1.8%. This means that approxi-
mately 2 out of every 100 tertiary students left their home countries to study. 
Moreover, this figure has barely changed since 1999 (1.9%). So, despite the 
dramatic rise in absolute numbers, the global share of mobile students has 
largely remained the same. Globally, student mobility has kept apace with 
student enrolment.
(UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2009: 37)
This broad measure of international student mobility is interesting, but mislead-
ing. Certain sectors of the world have experienced introverted growth; others 
continue on an extraverted path; and the overall conclusion of neutral growth is 
partly a result of changes in national borders that make international mobility 
seem greater than it actually is. When we disaggregate the world, the neutral 
growth regions are North America, East Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and 
the Caribbean, and East and Central Europe. On the other hand, more extraverted 
growth has taken place in Central Asia, sub- Saharan Africa, and the Arab world. 
Finally, Western Europe has been experiencing introverted higher education 
growth.2
 The data also reveal two other important trends. Increasing numbers of 
women are becoming internationally mobile students, and a higher share of this 
mobility is taking place within a region, as opposed to across regions. With 
respect to gender, women represent nearly half of all internationally mobile stu-
dents. With respect to international mobility within a region, two trends stand 
out. A large proportion of mobile Central Asian students are receiving their 
education within the Russian Federation, while increasing numbers of Chinese 
students are attending tertiary institutions in the region: Australia, New Zealand 
and Japan. This has meant that the share of mobile students coming to the United 
States has declined from about one- fourth of the total to one- fifth over the past 
decade (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2009: 36–48). In the Central Asian 
case, we might label this false or misleading educational globalization since 
presumably this movement of students across new international borders mimics 
the borderless flow of students during the Soviet era. On the other hand, the 
Arabian Peninsula in particular is associated with increasing the relative numbers 
of college students crossing borders to pursue higher education. The GCC, as we 
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shall demonstrate, likely possesses the most globally extraverted higher educa-
tional system in the world.
The globalization of institutions
It is difficult to investigate empirically the evolution of educational institutions, 
since the questions we are asking tend not to generate quantitative or numerical 
information. Despite this problem, it is still possible to determine if:
• Higher educational institutions from the advanced capitalist world are 
increasingly establishing cross- border presences.
• Higher education institutions are increasingly subject to common methods 
of assessment.
• Academic curricula are becoming more homogeneous.
• English is becoming a common language of instruction.
• A global corps of administrators and professors largely trained in the 
advanced capitalist world has emerged to run colleges and universities in a 
similar way.
• Personnel policies and academic governance have become more similar.
Indeed, describing and analyzing the institutional details of educational globali-
zation can give us a much better sense of the ways in which international inter-
connections are and are not being constructed. Our goal in this section is to 
provide a general commentary on international trends in order to situate educa-
tional developments in the Gulf in the appropriate global context. We list in 
Table 3.1 a list of the key methods of cross- border collaboration that can influ-
ence and potentially make uniform global educational practices.
The cross- border presence of Western universities and colleges
We begin by considering the cross- border presence of universities and colleges. 
Futao Huang provides a useful categorization scheme to guide our consideration 
of this issue (Huang, 2007).
 According to Huang, colleges and universities can establish online learning 
programs, academic partnerships with local institutions, franchise arrangements 
and/or branch campuses. Online programs, until recently, were delivered by the 
less prestigious for- profit sector of Western European and North American 
universities and had limited academic credibility. The rise of Massive Open 
Online Courses (MOOCS) and the offering of online degree programs by estab-
lished Western universities is a phenomenon that is too recent for us to discuss 
in this volume. For this reason, we will only focus on the creation of cross- 
border academic partnerships, including the establishment of branch campuses.
 What is most common is the establishment of academic partnerships, which 
range from support in curricular development, to assistance in overseeing admin-
istrative operations and the hiring of academic personnel, to the development of 
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degree programs closely identified with the prestigious foreign institution. For 
example, Huang describes the development of joint degree programs in China 
where the growth is substantial by stating:
At present, the transnational programs that are provided by foreign institu-
tions in China consist of two types: non degree- conferring programs and 
degree programs leading to degrees of foreign universities or universities of 
Hong Kong (a special administrative district of China). For example, in 
1995, there were only two joint programs that could lead to foreign degrees; 
by 2004, the number of joint programs provided in Chinese higher educa-
tion institutions in collaboration with foreign partners had reached 745, and 
by June 2004 joint programs qualified to award degrees in foreign or Hong 
Kong universities amounted to 169.
(Huang, 2007: 427)
Huang points out that these joint programs have mainly linked prestigious 
Western institutions with the most well- known state universities in China. While 
there are some science and engineering programs, the greatest number of these 
endeavors has focused on professional academic programs in business and man-
agement in order to “prepare professionals for work in multinational corpora-
tions or firms engaged in international commerce” (Huang, 2007: 428).
 The explosion of joint academic programs in China and elsewhere in the 
region combined with the increasing numbers of students documented above 
means that a larger share of students in Asia and, as we shall see, in the Gulf are 
being exposed to common academic programs (Naidoo, 2009). What is even 
Table 3.1 Categorizing cross-border collaboration
Types of cross-border collaboration Specific policy
Facilitating mobility Teacher exchange*
Student exchange**
Assistance in the hiring of faculty
Assistance in the hiring of administrators
Curriculum development General assistance in the development of 
curriculum
Offering of joint courses
Offering bi-national degrees Offering of a degree that carries the name 
of the foreign institution
Permitting a foreign institution to create a 
branch campus that allows all students 
to receive degrees that carry the name of 
the foreign institution
Notes
*  More often than not, professors from the foreign institution travel to the Gulf university or 
college to offer administrative or teaching services rather than the reverse.
**  More often than not, students from the Gulf institutions will travel to the foreign institution to 
take a year of course work or finish degree requirements rather than the reverse.
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more striking is the emergence of national educational strategies that combine 
the encouragement of student mobility and the creation of cooperative arrange-
ments in order to create centers of innovation or “knowledge societies.” These 
trends are most noticeable in China, Malaysia, the small city- states of Singapore 
and Hong Kong, and the GCC.
 Singapore is undoubtedly the leading pioneer of this linkage of higher educa-
tion reform to the restructuring of a region’s economic position in the world 
economy. Knight describes this strategy in the following passage:
The focus on tertiary education is clear as it aims to improve the quality and 
capacity of Singapore’s higher education sector by focusing on three strat-
egies such as inviting and providing financial support for “world class 
universities” to establish programs, research partnerships, and a branch 
campus in Singapore; recruiting 150,000 international students from Asia 
and beyond by 2015, and modernizing the domestic higher education insti-
tutions (HEIs) through international partnerships with elite universities from 
around the world.
(Knight, 2011: 226)
Certainly, the Singapore approach has transformed the city- state’s educational 
system. By 2009, 12 branch campuses had been established and “1,120 cross- 
border educational arrangements were operational” (Knight, 2011: 226).
 This educational hub trend is also clear in Malaysia, although Knight charac-
terizes the Malaysian initiative as a low- rent version of Singapore’s. The devel-
opers of a hub labeled Educity plan to invite eight international universities to 
offer programs in fields such as business, multimedia, engineering, logistics, 
hospitality and medicine. The hope is that Malaysia’s lower- cost education will 
continue to attract large numbers of foreign students, since Malaysia also has a 
reputation for offering educational services that are closely linked to foreign 
educational institutions (Knight, 2011: 226–228).
 Naidoo (2009) shows that for Asia and the Gulf, at least, both the quantity 
and intensity of international educational partnerships are increasing. One can 
also examine this phenomenon from the perspective of the institutions exporting 
educational programs and campuses. In this case, it is also clear that important 
cross- border collaborations are growing most intensively for English- language 
universities and colleges. As Naidoo notes:
Australia is by far the most active exporter of program mobility. With 1,569 
education programs and 37 institutions operating in the program mobility 
landscape, the overall “intensity” of Australia’s activity was 42.4 programs 
per institution, compared with 12.7 programs for U.K.-based institutions. In 
absolute terms, the United States is the third most active exporter of TNHE 
[transnational higher education] programs followed by New Zealand and 
Canada.
(Naidoo, 2009: 322)
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The intense participation of educational institutions in Australia and New 
Zealand highlights the importance of Asia in the construction of cross- border 
educational agreements. As we shall see, many of the Gulf countries have also 
required new universities and colleges to establish collaboration agreements with 
foreign institutions. Many of these arrangements do not receive much attention 
from international observers, but it is clear that they play a key role in the pro-
cesses of accreditation and regulation within the GCC.
The rise of the American university model
The spread of the American university model worldwide is a strong argument 
for cross- border homogenization of higher education. These ventures began in 
the 1860s and intensified after the 1990s. The American- style liberal arts educa-
tion continues to be initiated by political, economic and, in the early stages, reli-
gious elites. On the one hand, the American universities themselves are normally 
independent and thus cannot be characterized as a branch campus of a particular 
university in the United States. On the other hand, most of the overseas 
American- inspired institutions attempt to become accredited by agencies based 
in the United States and are chartered by one of the state governments of the 
United States. A good starting point in investigating the phenomenon of over-
seas American colleges and universities is to turn to the Association of Amer-
ican International Colleges and Universities. Founded in 1971, this body was 
designed to help these institutions to share information that might enhance the 
educational standards and missions of each college and university. The head-
quarters of the Association is presently in Beirut because the President of the 
American University of Beirut (Peter Dorman) currently heads the Association. 
The list of members of the Association gives a good sense of the significance of 
the movement to establish US- inspired higher education institutions (see Table 
3.2). Table 3.2 is not, however, a complete list of all institutions that claim the 
American label since the American University of Kuwait and the American Uni-
versity of Dubai do not belong to this association.
 The list of institutions in this table tells us something about the factors behind 
the recent drive to create American- style liberal arts education. The earliest insti-
tutions (of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries) were often founded by 
Christian organizations. The primary impetus behind this movement was often 
not to proselytize directly, but to create an institution that could provide 
important services to the surrounding community and thereby embed itself in it. 
The two Greek institutions in this list were originally placed in Anatolia and 
relocated to Greece after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, 
the Lebanese institutions and American University in Cairo have survived 
regional and national turmoil and became quite important parts of the region’s 
higher educational systems.
 The second wave of American universities came to Europe after World War 
II. Some institutions were founded to serve US expatriate communities and US 
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study abroad students. By the 1980s, most had established small, but sustainable, 
four- year degree programs and occupy a relatively insignificant niche within 
Western Europe’s well- established higher education system.
 Finally, a new wave of universities and colleges began to appear in the 1990s 
and 2000s. Two universities in Eastern Europe partially funded by George Soros 
and the Open Society Institute established themselves after the fall of Com-
munism. A similar process of educational innovation occurred in Central Asia 
with the establishment of the American University of Armenia and the American 
University of Central Asia (in Kyrgyzstan). Around the same time, several Arab 
countries began to reorganize higher education and permit the establishment of 
private and non- profit institutions. This restructuring process led to the establish-
ment of American- inspired institutions in Morocco, the UAE and Kuwait. 
Finally, there are signs that the American university movement is spreading to 
Afghanistan, Nigeria and the Kurdish area of Iraq. The Afghan and Iraqi cases 
are unique, in that the creation of these institutions intimately involved the 
highest levels of the Bush Administration. The Nigerian story is more typical: a 
well- placed politician used his influence to found the university and called on an 
American institution (in particular, the American University in Washington, DC) 
to help establish the institution.3
 One surprising feature of the American university phenomenon is that the 
Muslim world in general and the Arab world and the GCC region in particular 
seem to be particularly open to this educational innovation. We speculate that 
this connection is largely due to the earlier successes of the American University 
of Beirut (AUB) and the American University in Cairo (AUC). By the 1970s, 
both institutions had established themselves as two of the most elite higher 
education institutions of the region. As a result, wealthy business people and 
government officials interested in educational innovation looked to the AUB and 
AUC as models that could be replicated. The AUB, in particular, has often 
played an important role in supporting regional higher education institutions that 
wish to establish liberal arts educational practices.
The elite branch campus phenomenon
While free- standing universities based on American curricular principles provide 
some evidence of institutional homogenization, one could still argue that these 
institutions create unique and idiosyncratic cultures that do not completely repli-
cate the American experience of education. More recently, however, Gulf coun-
tries in particular, like Singapore, have begun to establish branch campuses of 
American and European institutions, and, in some cases, these institutions are 
required to provide the identical courses of study and the identical regulations so 
that students can claim their degree has the same prestige as the home campus. 
One advantage of this approach, from the point of view of the host country, is 
that the new institutions do not need to undergo intense reviews by national 
authorities. The administration in the home country campus provides the assur-
ances necessary to ensure that a quality education is being provided. Since Qatar 
Globalization of education and the GCC  37
inaugurated this practice in the late 1990s, the elite branch campus movement 
has received quite a lot of attention, even if the actual enrollment of students is 
rather small. The most high- profile additions have been implemented by New 
York University (NYU), which has established campuses in Abu Dhabi and 
Shanghai as well as a series of study away locations for students in this evolving 
NYU global network. It is clear that, in this case, the Gulf has led this globaliza-
tion movement, but it is unclear how significant this development is for global 
education, or even for higher education in the Gulf. We explore these issues in in 
more detail in Chapter 4.
Global rankings and homogenization
Regardless of the model being followed, higher education institutions are trying 
to establish elite centers of knowledge production and dissemination that are 
comparable to their Western counterparts. To achieve this goal, non- Western 
universities willingly subject themselves to Western assessment bodies in order 
to reach a higher global ranking. Securing a place in the top 500 rankings has 
become a major objective that universities are willing to do all it takes to reach 
it. This striving for prestige promotes institutional homogenization. As Margin-
son and van der Wende put it:
Global university rankings have cemented the notion of a world university 
market arranged in a single “league table” for comparative purposes and 
have given a powerful impetus to intranational and international competitive 
pressures in the sector.
(Marginson and van der Wende, 2007: 309)
Important rankings include the Times Higher Education Supplement and the US 
News and World Report. In addition to these Western agencies, Asian institu-
tions such as Shanghai’s Jiao Tong University are taking a leading role in impos-
ing traditional Western standards on their own higher educational systems. GCC 
institutions have recently been active in trying to figure in the top ranked institu-
tions worldwide but so far only two universities in the UAE and two in Saudi 
Arabia figure among the top 500 in the QS top universities rankings (QS, 2013).
Common language, curricula and academics
The combination of increasing cross- border collaborations with the adoption of 
common modes of ranking and accreditation has clear implications for the core 
of the academic project – providing degrees to qualified students who have 
undertaken a structured course of study. Whether it is joint degree programs with 
universities from the United States or the Commonwealth nations or global 
network branch campuses or the drive to obtain Western accreditation, these 
developments have meant that instruction is in English and nearly similar curric-
ula, if not identical ones, are established. Even European universities such as the 
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Sorbonne Abu Dhabi have had to make adjustments to their language of instruc-
tion by offering some degrees in English rather than French. Fouache, the dir-
ector of the Sorbonne Abu Dhabi, declared in response to the question why the 
physics bachelor’s degree was not offered in French: “We are realistic. . . . In the 
field of science there isn’t the market for French” (Swan, 2013).4
 To ensure uniformity and the maintenance of quality, sponsoring Western 
institutions will also lead to the appointment of Western academic administrators 
to oversee these initiatives. Not surprisingly, these chancellors, academic vice 
presidents and deans will hire professors who have received their degrees from 
English- speaking countries. This does not necessarily mean that those hired must 
be citizens of the United States or British Commonwealth nations, but it does 
mean that those hired bring with them the templates and experiences of Western 
academic institutions.5 The global dominance of Western graduate education in 
advanced academic training means that there are large numbers of potential aca-
demic workers on which to draw.
 This analysis suggests that even in the absence of partnerships with Western 
institutions, ranking and accreditation processes can push independent higher educa-
tion institutions in a similar direction. If one institution improves its standing by 
receiving Western accreditation, pressure is placed on competitive institutions to 
adopt similar standards. As we shall see, the spread of Western curricula and English 
language instruction in the GCC has often been promoted by government accredit-
ing boards as well as accreditors usually drawn from the West to accredit programs. 
In many cases Western approval for an academic program or the existence of part-
nership agreements are required before receiving government certification. All of 
these trends provide strong support for the global homogenization hypothesis.
 An important factor driving this phenomenon is the drive to improve one’s 
standing in order to gain access to increasingly scarce funds. The fact that higher 
education spaces are increasing rapidly means that governments and universities 
feel compelled to search for new methods of financing. As Mok puts it:
Educational restructuring and reforms taking place in Asia have been signif-
icantly influenced by the Western public management- oriented doctrines 
and neoliberalist ideologies and practices. Responding to the growing 
impact of globalization, we have found that all our selected Asian states . . . 
have reviewed their education systems and launched reforms along the lines 
of marketization, privatization, and corporatization with intentions to 
improve their governance and management.
(Mok, 2007: 440)
The emergence of new academic centers inevitably creates a new hierarchy of 
higher educational institutions and a decline in the prestige and influence of indi-
genous institutions which are left behind. It might be that the emergence of a 
more privileged, engaged group of faculty in elite colleges and universities is 
purchased by creating an enlarged group of proletarianized academics who have 
fewer rights and more contingent employment.
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 In addition, Mok argues that reforms in the elite institutions put greater 
emphasis on fundraising and getting grants, since governments increasingly 
expect them to be financially self- supporting. Some of Mok’s Chinese academic 
informants viewed these pressures to be “like forcing a gentlewoman to be a 
prostitute” (Mok, 2007: 442). Mok’s analysis tells us that there is an element of 
coercion in the institutional restructuring dynamic we have outlined. Not all 
faculty or students necessarily benefit from the drive to create prestigious, more 
Western- oriented academic programs, and Mok – by suggesting that educational 
internationalization is a polite word for educational imperialism – argues that 
this type of educational restructuring might not be in the national interest as well 
(Mok, 2007: 437).
 Indeed, to the extent that educational globalization increasingly creates stark 
distinctions among colleges and universities in both home and host countries, the 
corporatization process described by Mok implies that the democratic and liberal 
traditions of the academy are not spreading. While the content and language 
medium of college education is becoming more similar, governance and admin-
istrative practices remain diverse. There is little evidence that participatory 
systems of Western academic governance are spreading globally. This global 
homogenization hypothesis may be partially correct, but not in the liberating 
way that its proponents often celebrate.
Part II: the Arab Gulf states in the vanguard of educational 
globalization
The globalization of higher education has affected colleges and universities in most 
of the world’s regions. In this section, we argue that the GCC has played a central 
and unique role in both influencing trends in global higher education and allowing 
its own educational establishments to be transformed by Western educational insti-
tutions. While the number of Gulf university students is relatively small, the trans-
formation of the regional educational landscape has been profound and attracted 
international attention. We document these trends by drawing on a variety of quant-
itative and qualitative sources. Our discussion also places these developments in the 
context of pressures to change higher education in the Arab world as a totality.
Educational reform and the general Arab efforts to create a 
knowledge economy
The expansion and globalization of higher education that we outlined in the 
previous chapter have not occurred spontaneously. As we noted earlier, politics 
plays a crucial role in determining how fast higher education will expand, what 
type of institutions will be created, how universities and colleges will be 
financed, and what types of regulatory environments will be functioning. These 
decisions are interconnected and require a vision of higher education that guides 
policy- makers and takes into account the financial constraints which inevitably 
face any government or potential private funder of tertiary institutions.
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 What is significant about contemporary policy debates about higher education 
is their uniformity. From Barack Obama’s emphasis on creating an enlarged core 
of STEM high- tech workers to the World Bank’s policy pronouncements on 
educational policy, the focus is on constructing universities and colleges that 
serve the alleged economic need for rapid technological change and high levels 
of growth.6 In the Arab world, this ideology was most forcefully articulated in 
the first Arab Human Development Reports and partially adopted by GCC minis-
ters of education.
 Between 2002 and 2005, the UNDP released four highly publicized and con-
troversial documents collectively entitled the Arab Human Development Report. 
Using the framework of the UNDP annual Human Development Report, scholars 
(primarily Arab) assessed the successes and failures of the development policies 
of the region. Included in the general framework of the study was an evaluation 
of the health, living standards and educational status of the Arab population. 
Beyond this empirical exercise, however, lay deeper, political issues: the authors 
wanted to determine if Arabs in the region had the ability to enjoy freedom and 
security so that they could regulate their own political economic destiny. The 
conclusions of these studies were both revolutionary and conservative. The 
volumes were revolutionary because the authors expressed contemptuous disdain 
for the dominant authoritarian and patriarchal cultures of the Arab world. The 
first Arab Human Development Reports clearly favored radical reform. Indeed, 
the authors provided the sort of secular critiques that anticipate the ideologies of 
the Arab Spring a little more than half a decade later. On the other hand, these 
same Arab Human Development Reports were conservative because their points 
of reference were largely the practices and institutions of the United States and 
Western Europe. Arab development would be successful if the governments of 
the region could establish institutions that recreated the conditions that promoted 
dynamic social and economic evolution in the West. Unlike the Arab radicals of 
the colonial and early post- colonial period, these twenty- first century analysts 
largely embraced capitalist globalization and thus called for a deeper integration 
with the political, economic and cultural forces of the West (UNDP, 2002, 2003, 
2004, 2005).
 The analysis of educational reform in the Arab Human Development Reports 
best exemplify the neo- liberal capitalist tendencies of the authors. The first 
report (published in 2002) is subtitled “Creating Opportunities for Future Gener-
ations.” It identifies three shortcomings or gaps in Arab societies that must be 
overcome if human development is to reach its potential. These gaps persist in 
the arenas of:
• freedom;
• the empowerment of women; and
• knowledge.
The first two points clearly challenge contemporary political structures and 
social norms. This is the revolutionary side. Arab societies need to change or 
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radically reform their political regimes, while challenging pervasive male privi-
lege. On the other hand, the same report and the one that immediately follows 
mainly represent the knowledge gap as an economic failure (UNDP, 2002, 
2003). The authors wish to exploit the challenges posed by economic globaliza-
tion to create a more technically competent workforce. They do not stress higher 
education as an experience that fosters the capacity to engage in rational cri-
tiques of the social order or enhancing personal creativity. Rather, the focus is 
on the more effective use of science by an increased number of well- trained 
Arab professional scientists and engineers.
 This concentration on the more effective dissemination and utilization of 
mathematics and science is not new. The first twentieth- century universities of 
the Arab world, such as Cairo University, were well known for their high- quality 
engineering programs (Cairo University, Faculty of Engineering, 2014). The 
authors of the Arab Human Development Report criticize the old Arab socialist 
regimes for focusing on the importation of knowledge without laying the basis 
for the emergence of an internally dynamic scientific infrastructure (UNDP, 
2003: 5–6). This failure was certainly not the intention of the Nasser government 
and others like it (Cochran, 2013). The old policy might not have been success-
ful, but the technocratic focus on building an Arab- centric competence in applied 
science to transform the productive base of society is similar.
 What is different is the vision of how the higher education system should be 
organized. The focus is less on borrowing technology than on borrowing 
Western institutional templates. The authors call for a university system that is 
more autonomous from the state and open to the establishment of private higher 
education institutions which are not structured by the “unregulated profit motive” 
(UNDP, 2002: 61). While vaguely formulated, this apparently means the cre-
ation of independent governance boards for all universities, whether funded by 
the state or not. The members of what American educators would call the Board 
of Trustees or Board of Regents would include representatives from the state, 
business, civil society and academia. Notably absent in this formulation are rep-
resentatives from trade unions, faculty and students. In addition, the authors 
seem to envisage the creation of a non- profit sector of private universities similar 
to what exists in the United States that would be accredited by an independent 
Arab organization that supervises this process.
 It is important to note that, despite the emphasis on the importation of 
Western institutional structures, the authors of the Human Development Report, 
like their Arab nationalist forebearers, emphasize the need to create regional 
solutions to Arab deficiencies. The stress is on regional cooperation and the 
development of curricula and educational methods that unify the region as a cul-
tural whole. For example, while recognizing the importance of developing 
English language competence, the Arab Human Development Report calls for 
the Arabization of science and the aggressive development of translation facili-
ties that will permit the expansion of Arabic language instruction in a wide range 
of technical fields (UNDP, 2003: 7). As we shall see in later chapters, this 
emphasis on developing Arabic as a language of academic discourse differentiates 
42  Globalization of education and the GCC
the authors of these volumes from the actual reform efforts in higher education, 
which, in most other respects, closely follow the recommendations for institu-
tional reform embedded in these reports.
 The chief goal of these reforms is to construct a knowledge society. This 
entails, according to Abdel Latif Yusuff El Hamed – the then Director General 
and Chairman of the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development – “trans-
forming knowledge wealth into knowledge capital in order to generate new 
knowledge” (UNDP, 2003: v). This rather circuitous formulation stresses the 
need to create centers of knowledge production that are tightly integrated with 
expanded and technologically dynamic commodity production within the Arab 
world. The emphasis is on uncovering the commercial applications of science, 
but the authors do not restrict themselves to this domain. Developments in social 
sciences and the humanities – the authors claim – can also lay the basis for sci-
entific advances (UNDP, 2003: 43). What is needed is the creation of a “know-
ledge culture” that embodies “values motivating the acquisition and use of 
knowledge” (UNDP, 2003: 38–39).
 Since the publication of this report in 2003, Gulf societies in particular have 
rhetorically embraced the goal of creating a knowledge society. This is seen as a 
key part of a development strategy that can insert national intellectuals into 
systems of knowledge- based production. The technocratic goal is to create a 
skilled national workforce that can monitor and direct high technology indus-
tries. This requires more than the creation of an appropriate skill set. Perhaps 
more daunting is to overcome a rentier culture which, for understandable 
reasons, does not connect productive effort to the acquisition of high levels of 
income.
 The GCC countries have adopted much of the pro- capitalist focus of the Arab 
Human Development Reports without the potentially revolutionary political cri-
tique. The leaders of every country in the region claim that they are trying to 
create a ‘knowledge society” in which national citizens play a leading role. On 
the other hand, there are inevitable tensions between the Arab Human Develop-
ment Reports’ emphasis on freedom and political openness, and the GCC rulers’ 
emphasis on social solidarity, security and the preservation of cultural identity. 
At about the same time that the first Arab Human Development Reports were 
written, the GCC Ministers of Education released a document entitled the “Com-
prehensive Development of Education in the Gulf Cooperation Council.” While 
recognizing the need to be open to scientific knowledge, the document also 
stresses the need to use education to create “good citizens” who can more effect-
ively participate in the new representative institutions being created in most 
GCC countries. Great importance is placed “on preserving Arabic and Islamic 
identity” that can “enhance the spirit of citizenship in the Council countries’ 
youth” (Gulf Cooperation Council Ministers of Education, 2002).
 The GCC report mixes conservative and radical perspectives in unique ways. 
On the one hand, the openness of youth to the worldwide web is decried for its 
negative effects on social and cultural developments in the GCC. On the other 
hand, the ministers condemn restrictions on women’s employment and seem to 
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call for the full integration of women into the labor market – without apparently 
realizing that such a development would more radically transform traditional 
society than any other measure. It is worth noting that despite this rhetoric, most 
universities are gender segregated and thus perpetuate cultural taboos that restrict 
women’s ability to participate in the labor force and society at large.
 Less attention is paid in the Arab Human Development Reports and the GCC 
Ministers of Education document to financial issues. Nevertheless, they are real, 
even in the wealthy oil- producing countries. The emphasis on the creation of 
alternative institutional models in the Arab Human Development Report pro-
vides a way for governments to commit themselves to the radical restructuring 
of higher education without funding all these new endeavors. By suggesting the 
use of private funding to create autonomous, non- profit universities and colleges, 
the way is open to break from complete reliance on the state sector and, as we 
shall see, permit the rise of for- profit tertiary educational institutions as well. 
This focus on the knowledge economy and the creation of a private or non- state 
sector of higher education prepares the way for the GCC to adopt Western insti-
tutional templates that intensify the integration of local universities and colleges 
with their counterparts in the Western English- speaking world.
Expansion in university enrollment and the increasing international 
mobility of students in the Gulf
The policy shift toward the promotion of Western- oriented higher educational 
reforms is closely connected to the rapid growth of GCC higher education. Over 
the past 15 years, enrollment in Gulf colleges and universities has expanded sub-
stantially in nearly all countries. (Incomplete Kuwaiti data suggest that this 
nation’s tertiary educational experience might be something of an outlier.) 
Attendance in Qatar’s colleges and universities has expanded most slowly, but 
even in this case, enrollment figures have nearly doubled. The United Arab 
Emirates represents the other end of the spectrum with increases in the tertiary 
level student population of more than four times (from approximately 21,000 in 
1999 to about 122,000 in 2012). Even the lower income small countries of the 
region – Oman and Bahrain – have seen substantial increases in college- level 
education. Bahrain’s enrollment figures have nearly tripled, while Oman’s have 
more than doubled. Finally, Saudi Arabia stands apart because of the much 
greater number of young adults studying in its higher educational institutions. In 
13 years the capacity of universities and colleges increased from 372,000 to 
1,206,000 (see Table 3.3).
 This expansion has generally affected both male and female students. In 
recent years, there seems to be a slightly more rapid increase in the numbers of 
male tertiary students attending colleges and universities in the GCC, but 
women’s presence in higher education remains relatively higher than male parti-
cipation in most countries. In Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE women are a 
clear majority of university students, while in Saudi Arabia and Oman, they 
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feminization of the university student body, as the percentage of women students 
has increased from 41 to 50 percent, in Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the share of 
women in universities and colleges has declined. Between 1999 and 2012 the 
percentage of female students fell7 from 72 to 65 percent in Qatar and from 54 to 
49 percent in Saudi Arabia.
 The rapid expansion of higher education in the GCC has been accompanied 
by the unusually higher international mobility of students in most GCC coun-
tries. While the outward mobility of college students is not a new trend for the 
region, the increasing numbers of non- national students attending universities 
and colleges within the region does represent a significant change. In terms of 
the outward mobility ratio, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar have more than 10 
percent of their college students studying abroad. In the case of Saudi Arabia, 
which has the lowest outward mobility rate, the late King Abdullah’s ambitious 
program promoting college education in the United States has increased the 
outward mobility of Saudi students significantly (from 1.9 to 5.2 percent). For a 
large country with sizeable domestic university establishments, this outward 
mobility figure is unusually high (see Table 3.4).
 When we examine inward mobility data, the high numbers of non- national 
students who are “entering” Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and perhaps Kuwait are 
striking. These data – especially for Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE – represent a 
decision by the authorities to create colleges and universities that cater to large 
numbers of non- national students who live within the country or are temporarily 
immigrating to pursue higher education. The universities and colleges of the 
region are becoming much more diverse and open to the international influences 
that expatriate students bring with them.8
 When we examine the different regions that attract outbound and inbound 
students, we get a more precise picture of the type of intensified student mobility 
that is taking place. The outbound mobility ratios document what most qual-
itative studies have already claimed: that a key part of most of the Gulf ’s coun-
tries’ education policy is to send some of its most talented national students to 
Western institutions for study. While Saudi Arabia and, to a lesser extent, 
Kuwait send many of their nationals to the United States for university study, the 
other GCC states still tend to “export” their students to the United Kingdom. 
This is especially true for Bahrain and Oman (see Table 3.5).
 These data also reveal trends which receive less attention. Jordan is a very 
important destination for students in the Arabian Peninsula, and Jordanian col-
leges and universities have played a significant role in sponsoring and supporting 
degree programs in certain Gulf States. Finally, it is important to note that the 
UAE is an educational location for many students from the GCC region itself. 
Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah have all created tertiary educational institutions 
that attract other Gulf nationals for study.
 It is also interesting to note that if we divide the population into three broad 
segments – students from the GCC, students from South Asia and students from 
other Arab states – we find that the largest numbers of expatriate students comes 
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50 percent smaller. Eighty- four percent of the South Asian students (mainly 
from India and Pakistan) studying in the region are doing so in the United Arab 
Emirates. In the rest of the GCC, most expatriate students are from other GCC 
states or the rest of the Arab world, particularly the countries of the Levant, Iraq 
and Egypt (see Tables 3.6 and 3.7).
 Both outbound and inbound mobility data suggest that all of the states in the 
GCC possess extraverted higher educational systems. Outbound students study 
in disproportionately large numbers in British and American institutions, while 
the UAE, Qatar and Bahrain rely on a large number of non- national students 
Table 3.5 Top five destinations of outward bound student from the Gulf (2012)
Bahrain United Kingdom 1,112
Jordan 673
United Arab Emirates 467
United States 424
Saudi Arabia 269
Kuwait United States 3,605
United Kingdom 1,816
Jordan 1722
United Arab Emirates 963
Bahrain 504





Qatar United Kingdom 1,252
United States 948
United Arab Emirates 330
Jordan 219
India 214





Top five destinations of small GCC states United Kingdom 8,471
United States 7,529
United Arab Emirates 6,946
Jordan 3,693
Australia 1,619





Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics, Data Centre, “Global flow of tertiary level students,” avail-
able at: www.uis.unesco.org/Education/Pages/international-student-flow-viz.aspx (accessed May 22, 
2014).
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Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics, Data Centre, “Global flow of tertiary level students,” avail-
able at: www.uis.unesco.org/Education/Pages/international-student-flow-viz.aspx (accessed May 22, 
2014).
Table 3.7  Regional origin of inbound tertiary education students in the small GCC states 
(2012)
Region Numbers
GCC states  7,628
South Asia 12,397
Other Arab states 24,186
Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics, Data Centre, “Global flow of tertiary level students,” avail-
able at: www.uis.unesco.org/Education/Pages/international-student-flow-viz.aspx (accessed May 22, 
2014).
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from the surrounding region for their enrollments. The inbound mobility data for 
Saudi Arabia and Oman are relatively low, and we do not have enough reliable 
information to make any claims about Kuwait. The large movements of students 
across national borders also place pressures on universities and colleges through-
out the region to implement common educational practices and standards. We 
explore this issue in Chapter 6, which we devote to the issue of accreditation.
Part III: concluding analysis: the paradoxical context of 
educational globalization in the GCC: economic globalization 
and isolation of national workers
If we take into account the historical context, our findings that GCC colleges and 
universities are unusually influenced by global (or Western) trends in higher 
education is not surprising. None of the nation- states of the Arabian Peninsula 
had any experience with formal education before World War II and the dis-
covery of oil. The United Kingdom was content to leave the social structures of 
the region untouched and impoverished as long as the tribal leaders respected 
British hegemony.
 Given the initial dependence of the GCC on the outside world for its foreign 
exchange from the sale of oil and for the importation of labor and technology, it 
is not surprising that the globalizing patterns we have documented have con-
tinued and indeed intensified. We should, however, note the paradox in this 
finding. It is the historical insularity of the region that is responsible for its con-
temporary openness. Gulf society today is characterized by a tension between a 
sometimes xenophobic attachment to a somewhat invented tradition of cultural 
solidarity and Islamic piety and the drive to achieve complete capitalist 
modernity.
 This contradiction is reinforced by the idiosyncratic workings of the Gulf 
labor market as well as the dynamics of business formation. On the one hand, no 
region in the world has grown more rapidly over the past several decades. On 
the other hand, this growth has been accompanied by an unprecedented isolation 
of the national population from direct participation in and management of the 
capitalist economy. With respect to the labor market, national citizens normally 
work in the state sectors with wages and benefits significantly higher than those 
which similarly qualified private sector workers would receive (Hertog, 2014). 
With respect to business formation, many citizens take advantage of the sponsor-
ship system and laws restricting foreign ownership outside free trade zones to 
become relatively passive partial owners of the many enterprises that have 
formed in the Gulf.9 In addition, the influx of expatriate labor to these businesses 
has allowed many nationals to profit directly from sponsorship fees that workers 
must pay in order to gain access to the labor market. Because these expatriate 
workers are tied to workplaces, this also means that foreign workers are 
employed at a lower wage than an unregulated labor market would produce, and 
this allows national business owners (and foreign owners of local businesses as 
well) to gain further benefits or rents from the Gulf economies.
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 While all countries of the Gulf display these features, it is the richest GCC 
states (Qatar and the UAE) that have the smallest presence of national citizens in 
the private sector. Kuwait, while also wealthy, operates somewhat differently, 
because its citizens play a bigger role in the management of a larger public 
sector. Finally, Saudi Arabian, Bahraini and Omani citizens are much more 
likely to work in the private sector. In the Bahraini case, more nationals are 
private sector workers than public sector workers. In the Saudi case, more than 
60 percent of the total workforce (national and expatriate) is employed in one of 
the largest public sectors in the world (Hertog, 2014).
 The emphasis on educational reform, which extends to the primary and sec-
ondary educational sectors as well, is particularly salient because of the failure 
of governmental efforts to force business owners to hire more national workers. 
While quotas and hiring targets have been imposed in most countries, Hertog 
reports that:
They [hiring quotas] have been difficult to monitor, have led to evasion and 
in some cases corruption between businesses and labor administrations. 
Various forms of “phantom employment” of nationals are widespread across 
the region, and quotas have probably increased the informal employment of 
foreigners.
(Hertog, 2014: 7)
The lesson drawn from this unsuccessful experience has been that quotas have 
failed because nationals do not have the appropriate skills to function effectively 
in a global economy or do not have incentives to do so. Because national citizens 
are unattractive employees (even to citizen business owners), quotas cannot 
force businesses to really use their labor services.
 Despite their differences, all of the GCC governments are uneasy with these 
social arrangements. Drives to “nationalize” the private sector workforce by cre-
ating a new class of private sector national entrepreneurs, scientists, engineers, 
professionals and administrators are the center of each GCC country’s labor 
long- run economic policy. Most of the policy- makers have diagnosed national 
citizens’ lack of participation in capitalist economic life as an input issue. The 
public sector educational system in general and the national university system in 
particular are accused of failing to mold college students into workers who have 
the appropriate technical, social and linguistic skills. By creating a competitive 
higher education system, it is hoped that both the new colleges and universities 
and the older public universities will be able to produce a well- trained workforce 
of technicians who are competent in English and creative, critical thinkers. In 
other words, the answer to the pressures of economic globalization is more glo-
balization in the education sector.
 This analysis certainly has its persuasive aspects. It is the case that many 
national citizens have poor technical and work skills when they complete their 
formal education. On the other hand, most analysts who have studied this 
problem believe that the problem is deeper than “getting the education system 
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right.” On the demand side, many business owners (national and expatriate) 
would rather hire foreign workers who command lower wages and are easier to 
control through the sponsorship system. On the supply side, many national 
citizens prefer to work in a less onerous environment for higher incomes. To use 
economic jargon, the “reservation wage” of nationals is too high from the per-
spective of private sector employers.10 This means that national workers are 
unwilling to accept a job below a certain wage. The richer the country, the higher 
the reservation wage will be.
 Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia have higher private sector participation 
because per capita income is lower in these countries and thus the reservation 
wage is lower. Moreover, because these countries are poorer in terms of per 
capita income, there is a greater economic concern about the long- term costs of 
continuing to rely on expatriate workers, who export a lot of their income to 
their home country in the form of remittances and who, more importantly, 
acquire job skills through private sector work that cannot be attained by nation-
als in these three countries. Thus, these three countries have most aggressively 
pursued policies that will nationalize the workforce.
 Changing the wage gap between private- sector expatriate workers and public- 
sector national workers could, in principle, be accomplished by taxing private 
sector employers who hire expatriate workers, providing subsidies to employers 
who hire national workers, and both lowering the wage of public sector workers 
and cutting back on employment by the government. All of these measures are 
difficult to implement politically, except perhaps providing subsidies. Unfortu-
nately, in the absence of reforms in the public sector, efforts to increase private 
sector wages and benefits for national workers are likely to be costly and not 
entirely successful.11
 Given these political economic difficulties, even more pressure is placed on 
the educational system to produce high- skilled, creative national citizen workers. 
The hope is that by exposing the youth of the Gulf to Western educational prac-
tices and the English language that they will become attractive and eager 
employees. This instrumentalist view of higher educational reform is not unique 
to the GCC. Many countries (especially in the Arab world) worry about the skills 
and quality of the workforce that higher educational institutions are attempting 
to create. On the other hand, the GCC is unusual. No other region of the world 
faces the peculiar problems of economic isolation of national citizens that we 
have outlined in this section. As we have documented, this has led to reform 
efforts that have created a globally extraverted higher education system. Whether 
or not these reforms have been successful or are sustainable is one of the key 
issues we examine in the rest of this book.
Notes
 1 Even these measures cannot completely capture the complexity of the educational 
globalization dynamic. It might be that some institutions within a country are globally 
extraverted, while others are introverted. We will argue later that this extraverted and 
introverted combination exists within some Gulf higher educational systems.
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 2 Between 1999 and 2007, the outbound mobility ratio rose by 1.1 percentage points in 
Central Asia, followed by 0.8 percentage points in sub- Saharan Africa, 0.5 percentage 
points in the Arab states and 0.4 points in South and West Asia. In contrast, the ratio 
fell by 0.5 percentage points in Western Europe over the same period (UNESCO 
Institute for Statistics, 2009: 37).
 3 The American University in Washington, DC has no direct governance connection to 
any American university outside the United States. On the other hand, it has recently 
participated actively in helping the American University of Sharjah and American 
University of Nigeria establish themselves. This was done under the direction of an 
entrepreneurial president (Ben Ladner). His departure has led American University to 
partially withdraw from this aggressive international posture.
 4 The only exception to this trend of establishing academic programs in English that we 
could find is the attempt of the Sorbonne in Abu Dhabi to offer a course of study in 
French.
 5 See for example this sentence in calls for applications for faculty positions at an 
American university in the GCC region: “As a university formed on American 
models, [name of university] will give priority to candidates who have substantial 
experience in American models of higher education.”
 6 This is not the place to question in detail the hegemonic emphasis on the need to have 
an ever expanding economy as measured by GDP per capita. However, it is not clear 
to us that constant increase in material abundance is a realistic policy goal – espe-
cially in the advanced capitalist world. The growth imperative of capitalism should 
not be confused with the ever- present need of complex societies to constantly evolve 
in the face of new social and environmental challenges.
 7 The definition of inward mobility makes it more difficult to interpret these numbers. 
UNESCO defines a student as being internally mobile if he or she attends a higher 
education institution but does not have permanent status. Thus, this increase of inward 
mobility can take place if students who have lived most of their life in the region 
attend university but do not have permanent resident status.
 8 Many of the small businesses in the GCC economies are operated and partially owned 
by expatriate business people. However, in most cases, national citizens must have 
majority ownership in all businesses located outside the free trade zones. In many 
cases, nationals receive a majority ownership share and a pre- arranged share of profits 
in return for sponsoring the small business.
 9 The term reservation wage refers to the minimum wage that workers will accept in 
order to enter a particular job.
10 Hertog notes that most subsidization schemes last for a limited duration. At that point, 
private sector employers are supposed to raise the wages of national citizens. This 
makes such policies much less attractive, especially since employers have no ability 
to prevent citizens from migrating to other sectors in search of higher wages and more 
comfortable working conditions.
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1993 marks the beginning of private higher education experimentation in the 
GCC, and, not surprisingly, the first innovations occurred in Dubai. During this 
year, the Australian University of Wollongong established a campus that offered 
English language courses and later undergraduate degree programs in business 
and information technology. Two years later, the American University of Dubai 
(AUD) opened its doors. Although now independent, the AUD was originally a 
branch campus of little- known American College in Atlanta, Georgia. The estab-
lishment of these relatively small, business and technology- oriented universities 
had four important characteristics that served as benchmarks for many of the 
private colleges and universities that would soon emerge in the region.
1 The University of Wollongong of Dubai (UOWD) and the AUD were 
originally connected to home universities in Western countries.
2 Instruction was wholly in English, rather than Arabic.
3 The UOWD and the AUD both offered gender- integrated classes and 
developed small campuses that (whether planned or not) encouraged the 
social intermingling of men and women, a first in the region.
4 Expatriate students (primarily from South Asia or other Arab countries) 
could earn a Western- recognized degree within Dubai, and this could be 
used to obtain professional employment either within or outside the region.
From these small beginnings in Western- oriented experimentation, the private 
higher education system has boomed since the 1990s. In the seven emirates of 
the UAE alone, there were 113 colleges and universities in 2013 (Bhanyani, 
2013). Some of these private institutions are branch campuses and others are 
stand- alone establishments. While the UAE has led the way in the quantitative 
expansion of the higher education sector, every GCC state (including Saudi 
Arabia) has experienced a significant explosion and radical structural transfor-
mations in its tertiary education sector (Swan, 2013b).
 Why have these radical developments occurred in societies that the rest of the 
world often considers “traditional” and “conservative”? The phenomenal economic 
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and social transformation of the region, characterized by the importation of 
advanced technology, sharp increases in living standards, and a population boom of 
expatriate workers and investors,1 created a demand for alternative colleges and 
universities – particularly for the youth of expatriate professional families, since 
national universities were reserved for citizens. These national universities estab-
lished during the early decades of independence (1960s, 1970s and 1980s) were 
also judged by many to be inadequate for the educational needs of GCC societies 
(see Chapter 5). The growing anxiety about the quality of higher education provided 
in the public universities led some rulers to attempt to offer alternative institutions 
of higher education (in the public as well as private sectors) so that talented national 
students could benefit as well.
 This chapter provides an overview of the revolutionary steps taken in priva-
tizing higher education throughout the GCC. To make sense of this flowering of 
educational alternatives, we develop a typology of the different institutions that 
now exist in the region. This will allow us to develop both a clearer historical 
narrative and a framework for assessing the educational viability of the very dif-
ferent colleges and university models that now operate within the GCC.
Classifying the new universities and colleges of the GCC
The new GCC higher educational systems that have emerged are difficult to cat-
egorize, and any effort to classify them risks oversimplification. Attempts to dis-
tinguish them as private and public colleges or for- profit and non- profit 
universities or even branch and independent campuses fail to capture the realities 
on the ground (Heath, 2012).2 For example, the branch campuses of American 
universities are often heavily subsidized by local governments but governed 
from the home campus. Other branch campuses may have a local board of trus-
tees and yet remain loosely connected to their home campus. Independent private 
institutions may be owned privately or by rulers and, in any event, are often indi-
rectly subsidized by the government. For- profit institutions sometimes behave 
more like non- profits, and both non- profit and for- profit colleges operate under 
similar economic stress.
 Despite these ambiguities, we believe that it is necessary to develop a classifi-
cation system so that we can take account for the great heterogeneity in higher 
education that currently exists within the GCC (see Table 4.1). We associate 
these types of higher educational systems with different governments because 
the distinctions we do observe are often a reflection of the educational policies 
pursued by national governments and/or emirates. This does not mean, however, 
that all the institutions that could be classified as following a particular model 
are only located in a specific country or emirate.
The elite branch campus model: Qatar and Abu Dhabi (UAE)
The educational innovation that has attracted the most international attention is 
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Dhabi in the UAE. These are branch campuses invited by the government to 
offer specific academic programs. The government offers generous subsidies in 
terms of capital expenditures by paying for the construction of the campus, its 
maintenance (Lane and Kinser, 2011) and generous scholarship grants to admit-
ted students. We will argue that it is difficult to assess the educational and eco-
nomic benefits that this model bestows on the subsidizing country, as few 
national students are admitted to these branch campuses. Nevertheless, the 
worldwide reputation of the home universities adds prestige and enhances the 
image of the host country/emirate.
Qatar’s Education City: home of the elite branch campuses in the 
state of Qatar
Like its GCC neighbors, Qatari higher education is a fairly recent development. 
Before 1973 Qatar had no higher education institutions and Qataris who wanted 
and could pursue their education beyond high school had to travel abroad. 
Qatar’s first modern university was its national public university, Qatar Univer-
sity (QU). QU opened in 1973 in order to train nationals to lead their country’s 
development projects. By the mid- 1990s, but particularly after the events of 
9/11, Qatar embarked on major reforms of its educational landscape by encour-
aging the establishment of private institutions and initiating reforms of the public 
ones.
 When former Emir Hamad took over from his father as ruler of Qatar in 1995, 
he implemented major reforms in the sectors of health and education to prepare 
future Qatari generations to take over the development of their country (Moini et 
al., 2009). As outlined in Qatar’s National Vision 2030 (World Data on Educa-
tion: Qatar, 2010), the reforms have included human, economic, social and 
environmental development. However, human development is undoubtedly the 
major priority in this vision as it is considered the fuel for progress in the other 
three sectors. This prioritization is manifested in the heavy investment in the 
educational system and the implementation of a series of reforms from the ele-
mentary to the university sectors.
 The reforms were a response to both educational and political considerations 
as well as external pressures. It was believed that the traditional approach to 
learning in the Arab/Muslim world had failed to develop the analytical and crit-
ical thinking skills needed for the twenty- first century economies. In the post 
9/11 United States, there were claims that traditional Muslim schooling tended 
to foster “terrorist tendencies and intolerance” among its graduates (Blanchard, 
2008). The US Congress even passed a law that “requires the Administration to 
submit an annual report to Congress on the efforts of Arab and Muslim countries 
to increase the availability of modern basic education and to close educational 
institutions that promote religious extremism and terrorism” (Blanchard, 
2008: 6).
  To modernize its educational system, the Qatari ruling family invited the 
RAND Corporation to lead its reforms and overhaul the whole educational 
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system, from its content, methodology and administration, to outcomes. As part 
of the reforms, QU, still the only national university in the country, adopted a 
US system of liberal arts education but the more significant step was the estab-
lishment of “Education City,” housing branch campuses of select foreign univer-
sities in Qatar (Lewin, 2008). This resulted in dramatic diversification of the 
educational landscape. Education City, located in Qatar’s capital city, Doha, was 
established in 2000 by the Qatar Foundation for Education, Science, and Com-
munity Development (founded in 1995). Education City is a not- for-profit, semi- 
governmental body headed by the former Emir’s wife, Sheikha Moza Al 
Misnad.3 It hosts several research centers, administrative organizations and 
branch campuses of foreign universities that were carefully selected from leading 
US universities and invited to offer one of their prestigious, specialized degree 
programs in Doha. Education City also houses other institutes that offer voca-
tional and technical training even though they are not formally part of the Educa-
tion City structure. The first branch campuses to open were: Virginia 
Commonwealth University (1998), Weill Cornell Medical College (2001), and 
Texas A&M University (2003). Carnegie Mellon University followed in 2004, 
Georgetown University in 2005 and Northwestern University in 2008 (see Table 
4.2). The European branch campuses of HEC Paris and UCL Qatar opened 
branches in 2011.4
 Each of the branch campuses was selected to offer its “best programs” and is 
expected to maintain the same admission, academic and graduation standards as 
in the home campus. Degrees conferred in Qatar by these branches are supposed 
to be equivalent to the ones conferred at home. Instruction is in English and is 
co- educational. To increase the chances of the best qualified Qatari students to 
access these branch campuses, Qatar Foundation also opened an Academic 
Bridge Program aimed at improving high school graduates skills in English, 
mathematics, computer literacy, and study skills.
 In addition to the foreign campuses, one Qatari institution, the Qatar Faculty 
of Islamic Studies (QFIS), is also housed in Education City since 2007 and 
offers a master’s degree in Islamic studies. Additionally, there are other foreign 
campuses that have opened in Doha since 2002, such as the Canadian Technical 
College, the College of the North Atlantic (replacing a state- run vocational 
college), CHN University of the Netherlands offering bachelor’s degree pro-
grams in hospitality- related fields and in business administration and the Univer-
sity of Calgary which offers a four- year degree program in nursing.
 As part of its 2030 vision, Qatar Foundation launched graduate programs and 
research centers by inviting its branch universities to offer interdisciplinary 
masters’ and PhDs under the new Hammad Bin Khalifa University (HBKU) 
(Mathews, 2013). According to the new university’s provost Dr. David B. Prior, 
the Western branch campuses will be able “to build graduate programs all the 
way to PhD in some areas and . . . to step beyond what they are doing now and 
do things they couldn’t do on their own.” The plan is to build on the strengths of 
the undergraduate programs offered by each of the branch campuses to create 
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 progress as the branch campuses seem to focus on establishing robust BA pro-
grams. As a result, while the response to the proposed integration is generally 
positive, few steps have been implemented toward this goal. In 2013, Sheikh 
Abdulla bin Ali al- Thani, President of HBKU and Vice President of the Qatar 
Foundation, announced that University College London Qatar (UCL Qatar) is the 
first partner university with HBKU offering a Master of Arts in Library and 
Information Studies. He also confirmed that another planned master’s on energy 
resources is planned with three of the Education City campuses (Varghese, 2013) 
where each would cover particular aspects of the program. The three branch cam-
puses to be involved in these graduate programs are Texas A&M which would 
cover technical subjects, Georgetown University would provide political subjects, 
and HEC Paris would cover the business field. It is hoped that HBKU will integ-
rate the different branch campuses into new units of graduate instruction, where 
each will function as an independent department of the new university. Presently, 
HBKU’s website lists five graduate colleges without specific mention of partner-
ships with the existing branch campuses. These colleges include the College of 
Sciences, Engineering and Technology, the College of Humanities and Social Sci-
ences, the College of Law and Public Policy, the College of Public Health, the 
College of Business and the Qatar Faculty of Islamic Studies (QFIS).
 The difficulty of establishing these MA and PhD programs is indicative of the 
limited cooperation between the elite branch campuses even at the undergradu-
ate level. In principle, cross- registration in some select courses is possible to 
fulfill home degree requirements. For example, it is possible for a Texas A&M 
University, Qatar (TAMUQ) engineering student to register for an art class at 
Virginia Commonwealth or a political science course at Georgetown University 
(Tamar, 2008). However, in practice this cross- registration is problematic due to 
scheduling conflicts and heavy requirements by each home university (Texas 
A&M University at Qatar).
 In terms of numbers, Education City seems to have already exceeded expec-
tations by 2013. The number of students enrolled in the various campuses 
reached the 2,500 student population targeted for 2015 and expects to go beyond 
4,500 by 2020 (Mathews, 2013). But as Table 4.2 shows, the overall number of 
students in each branch campus remains relatively low except for vocational 
institutions such as the College of North Atlantic. Even more significant is the 
percentage of Qataris, which is publicly unknown, but is not likely to exceed a 
third of total enrollments (Mathews, 2013). Such low numbers raise questions 
about the long- term sustainability of these branch campuses independently of the 
heavy government subsidization. Many Qatari students choose to benefit from 
the availability of the Hamad Bin Khalifa and Tamim Bin Hamad scholarships 
for study abroad in pre- designated disciplines selected by the Supreme Educa-
tional Council (SEC) instead of studying at home.
 Even though Education City sets minimum quotas of Qatari nationals to be 
admitted to the branch campuses, the quotas cannot be enforced in all campuses 
because of variations in the demand for the discipline being offered and the skill 
set required for entry. For example, TAMUQ has the highest proportion of Qatari 
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students because of the high demand for engineers in local companies and a better 
preparation in math in Qatari high schools. This compares to WCMCQ (Weill- 
Cornell Medical College- Qatar) which has the lowest proportion of Qatari stu-
dents, given the skills required and the length of study in medicine. The majority 
of the students in the six campuses are children of expatriate residents and around 
10 percent come as foreign students specifically to join these universities.
 While one of the major goals of Education City is to offer quality education to 
Qatari students, improving high school graduates’ competencies to meet admission 
requirements remains a major challenge that limits their access. In addition to 
major reforms going on at the pre- university level to raise students’ competencies, 
some branch campuses such as Georgetown University, Qatar are offering pre- 
college summer programs (Georgetown Pre-College Summer (GPS)) for high school 
graduates to improve their reading, writing and research skills in order to prepare 
them for university study. The program also covers mathematics and economics 
and provides a practical preparation for Scholastic Assessment Test (SAT) exams 
(School students in Qatar prepared for university life by Georgetown, 2013).
 Other challenges relate to cultural norms and political culture differences 
between the branch campuses and the Qatari context. So far, the foreign univer-
sities have been able to evade many questions such as cultural taboos, govern-
ance, university autonomy, and pay inequality based on origin of expatriates. 
They usually justify some of the concessions they have had to make in terms of 
academic freedom by pointing out that universities are “subject to the laws of 
the land, and the laws here are somewhat different in some areas,” as stated by 
David Prior, HBKU provost when he was asked about the extent to which 
universities can criticize the government. In fact, lack of freedom is often men-
tioned by academics in the home campuses as a costly compromise in return for 
important financial backing from the Qatari government. Provost Prior explained 
that: “One has to be sensitive to the political and social environment in which 
one lives,” and that “Academic freedom is in the eye of the beholder. There are 
different political contexts in which universities have to work” (Mathews, 2013).
 A major achievement worth pointing out is the apparent success of providing 
gender- integrated university instruction. In all GCC countries gender segregation 
in education is the norm, but each of the six branch campuses is able to offer co- 
educational education. This constitutes a major break with tradition. Male and 
female students attend mixed classes and collaborate in all subjects except in the 
physical education classes that remain segregated.
 In the area of governance, all branch campuses follow the US home 
campus but some have local boards where local members from Qatar Founda-
tion and business leaders participate. For example, Texas A&M University at 
Qatar established its Joint Advisory Board (JAB) in 2003. The board provides 
advice regarding the management and operation of Texas A&M at Qatar to 
the dean and to the Qatar Foundation. The JAB represents an attempt to build 
a prestigious local body that “is responsible for the ongoing review and evalu-
ation of the success of Texas A&M at Qatar” (Texas A&M University at 
Qatar website).
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 The private universities that have opened in Education City and elsewhere in 
Doha, Qatar, have undeniably brought choice and increased opportunities in 
higher education for Qatari students. The Qatar Foundation, the sponsor of the 
Education City project, sought to not only provide quantity but quality in higher 
education by inviting leading Western universities. The foundation offered these 
institutions generous financial incentives and a great degree of autonomy relative 
to the national institutions. Despite this support, it is not clear that the elite 
branch campuses have sustainable local backing. A survey commissioned by 
Booz & Co. in the GCC countries found that 40 percent of students surveyed in 
Qatar felt that they had no input in the decision- making process relating to their 
education. This exclusion tended to make many of them (21 percent) mistrust 
their education leaders (Missing link in GCC’s education reform strategy, 2013).
 One issue, as Mounira Jamjoom, a senior research associate, noted, is the 
poor output of the rest of the educational system in Qatar and the GCC. Despite 
great strides in education, the national population still suffers from a high rate of 
youth unemployment. The Booz & Co. study attributes the educational short-
comings to: 
lack of well- trained teachers, outdated teaching methods, curricula that are 
neither relevant nor innovative, limited use of technology in the classroom, 
and little in the way of academic advice or career counseling [that] are con-
tributing to the mismatch between the outputs of the GCC’s education 
system and the needs of the employment market. 
(Missing link in GCC’s education reform strategy, 2013)
We will explore the linkages between higher education reforms and labor market 
failings for the national population in Chapter 9.
Abu Dhabi’s prestige branch campuses
Five years after Qatar began Education City and seven years after the first elite 
branch campus was established in Doha, Abu Dhabi Educational Council (ADEC) 
was formed by the emirate’s government “to develop education and educational 
institutions in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, implement innovative educational pol-
icies . . . support educational institutions and staff to achieve the objectives of 
national development in accordance with the highest international standards” 
(About ADEC). As a result of the decisions of ADEC, which enjoyed the 
important backing of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan, the govern-
ment of Abu Dhabi announced that New York University and Paris- Sorbonne Uni-
versity would open campuses that would offer degree programs that are equivalent 
to those of their home campuses. Paris- Sorbonne opened in 2006, while New York 
University began its undergraduate program in the Fall 2010 semester. Each 
branch campus offers specialized degrees in specific disciplines.
 Abu Dhabi’s approach to higher education is similar to the Qatari model 
described above. Both governments offer important financial incentives to high 
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profile universities. ADEC has granted full scholarships to most students joining 
New York University Abu Dhabi (NYUAD), has built modern state- of-the- art 
educational facilities, and provides substantial subsidies toward campus operat-
ing expenses. But, unlike the Qatar Foundation’s policy of requiring that a speci-
fied percentage of the student body (40 percent) of the branch campus’ student 
population be nationals, neither NYUAD nor Paris- Sorbonne University at Abu 
Dhabi (PSUAD) are under such a restriction. As a result, the otherwise diverse 
student body is almost completely non- national. Indeed, although the NYUAD 
website and promotional materials highlight the diversity of their student body, 
very few Emirati youth are part of this experience.5
 Branch universities position themselves as centers of excellence in education 
and research in the region. They highlight their ties with the home university to 
emphasize the Western brand of education generally associated with prestige and 
status. They also highlight their contribution to the regional economic develop-
ment and their respect of local cultural norms. Both NYUAD and PSUAD 
sponsor annual lecture series that attract large national and non- national audi-
ences from Abu Dhabi. In addition, NYUAD runs a small, intensive annual 
seminar on American politics for approximately 12 students from the three 
federal universities (University of the United Arab Emirates, Zayed University, 
and the Higher Colleges of Technology) that includes a trip to New York City 
and Washington, DC.6
 Despite these outreach efforts, the overwhelming impression one gets from 
reading NYU- Abu Dhabi’s own publicity is that this is an elite undergraduate 
university that exists inside a protected Western bubble that separates it from the 
rest of Abu Dhabi and the UAE. The recent move to the newly built campus on 
Saadiyat Island outside of the city center further accentuates this separation 
(Dight, 2014). Students are recruited in large part from outside the UAE and top 
students are drawn to joining NYUAD by offering them all- expenses-paid 
education and generous international exchange programs. It is true that this sepa-
rate world’s reality is not unique to the education sector. Abu Dhabi and Dubai 
in particular are UAE cities that are known for their vibrant expatriate com-
munities and associated entertainment events with little interaction or productive 
contact with Emirati society in general. Still, the creation of a heavily subsidized 
institution of higher education which provides hardly any education services to 
the national population raises the question about the benefits that Abu Dhabi 
receives from this high profile project.
 The other elite university to set up in Abu Dhabi was even more of a gamble. 
The prestigious French Sorbonne University opened a branch campus in 2006 
with 100 students. It offered undergraduate degree programs in arts, social sci-
ences and sciences with French as a medium of instruction (Swan, 2011). Today, 
the Sorbonne has over 600 students, is opening a research center and with the 
collaboration of ADEC is encouraging its graduates to enroll in PhD programs 
in France. It also has had to adapt to the English dominance in the region and 
started offering its degree program in physics in English. Sorbonne leaders 
explain this shift to meeting the needs of the job market for physics teachers and 
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the expansion of the aeronautics industry in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi. The 
Sorbonne AD campus director, Eric Fouache, explained this move by stating that 
“Although students will study physics in English, they will also have to study 
French as their secondary language, keeping them rooted to the French way of 
thinking, culture and language” (Swan, 2013a). INSEAD is another branch 
campus of a French institution. It opened in 2010 and only offers specialized 
graduate education in business.
 One of the major challenges that the elite branch campuses have to face is 
aligning learning outcomes of the branch campus to those in the home univer-
sity. Indeed degree equivalence is one of the attractive features and marketing 
tools branch campuses use to enroll international students. However, there are 
many obstacles that stand in the way of achieving this commitment. The obs-
tacles are both at the level of the students’ academic backgrounds and study skill 
sets they bring with them (see Chapter 5) as well as the faculty. While some 
faculty are on temporary loan from the home campus to the branch campus, most 
are locally hired or specifically hired for the branch campus. These faculty work 
under different employment regulations that offer less security and fewer finan-
cial benefits for those faculty who are recruited locally. In addition, every faculty 
member must teach and do research in a different cultural and political environ-
ment than their colleagues’ experience at the home campus. Finally, locally 
recruited faculty members receive significantly lower financial benefits than 
those who are recruited internationally. All these factors make it difficult to 
really provide an equivalent academic experience. Faculty grievances center on 
inadequate access to research funds, problems of inadequate local governance 
and job security.7 The home campus administrators could not reasonably promise 
to the faculty in Doha the same employment conditions, and this inevitably led 
to tension. None of this suggests that the students of the elite branch campuses 
receive an inferior education when compared to those of the home campus but 
the education is clearly not identical. The data suggest that the students are 
highly qualified, and our interviews indicate that the faculty and administrators 
of these academic outposts are highly motivated as well. Nevertheless, it is also 
the case that the education experience in Doha and Abu Dhabi is different, and 
this might make it difficult to maintain the separate but equal commitments of 
the home institutions and host governments that have sponsored these ambitious 
endeavors. Despite the achievements of the elite branch campuses, it is not clear 
that this model is either sustainable or replicable.
Education malls model: Dubai
We noted in the introductory paragraph of this chapter that Dubai played a 
leading role in the introduction of private universities and colleges into the 
region. However, its approach to educational innovation is quite distinct from 
the more famous innovations of Qatar and Abu Dhabi discussed above. Rather 
than focusing on inviting a few branch campuses from prestigious American or 
European universities and colleges, the Dubai government offers a neo- liberal or 
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relatively laissez- faire space for producing higher education and has been a 
fertile ground for experimenting in the selling and marketing of educational ser-
vices. The emirate provides infrastructure in designated free trade zones and then 
invites universities and colleges to offer their academic programs. This approach 
represents a more deregulated branch campus model that creates a much larger 
number of less prestigious educational products. This is why we call this an 
educational mall approach which fits in the overall economic development plans 
of Dubai.8
 Table 4.3a gives a list of both locally owned campuses and branch campuses 
in Dubai. Private universities vary in terms of which curriculum they choose to 
follow – American, British, UAE/Arab, Russian, Iranian or Indian, to name 
some. There are over 57 branch campuses located in Dubai free zones, Dubai 
Knowledge Village (DKV) and Dubai International Academic City (DIAC). The 
phenomenal increase in the number of private higher education institutions in 
Dubai was encouraged by attractive incentives offered by the TECOM Invest-
ments Company for those industries that establish branches in the ten free zones 
business parks which specialize in five industry clusters (education, information 
and communication technology, media, sciences, and manufacturing and 
logistics) (TECOM Investments, 2013). The Education Cluster (EDC) oversees 
both DIAC and DKV. DKV was the first to open in 2003, followed by DIAC in 
2005 where most branch campuses are located today. DKV presently has 450 
Human Resource and Training Institutes and DIAC houses 21 of the UAE’s 37 
international branch universities in addition to other private and public univer-
sities. These are relatively self- contained educational zones spread over 18 
million square feet. In addition to these two free zones specialized in education 
enterprises, Dubai also encouraged medical schools and finance institutions to 
open up educational branches in corresponding industry free zones such as 
Dubai Healthcare City (DHC) and Dubai International Financial Center (DIFC) 
in 2004. 
 The Dubai branch campuses in the free zones (66 percent of the total institu-
tions offering tertiary education) are set up as private for- profit businesses that 
depend on their revenues for survival. The city of Dubai and TECOM Invest-
ments are also in this business for profit, and several of the educational leaders 
we interviewed stated that the Dubai authorities are primarily interested in their 
rental income. This approach has meant that even well- established educational 
institutions are allowed to fail in Dubai. The 2008 economic downturn, for 
example, led to the closure of an ambitious undergraduate program sponsored by 
Michigan State University. On the other hand, with the new upturn of the 
economy there is an increased demand for education. In its 2011 annual report, 
the Knowledge and Human Development Authority (KHDA) boasts a 10 percent 
increase in student enrollment from October 2010 in 52 tertiary education insti-
tutions. It also notes that the number of Emirati nationals studying in Dubai 
private institutions rose by 11 percent. It is worth stressing that the institutions 
defined by KHDA as tertiary institutions include those only offering post- 
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Dubai, but sometimes have full- time faculty flown in to teach in the Dubai 
campus. Eighteen higher education institutions in Dubai (34 percent) are located 
outside the free zones. All are for- profit institutions and are owned by local busi-
nesses except for the Strathclyde campus (housed in HCT) which is a branch 
campus of Strathclyde UK and offers an MBA in Dubai and Abu Dhabi (KHDA 
Report, 2012).
 Given the rapid change and instability characteristic of the Dubai model, it 
is difficult to report the exact number of private universities nor access precise 
statistics on their student body. The size of the student body and the variety of 
programs offered by these institutions vary a great deal. About half have fewer 
than 300 enrolled students. In October 2011, there were 52 colleges or univer-
sities in Dubai serving 43,212 students (KDHA Report). In addition to the 
educational mall concept, Dubai also has institutions which are privately 
owned and generally affiliated to external institutions such as the University of 
Jazeera (UOJ),9 the largest private university in Dubai with 3,130 students (see 
Table 4.3b). The UOJ offers bachelor’s degrees in four colleges (law and eco-
nomics, business administration, information technology and design, and 
media sciences and communication). The medium of instruction is English in 
most of its programs.
Regulated privatization model: Oman, Bahrain and Kuwait
The other national governments of the GCC have not followed the Qatar/Abu 
Dhabi elite branch campus approach or the Dubai educational mall model. 
Oman, Bahrain and Kuwait have instead chosen to permit the establishment of 
new private universities and colleges under a new regime of enhanced govern-
mental regulation. This has led to a considerable number of private higher educa-
tional institutions that are sponsored by local elites and business groups. In most 
cases, these colleges and universities have also established ties with foreign 
counterparts.
 We begin this account with Oman. This is because the government of Sultan 
Qaboos was the first GCC government to launch policies that permitted the 
establishment of a large number of private colleges and universities to respond 
to greater demand than public universities could accommodate.10 Oman’s 
approach encouraged local entrepreneurs to create independent higher educa-
tional institutions that would be obligated to subject themselves to new forms of 
national regulations. One of the key rules was the requirement that external insti-
tutions had to play a major role in constructing the degree programs that the new 
colleges and universities were offering (Donn and Al Manthri, 2010). This ambi-
tious regulatory initiative attempted to ensure that the new institutions being 
created would follow rigorous rules and procedures developed by Western 
accreditation authorities. Through these reforms, Oman created a market- based 
system of higher education that was designed to increase the ability of the state 
to oversee the academic quality and economic sustainability of the rapidly 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































70  The multi-model approach to privatization
 The growth of this new sector of private education was surprisingly rapid. 
During the first few years of the late 1990s, four colleges were initially established 
in Oman. By 2008–9, however, there were 24 private colleges that provided educa-
tion services to more than 30,000 students (Donn and Al Manthri, 2010). Many of 
the degree programs that have been created are vouched for by the external univer-
sities with which they are associated. The universities are located in the Common-
wealth countries, the United States and non- Western universities such as Jordan, 
Lebanon and India. The curricula are designed to serve the country’s 2020 labor 
market vision by offering diplomas and degree programs in computer sciences, 
engineering, commerce, business, health sciences and English language (Donn and 
Issan, 2007). Most of the institutions listed in Table 4.4 are relatively small with 
less than 2,000 students, and many are limited to providing specialized degrees in 
one field of study such as business or information technology. On the other hand, 
some of the new entrants are universities or colleges which grant both master’s 
and bachelor degrees with more varied curricula in terms of subjects covered and 
in terms of rigor. In addition, these educational reforms have led to the establish-
ment of a series of medically oriented specialized schools that were formed to train 
doctors, nurses and pharmacists.
 Like the early non- state institutions in other GCC countries, instruction is 
largely in English. Classes are open to national citizens and non- citizens alike. 
All classes are sex- segregated, and thus, many of the institutions specialize in 
providing educational services to a male or female student body (Donn and 
Issan, 2007). Unlike Qatar and Abu Dhabi, the British, Jordanian and Indian ter-
tiary institutions tend to have a higher involvement with their partner Omani 
institutions than American institutions.
 An examination of private higher education audits reveals that half of the 
Omani institutions grant degrees that are actually conferred by other institutions. 
However, British institutions are more likely to have this arrangement than Jor-
danian and Indian institutions which also confer degrees in Oman. In some 
cases, only a subset of the total degrees granted by an Omani college is con-
ferred by another institution. In other cases that often involve American univer-
sities, degrees are granted by the Omani institution itself, but state on the degree 
document that the academic program has been partially developed and moni-
tored by a non- Omani institution. For example, Mazoon College states on many 
of its degrees that the college is affiliated with the Missouri University of 
Science and Technology.
The nature of external affiliations
A review of the audit panel reports on the academic arrangements that Omani 
institutions have with non- Omani colleges and universities reveals a variety of 
different relationships (Government of Oman, Oman Academic Accreditation 
Authority, 2014). The most intensive affiliation agreements create a type of 
franchise arrangement, in which the Omani institution agrees to provide a curric-
ulum and course of study that allows the non- Omani higher education institution 
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to grant its own degree. This should imply a very close coordination of the 
courses of study, supervision of examinations and other assessment instruments, 
and the external evaluation of the academic accomplishments of Omani students. 
One would also expect to observe frequent visits of academic personnel between 
campuses as well as the development of student and faculty exchange programs. 
Other looser arrangements are agreements in which the external partner agrees 
to provide advice as a consultant so that the Omani institutions can develop their 
own academic programs. In this case, an external institution will make frequent 
visits to Oman, but the involvement of the rest of the campus in such a program 
is more limited and the time and resource costs are considerably lower. It is less 
likely that the students and faculty will come to know each other or even, in 
some cases, be aware of the affiliation agreement itself.
 The fact that external institutions are closely involved with the academic pro-
grams of the Omani institutions does not mean that each institution in Oman has 
affiliation arrangements of similar quality.11 In general, it appears that the British 
institutions that are involved with Oman devote more time and resources to 
fulfill the requirements of their affiliation agreements. More of the degree pro-
grams are actually conferred by the British partner, and sometimes Omani stu-
dents spend summers of their final year studying in the UK. Such an arrangement 
is not without risks. Several auditing panels mentioned that it was difficult to 
ensure that the Omani students could do the required academic work in English. 
(See Chapter 6 for further discussion on this issue.) Moreover, universities or 
colleges can rarely serve as turnkey institutions, in which an identical curriculum 
is imported into the institutions and taught in exactly the same manner. External 
academic programs need to be given an Omani context, and if they are not, the 
academic capabilities of the institution can suffer.12
 As discussed above in the case of the elite branch model, creating academic 
programs to meet the needs of students in different countries and guaranteeing 
equivalent quality at the same time can be challenging. And, it is clear that in 
some cases, external institutions do not effectively accomplish both of these 
tasks.
 It is clear that not all of the external partnerships have worked well. The inter-
national partner might not devote enough resources to fulfill their part of the 
agreement and the Omani institutions might use this agreement to avoid the hard 
work necessary to build and maintain academic quality and relevance for the 
Omani community around it. There is also some indication that some of the 
more successful institutions are beginning to use these relationships to develop 
their own academic programs. This type of academic Omanization could lead to 
the establishment of more independent, reasonably high quality institutions.
 The burst of experimentation in the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Oman 
did not go unnoticed by the other GCC states. Bahrain’s recent higher education 
experience shares many features with Oman’s. Like Dubai, both countries have 
encouraged the formation of small, for- profit colleges and universities. Also, 
Oman and Bahrain have attempted to ensure quality by implementing a rigorous 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































74  The multi-model approach to privatization
entered into the private higher education arena in the late 1990s after the Univer-
sity of Bahrain reached its capacity and otherwise qualified students were not 
admitted. In addition, the 9/11 attacks increased the demand for higher education 
in Bahrain as Saudi students who might otherwise have gone to the United States 
looked for alternatives. Students from the Eastern provinces of KSA and Kuwait 
saw Bahrain as an attractive destination.
 The decision in 2001 by King Hamad to permit the accreditation of a private 
university, Ahlia University, marks the beginning of the effort to launch the 
private tertiary sector. Planning authorities eventually decided to create an 
educational hub that would lay the basis for a more technologically dynamic 
economy. In 2006, Bahrain announced its intention to create a $1 billion world 
class higher education complex through the Bahrain Economic Development 
Board.13 This initiative was to be jointly financed with the Kuwait Finance and 
Investment Company and led by the reformist Crown Prince, Sheikh Salman bin 
Hamad al Khalifa. It anticipated attracting high quality branch campuses and 
25,000 students to Bahrain. Presently, Bahrain has 17 private universities as 
listed by its embassy in the United States.14 Some of the colleges were founded 
by local investors, while others were sponsored by American, British, Indian and 
Filipino institutions (see Table 4.5).
 Jane Knight (2011) points out that Bahrain appears to be following regional 
rivals like Qatar and the UAE in its effort to create an educational hub, which 
she defines as an effort “to build a critical mass of local and foreign actors – 
including students, education institutions, companies, knowledge industries, 
science and technology centers – who . . . engage in education, training, know-
ledge production, and innovation initiatives” (Knight, 2011: 211). Knight notes 
that this goal would, in the best of circumstances, have been hard to attain, given 
the fact that Bahrain was entering into the higher education innovation business 
relatively late.
 Although the University of Bahrain remains the predominant higher educa-
tion establishment in the country and the dream of creating a dynamic educa-
tional hub remains elusive, the new private sector that has largely emerged in the 
last decade has significantly reshaped university and college education. In the 
first place, it is clear that these relatively small institutions have provided 
expanded openings for students who are primarily interested in business and IT 
degree programs. These students are less likely to be Bahraini nationals, since a 
number of students from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have joined some of these 
colleges. Institutions such as the Birla Institute of Technology, on the other hand, 
mainly attract expatriate South Asian students. Finally, some institutions, such 
as the Royal College of Women or the Arab Open University, recruit students 
who otherwise might be hesitant to join an institution that permits men and 
women to mingle together on campus.
 Like Oman, many of the new Bahraini institutions are for- profit institutions 
that have links to higher education institutions outside the country (Karolak, 
2012). Unlike Oman, there is a higher proportion of branch campuses within 
Bahrain. Five of the 12 institutions listed in Table 4.5 are branch campuses, and 
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nine campuses are privately owned by Bahraini entrepreneurs or business 
groups.15 Despite these differences, the structure of higher education that has 
emerged in Bahrain is thus quite similar to that of Oman’s and very few of these 
colleges and universities could be considered prestigious and their quality has 
come under question. As such they fall short of the Bahraini government’s 2006 
vision of a dynamic educational hub that integrates higher learning with the con-
struction of a dynamic, technologically sophisticated knowledge economy.
 Kuwait also decided to encourage the creation of private higher educational 
institutions under a regime of enhanced regulations that is very similar to Oman 
and Bahrain’s. Despite the aggressive challenges to many of the Bahraini private 
higher education institutions discussed above, the Kuwaiti government issued a 
Private Universities Decree in 2000 that permitted the establishment of higher 
education alternatives to the University of Kuwait. The decree also established 
the Private University Council (PUC) to be in charge of evaluating and licensing 
the academic programs offered by the new colleges and universities. All private 
universities, as in the case of Oman, are supposed to provide a credible affili-
ation of a well- regarded university or college from an OECD nation. Credible 
and well- regarded means that the external institution should be highly ranked 
within its own country, be actively involved in the development of academic 
programs in Kuwait, and provide its own evaluation of any change in academic 
programs that the private university or college with which it is affiliated is 
considering.
 Two new private universities were established soon after these liberalizing 
measures were issued. The Gulf University for Science and Technology (GUST) 
is the first private university in Kuwait. It opened its doors to students during the 
academic year 2002–3. GUST was founded by an alliance of academics from 
Kuwait University and prominent regional businessmen. It offers undergraduate 
degrees through two colleges, the College of Arts and Sciences and the College 
of Business Administration. It also offers a master’s degree in business adminis-
tration. GUST has affiliation agreements with the University of Missouri- St. 
Louis (UMSL) and the Missouri University of Science and Technology. These 
partnerships provide consultancy services on the quality of academic programs, 
staff recruitment and the development of both academic and non- academic 
departments of the new university.
 At around the same time that GUST was established, Shaikha Dana Nasser 
Sabah Al- Ahmed Al- Sabah, who is a prominent member of the Al- Sabah ruling 
family, founded the American University of Kuwait (AUK) based on the Amiri 
Decree #139 in 2003. The AUK was accredited by the PUC, the arm of the Min-
istry of Higher Education in Kuwait in 2006. Dartmouth College in Hanover, 
New Hampshire is the AUK’s international partner (PUC Resolution, 
5/21–2/2005). Based on the 2003 Memorandum of Understanding between the 
two institutions, Dartmouth provides a wide range of administrative and aca-
demic consulting services to the AUK and the two universities collaborate on 
joint projects. The initial agreement was recently renewed for a third time in 
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 According to its provost,16 the AUK offers a liberal arts education modeled 
on the American educational system. Its student body is made up of 70 percent 
Kuwaitis and 30 percent expatriates. Ten percent of the faculty are Kuwaitis, 
while 60 percent are Americans and 10 percent come mainly from Australia, 
Canada, the UK and South Africa. Preference in recruiting faculty is given to 
holders of American terminal degrees. The AUK is made up of two colleges, the 
College of Arts and Sciences and the College of Business and Economics, and 
an English Intensive Program.17
 Both GUST and AUK are for- profit institutions, although it is not clear that 
the investors expect the same rate of return as they would from other more tradi-
tional commercial projects.18 The other institutions listed in Table 4.6 are very 
small. The American University of the Middle East (AUM) is affiliated with 
Purdue University, which assists it in curriculum development, academic and 
administrative affairs, and application of accreditation standards. The AUM is 
also associated with the University of Calgary in Canada to develop the College 
of Medicine and a university hospital.
The semi- private model: Sharjah and elsewhere
While the founding of the new, private colleges and universities began in Dubai 
and Oman, the opening of University City in Sharjah established one of the most 
important education hubs in the UAE and the region both in terms of quality and 
quantity. Dr. Sheikh Sultan bin Muhammad Al- Qasimi, the ruler of Sharjah, an 
Arab nationalist and avid supporter of education and cultural initiatives, fulfilled 
his vision of advancing education opportunities in Sharjah, the UAE and the 
Arab world by sponsoring two new universities, the gender- integrated American 
University of Sharjah (AUS), and the gender- segregated University of Sharjah 
(UoS). Sheikh Sultan’s initiative can best be labelled as an attempt to create 
semi- private institutions since the ruler of the Emirate of Sharjah is the president 
of the two institutions, but administrative authority is delegated to academic 
administrators and the Boards of Trustees that in many ways operate along 
Western educational models. Although the Emirate of Sharjah continues to 
provide important infrastructure support, both universities are supposed to be 
financially self- sustaining. Enrollment is open to all qualified students.
 The AUS was an attempt to create an institution similar to the American Uni-
versity of Beirut and the American University in Cairo, two reputable institu-
tions in the Arab world. As a result, the sheikh decided to contract with the 
American University of Beirut as well as the American University in Washing-
ton, DC to organize and launch this ambitious new project (French, 2010). Other 
universities such as Texas A&M were contracted for the development of the 
college of engineering in AUS. Dr. Sheikh Sultan is the president of the AUS 
Board of Trustees but the day- to-day administrative and academic decisions are 
in the hands of administrators to offer an American- style liberal arts undergradu-
ate program and master’s degrees delivered in its colleges of Arts and Sciences, 
Engineering, Business Administration and Architecture and Design. As an 
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American model institution, English was adopted as its medium of instruction. 
The AUS has one of the highest admission requirements in the region with a 
mean Grade Point Average (GPA) entry of around 90 percent and a Test of 
English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL) score of 550. Its reputation as the 
preeminent higher education institution in the region is widely accepted and it 
has been ranked among the top 430 universities worldwide by Quacquarelli 
Symonds (QS) World Rankings. Its student body is around 6,000 students, 17 
percent of whom are Emiratis. The rest of the students are a combination of other 
GCC nationals, children of expatriate residents and a few international students 
who do not come from the region (AUS website).
 The controversy surrounding the creation of the gender- integrated classroom 
experience in conservative Sharjah was deflected by opening the gender- 
segregated institution, the UoS, nearby. The UoS is the largest institution in Uni-
versity City. It had approximately 11,000 students in 2012. Half of the student 
body are Emiratis, a third are Arab residents and about a third of this group are 
other GCC nationals. Although the UoS curriculum is also based on the Amer-
ican model, some of its colleges are affiliated with Australian and other institu-
tions. English is the medium of instruction in medicine, pharmacy, health 
sciences, sciences, technology and engineering, while Arabic is used in social 
sciences and humanities. The UoS is comprised of separate women’s and men’s 
campuses and comprises 13 colleges. Its medical and health science college and 
university hospital are run in collaboration with Australian and British univer-
sities. The UoS also has a separate fine arts college, a community college and 
campuses in other parts of the Emirate of Sharjah (see Table 4.7).
 Both the AUS and UoS are located in University City, which also houses the 
branches of the federal Higher Colleges of Technology (HCT) Sharjah Men and 
Women campuses, in addition to many other institutes and the Police Academy. 
The Emirate of Sharjah also has other private higher education institutions 
(HEIs) such as the privately owned Skyline College University and other tertiary 
institutions located outside University City such as Abu Dhabi’s Khalifa Univer-
sity Sharjah campus and Troy University. In 2014, the ruler added a new Arabic 
Islamic university, Al Qassimiya University (also known as the Islamic Univer-
sity), to the University City complex. The university will offer majors in media, 
Islamic finance, Arabic studies, economics, Sharia law, engineering and Islamic 
architecture (Gulf News, 2013).
The semi- private institutions of Abu Dhabi
In addition to its high profile flagship branch campuses of NYUAD and the 
Sorbonne AD, the Emirate of Abu Dhabi houses other tertiary institutions that 
are either completely or partially supported by the government of Abu Dhabi 
rather than the UAE’s Ministry of Higher Education. These semi- private or 
public institutions have specific industries and foreign partnerships such as the 
Petroleum Institute (PI) and Masdar Institute of Science and Technology 
(MIST), which are both specialized in energy sciences. The PI was established 
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in 2001 and offers both graduate and undergraduate degrees in engineering with 
a focus on oil industry research. It has several collaborative partnerships with 
companies in the domain, particularly the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company 
(ADNOC) as well as BP, Japan Oil Development Company, Shell and Total 
(The Petroleum Institute website). MIST was established in 2009 in collabora-
tion with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) as its primary partner 
and stakeholder. It offers specializations focusing on renewable energies. “The 
joint partnership [with MIT] extends from collaborative research and develop-
ment of the Institute’s degree programs, to the assessment and recruitment of 
potential faculty, students and senior administration staff ” (Masdar University 
website). MIST is part of Masdar city in Abu Dhabi, which is a large scale 
experiment of a green, zero carbon emissions space within this very energy- 
intensive region. MIST offers graduate programs and has an ambitious R&D 
focus on alternative energies and ecology.
 Other institutions such as Fatima College of Health Sciences and Emirates 
College for Advanced Education provide training in health care and education 
professions. Khalifa University of Science, Technology and Research 
(KUSTAR) was launched by the Abu Dhabi government in 2007. The university 
has partnerships with foreign universities as well as local industries and offers 
both graduate and undergraduate degrees in Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICT), aerospace, transport and logistics, energy and the environ-
ment, health care and security (Khalifa University website).
 Another category of universities in Abu Dhabi is its six private universities, 
four of which are locally owned. These are Abu Dhabi University, Al Hosn Uni-
versity, Al Khawarismi International College and Al Ain University of Science 
and Technology. The other two are the New York Institute of Technology set up 
in 2005 and University of Strathclyde Business School opened in 1995, which 
are the only branches of foreign institutions that are not supported by the gov-
ernment. Like Abu Dhabi, the other emirates, Ajman, Ras Al Khaimah, Umm Al 
Quwayn and Fujairah, have adopted a combination of approaches and offer both 
private and branch universities as listed in Table 4.8.
 The above description of the UAE’s private higher education shows that it is 
difficult to fit all the institutions in clearly defined models. Given its unique 
federal structure, it is not surprising that the educational models followed (from 
elite branch campus to educational mall to regulated privatization to semi- 
private) coexist within this small state. The extraordinary experimentation we 
observe in Sharjah, Dubai and Abu Dhabi makes this country unlike any other in 
the region. Indeed as French (2010: 13) argues: 
The major center for education in the Gulf if not the region, will be the 
UAE. The three leading emirates in this enterprise are Abu Dhabi, Dubai 
and Sharjah. The hallmark of reforms and expansion in all three cases has 
been Americanization but the distinct differences in the models adopted by 
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Concluding thoughts
The Qatar and Abu Dhabi model of allowing elite branch campuses to set up 
academic programs in the Gulf may seem to be very successful because it 
removes the need to impose an extra layer of governmental regulation. The spon-
soring university has a stake in maintaining the prestige of its academic product 
and will therefore ensure that educational quality is protected. After all, such 
programs must involve the sponsoring Western institution in the direct super-
vision of the academic program and staff. While attractive as a short cut to aca-
demic quality, our earlier analysis of Education City in Qatar and NYU in Abu 
Dhabi suggest that such turnkey projects are not automatically suitable for the 
national population (Ross, 2011; Lehman, 2011). In both cases, the academic 
standards of the imported institutions serve to exclude most national students. 
Even more serious is the problem of Western cultural hegemony. An aggressive 
commitment to the superiority of the Georgetown or Texas A&M or NYU way 
of doing things can prevent or prohibit administrators from both making adjust-
ments in the academic curriculum of the branch campus and providing a wel-
coming environment to talented students from the GCC. Paradoxically, the 
demand that the branch campuses provide structurally identical degree programs 
reinforces the tendency to create higher educational institutions that do not 
engage with the bulk of the national population.
 One could argue that these are short- term problems. Eventually, the branch 
campuses will have to embed themselves in the community. However, the ways 
in which the branch campuses have been created can lead one to question this 
optimistic scenario. In the first place, the enormous financial commitment of 
Qatar or Abu Dhabi to these prestige academic products could lead to an unex-
pected retrenchment if economic conditions ever deteriorate in the Gulf. It is 
more likely that more acceptable and less controversial national educational 
institutions will be rescued if budget cuts have to be implemented. In the second 
place, the liberal political economic projects of many of the Gulf rulers are not 
necessarily accepted by all members of the national population or even by all 
members of the ruling families. As we shall see in our analysis of reform of the 
national university systems, policies can change rapidly and unexpectedly in the 
GCC. In such a world, it is important for non- public higher educational institu-
tions to be able to exist relatively autonomously from the state. This requires a 
sound financial footing and some popular support. For that reason, Qatar’s insist-
ence on maintaining a quota for national students within the elite branch cam-
puses may serve these institutions well in the long run.
 The final difficulty with the elite branch campuses is that their existence also 
relies on support in the home campus, and this is often difficult to guarantee. 
Most of the decisions by educational authorities in New York City or London or 
Paris or College Station, Texas are made by high level educational officials 
within the home university with few consultations with the rest of the faculty. 
Thus, most of the faculty and students of the home universities are disconnected 
from the globalizing ambitions of the university leaders and may come to resent 
92  The multi-model approach to privatization
what seems like an unnecessary diversion of precious academic resources. More-
over, since the political environment of the Gulf is very different from that of the 
United States, France or the United Kingdom, it is not difficult to make the case 
that establishing a branch campus in a non- democratic society violates principles 
of academic freedom and integrity (Brooks, 2011).
 Whatever the validity of this argument, the important point here is that the 
sustainability of branch campuses depends on a continued political commitment 
to this project in both the home and host country. It is not at all inconceivable to 
imagine a new president of NYU or some other home institution deciding to cut 
back on international commitments. This will especially be the case if the educa-
tional practices of the home and host campuses gradually begin to diverge. In 
Qatar, the attempt to found integrated graduate programs might signal the weak-
ening of ties between home and host institutions. In both the Education City 
campuses and NYUAD and the Sorbonne, the campuses rely on faculty who 
would not necessarily be hired to teach by the university in the United States, 
United Kingdom or France.19 Our sense is that while the branch campuses cur-
rently provide a high quality educational experience for a largely expatriate 
population, forces will eventually force these campuses to become more inde-
pendent. At that point, the problem of ensuring quality and establishing new 
methods of regulation will reappear.
 If the elite branch campus model potentially suffers from its isolation from 
the national population, the impact of the educational mall, regulated privatiza-
tion and semi- private models we have outlined are much more difficult to 
summarize. The types and quality of the large number of educational institutions 
that have been created through these educational reforms are heterogeneous. 
Some institutions (such as the American University of Sharjah, the University of 
Sharjah, Abu Dhabi University, the British University of Dubai or the Gulf Uni-
versity for Science and Technology) have aggressively attempted to create an 
institution that can offer a diverse number of degree offerings, while others have 
limited themselves to providing less prestigious degrees in business, information 
technology, and other professional vocations.
 The future of these small institutions remains to be seen as the educational 
market reaches saturation and experiences increasing competition. As mentioned 
above, most of these small institutes and colleges have relatively small numbers 
of enrolled students which casts doubt on their financial long- term viability. In 
addition, it is just not clear how many training and vocational institutes are 
needed to serve a relatively small population. There are already signs in Oman, 
for example, that the local labor market cannot absorb all the graduates from ter-
tiary institutes who have started looking for jobs elsewhere in the GCC (Al 
Barwani et al., 2009).
 The difference in academic offerings is reflected in distinct governance and 
ownership structures. The majority of the new colleges and universities are for- 
profit institutions, but the less vocationally oriented, multi- disciplinary institu-
tions have attempted to create robust boards of trustees that are primarily 
charged with ensuring the academic quality of the institution. On the other hand, 
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the smaller, more vocationally oriented colleges are often directly managed by 
owners who have established more hierarchical and less participatory govern-
ance structures. We will explore this issue more fully in Chapter 6, when we 
discuss more systematically what the new regulatory bodies’ investigations of 
the colleges and universities of the GCC reveal about educational quality.
 We close by noting that both the prestigious and less prestigious universities 
of the region do face some common challenges. A major one concerns the aca-
demic preparedness of the high school students who are entering the higher 
educational system. The need to offer academic bridge programs that attempt to 
improve students’ ability to do academic work in English and upgrade basic 
mathematical and information processing competencies has become a necessary 
feature of the reconstituted higher educational landscape of the GCC. One result 
is that the privatization of higher education seems to require the privatization of 
secondary and primary schools, as more elite parents believe that their children 
can attain the English linguistic and academic skills necessary for academic 
success only in private schools. The revolution in higher education we have out-
lined is part of a broader restructuring of the fundamental educational practices 
and social arrangements of Gulf society.
Notes
 1 To reside in some GCC countries, one has to have an employment contract or have 
investment in real estate property in freehold areas or have a business with local 
sponsorship.
 2 Indeed many studies have in fact attempted classifications based on these categoriza-
tions. See, for example, Peter Heath (2012).
 3 Sheikha Moza is the mother of the current Emir of Qatar.
 4 HEC Paris (2011) and UCL Qatar (2011) offer graduate programs only.
 5 It is very difficult to have access to numbers of local students in the elite branch cam-
puses as they are not published, but colleagues we talked to from these campuses 
confirm our assessment that very few nationals are enrolled in them.
 6 When one of the authors of this book went to Qatar to interview for a position as 
Assistant Dean that would oversee faculty development and student outcomes, some 
of the faculty of this Education City campus presented a “manifesto” arguing that they 
should be accorded increased rights and access to resources that their Georgetown 
counterparts already enjoyed.
 7 Dubai’s International Academic City is one of the many industry specific cities which 
are conglomerations of businesses in a particular domain such as Dubai Media City, 
Dubai Internet City, Dubai Heath Care City, Dubai International Financial City, etc. 
Dubai is, of course, famous for its numerous large shopping malls.
 8 All numbers are approximate and vary somewhat from one source to the other. For 
example, the same official KHDA source reports the number of private institutions as 
57 and 52 in different places.
 9 For example, each year there are about 27,000 potential applicants for tertiary educa-
tion, but only about 5,000 can join the national university, Sultan Qaboos University 
(SQU), and the other public technical and vocational colleges.
10 Al Buraimi College, for example, states on every degree that, “This certifies that the 
curriculum of the Al Buraimi University College was developed with the California 
State University, Northridge, USA.” This certainly implies rather close coordination 
between the two institutions, but the audit panel also states that “The Panel was 
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unable to find evidence of how the activities specified in the CSUN agreement expli-
citly guarantee the quality of education.” In contrast, the audit panel of Majan College 
praises the support and quality assurance activities of the University of Bedfordshire.
11 For example, the audit report of the College of Applied Sciences, Nizwa, argues that 
the academic arrangements that all of the public Colleges of Applied Sciences in 
Oman have with the New Zealand Tertiary Education Consortium (NZTEC) led the 
internal academic leadership of the colleges to pay less attention to the development 
of its academic programs. This suggests that one danger of external affiliations is that 
the academic management capabilities of the Omani institutions become stunted.
12 Bahrain’s vision 2030: Launched in 2009, the first National Economic Strategy (NES) 
started the journey toward realizing the aspirations of Bahrain’s Economic Vision 
2030. The second NES 2011–14 continues the journey, responding to the latest chal-
lenges and aligning initiatives with the 2011–12 Budget. During 2011, further pro-
gress was made in continuing Bahrain’s major reform programmes in education, 
health and housing. Annual Report 2011 – Bahrain Economic Development Board. 
Available at: http://45angles.com/clients/edb/aug4/operations_reform.html.
13 The official website (www.mofa.gov.bh/Default.aspx?tabid=7749) lists 17 institutions 
and Wikipedia lists 18 by including Kent Business School where students spend the 
foundation year in Bahrain and go to the home campus in the UK to complete their 
studies (retrieved October 2014).
14 In addition to the institutions listed in the table, one should note that one other private 
higher education institution of long- standing exists in Bahrain. The Bankers Institute 
of Banking and Finance (BIBF<HS>) was originally founded as a vocational training 
center in 1981. Now, BIBF offers a variety of business- oriented degree programs, 
which include graduate and undergraduate degrees sponsored by the University of 
Wales, Bangor, DePaul University and Bentley University.
15 Interview with then AUK Interim Provost on 24 November 2013.
16 The relatively high percentage of Kuwaiti nationals in both the student body and 
faculty is worth noting compared to much lower participation in private universities 
elsewhere.
17 The Sheikha is Executive of the Al- Futooh Investment Company, which has holdings 
in the Kuwait Projects Company, the United Education Company, Syria Gulf Bank, 
and Kuwait Hotels Company. Available at: www.zawya.com/cm/profile.
cfm?companyid=284054.
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5 GCC public universities
Growing pains
Introduction
Although the establishment of the GCC national universities preceded the private 
tertiary revolution discussed in Chapter 4, the transformations undergone by the 
national institutions must be interpreted mainly as a response to the broader trans-
formations taking place in the GCC and are no less revolutionary than the process 
of privatization. In the previous chapters we have demonstrated that the global 
expansion of higher education has had important qualitative and quantitative 
impacts on the educational landscape in the GCC. Not only are the numbers of 
university students growing steadily, but global educational institutions are 
becoming more homogeneous overall. These broad trends are important to 
acknowledge, but should not be used to obscure the fact that the mechanisms that 
govern them are still largely determined by local governments and regional 
market forces. The GCC higher education transformations vary from government 
to government but are all the result of political decisions that are influenced by 
the predominantly welfare nature of the oil- rich states, the demographic composi-
tion of the GCC societies, their adoption of laissez- faire liberalism and their 
ambitious goals to join the “knowledge societies.” This chapter begins by provid-
ing a brief historical background of the birth of public education in the GCC 
before presenting a general overview of the major GCC national universities. This 
chapter will analyze the impact of the higher educational reforms that have trans-
formed most of the GCC national universities in recent years. In addition, we ask 
whether or not these reforms will help governing authorities to achieve their 
stated goals of integrating national workers into the private sector workforce 
while strengthening the Arab- Islamic identity of the GCC.
The rise of the national university
The oil discoveries of the 1930s and the exploitation of their revenues by local 
governments in the 1970s were decisive in transforming the Arabian Gulf region 
from a relatively obscure region and a minor player in Arab world affairs to a 
major force, despite their relatively small sizes and populations compared to 
 traditional power players in the region such as Egypt, Iraq or Syria (before the 
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US invasion of Iraq or the Arab Spring revolutions). In addition to their new- 
found political and economic influence in the region, the GCC countries have 
made it clear that they aspire to become leaders amongst the knowledge- 
producing societies (Al Maktoum, 2006). All GCC governments recognized the 
important role of an educated citizenry to achieve this goal and have invested 
heavily in education in the last four decades.
 Before the advent of its oil wealth, the GCC region had no schools to speak 
of where mosques were almost the only institutions that provided any sort of 
formal literacy and religious education. UNESCO estimates in the 1950s put 
illiteracy rates at more than 90 percent of the Gulf population (Wiseman, 2011).1 
Those few families who could afford it sent their male children to neighboring 
Arab countries, mainly to Egypt, to have an education. The 1960s marked the 
inception of a modern public education system that was developed and imple-
mented by teachers and administrators from other Arab countries, initially from 
Egypt, and later from Iraq, Palestine and Syria. This dependence on non- citizens 
in the educational system continues to this day. While an important number of 
Arabs from across the Arab world still make up the majority of the teaching staff 
and administration, recently GCC countries have turned to experts from the West 
as part of reforming their public educational system.
 Given the origin of the first planners, early public schools and universities in 
the GCC followed mainly the Egyptian educational model in terms of its struc-
ture, curriculum and use of Arabic as the medium of instruction. Enrollments in 
free public universities were reserved to national students only, although 
recently, some foreign students, mainly from Arab nationalities, are being admit-
ted to these public institutions.
 Starting in the second half of the twentieth century, each state established its 
national university. Kuwait University was the first to open its doors in 1966 fol-
lowed in 1973 by Qatar University and the United Arab Emirates University in 
Al- Ain in 1976. The Sultan Qaboos University in Oman and the University of 
Bahrain were established in 1986 (see Table 5.1). Public higher education is free 
for citizens who also enjoy generous government stipends to cover other expen-
ditures such as books and housing.
Table 5.1 The first state universities in the Gulf
Country University Date of establishment
Kuwait Kuwait University 1966
Qatar Qatar University 1973
UAE United Arab Emirates University 1976
Oman Sultan Qaboos University 1986
Bahrain University of Bahrain 1986
Sources: Kuwait: www.kuniv.edu/ku/AboutKU/BriefHistory/index.htm; Qatar: www.qu.edu.qa/the-
university/history.php; UAE: www.uaeu.ac.ae/en/about/; Oman: www.squ.edu.om/tabid/61/lan-
guage/en-US/Default.aspx; Bahrain: www.uob.edu.bh/english/pages.aspx?module=pages&id=2990
&SID=312.
GCC public universities  99
 At their onset, national universities were modeled on their sister Arab institu-
tions and most faculty and administration were also imported from other Arab 
countries. Up until the 1990s they were the only available higher education insti-
tutions in each country. The beginning of the millennium saw a dramatic 
increase in the number of smaller public colleges and institutes primarily 
designed to offer vocational and technical education to meet the need of increas-
ingly larger numbers of high school graduates seeking alternative types of free 
tertiary education. The following sections provide a description of the major 
national universities in each state starting with the earliest public university in 
the region.
Kuwait public higher education institutions
Kuwait was the first to construct a higher education system that is today largely 
controlled by Kuwaitis. Its public university, Kuwait University (KU), was the 
first and became an important institution for students in the whole region. Pres-
ently, KU has 16 undergraduate colleges, from sharia and Islamic studies, to 
engineering, social sciences and the arts. It also offers approximately 25 graduate 
programs (see Table 5.2). Courses of study heavily emphasize the sciences with 
five doctoral programs in mathematics, chemistry, microbiology, physiology and 
pathology. Most of the instruction is in Arabic, and, as with all of Kuwait col-
leges and universities, the actual classes are still sex- segregated, even if the 
common areas in which students congregate and socialize often are not (Calder-
wood, 2009; Sharaf and Ibrahim, 2013). The number of students attending KU is 
around 37,225 as of 2013 (Kuwait University). The majority are female students. 
Depending on the college being applied to, students must have a high school 
GPA between 75 and 85 percent.
 Unlike the rest of the region, a relatively high proportion of professors at KU 
are Kuwaiti citizens with tenure. In an effort to encourage research among 
faculty, the government has created incentives and faculty promotion and 
success depends on successful academic publishing. For example, Kuwaiti aca-
demics are able to get two research sabbaticals during their careers, unlike non- 
nationals who usually can only obtain research funding if they agree to 
collaborate with Kuwaitis.
 A unique feature of KU, compared to others in the region, is the strong tradi-
tion of faculty governance. Kuwaiti academics belong to a faculty union, and 
certain professors are actively involved in monitoring other higher education 
institutions. Unlike any other state university in the region, KU and its faculty 
play an important role in the shaping of the nation’s higher education policy as 
will be described below.
 KU lost its monopoly over higher education in Kuwait when the Emir of 
Kuwait, Jaber al- Ahmed al Sabah, promulgated law no. 34 in 2000. The law per-
mitted the Ministry of Higher Education to license private universities as long as 
the shared capital of the new institutions is more than 50 percent owned by 
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wished to establish a branch campus. As expected, the introduction of private 
universities into the higher education landscape, discussed in Chapter 4, deeply 
affected the public university which had to face this competition by enacting 
several reforms discussed below.
 The State of Kuwait also sponsors other technical and vocational institutions 
which are governed by the Public Authority for Applied Education and Training 
(PAAET) under the Ministry of Higher Education. The PAAET was established 
in 1982 to replace the Technical and Vocational Education Department and insti-
tutes under its umbrella are expected to produce a technically trained workforce 
to respond to the economic and industrial development of the country. They 
focus on vocational education and training in the areas of business, education, 
energy, industry, health sciences, technology, telecommunication and navigation 
leading to certificates for short courses or diplomas at the end of longer two- year 
study programs.
Qatar University
Qatar’s national university (QU), the only national university in Qatar, grew out of 
the College of Education, which was established in 1973. In 1977, responding to a 
growing need for higher education, three new colleges were added (social sci-
ences, science and Islamic studies) leading to what is today Qatar University (see 
Table 5.3). In 1980, QU opened its engineering, business and economics colleges. 
In 2006 a pharmacy program was added which became the College of Pharmacy 
in 2008. From 150 students in 1973 the student body has steadily grown to reach 
over 14,000 students, 65 percent of whom are Qatari nationals, representing 
around one- sixth of the eligible Qatari population (Qatar University).
 QU offers 30 undergraduate programs and 19 master’s degrees. It also offers 
doctoral programs in biological and environmental sciences, engineering and 
pharmacy. The colleges of engineering, science and business and economics use 
English as a medium of instruction while the other colleges have recently 
switched back to Arabic as the medium of instruction.2 All graduate programs 
use English as a medium of instruction with the exception of Arabic and Islamic 
studies master’s degrees. Women make up about 70 percent of the student body 
Table 5.3 Qatar University
Colleges Students enrollments
Qatar University Arts and Sciences




Sharia and Islamic Studies
14,000
Source: Qatar University: www.qu.edu.qa/ (no info about the number of students).
102  GCC public universities
and facilities and classrooms are gender segregated. Five research centers are 
linked to the university: the Scientific Applied Research Center, the Sira and 
Sunna Research Center, the Educational Research Center, the Documentation 
and Humanities Research Center, and the National Center for Economic 
Research. QU is open to Qatari nationals free of charge provided they meet the 
admission requirements set up by each college and based on their performance 
on national standardized examinations at the end of high school. Usually high 
school scores of 70 percent are required in the sciences and 85 percent in phar-
macy, while the other colleges accept an overall high school score of 75 percent.
The UAE’s public higher education institutions
The UAE has three federal institutions (see Table 5.4): the United Arab Emirates 
University (UAEU), which is located in Al Ain, is the flagship university. The 
UAEU was founded by the late Sheikh Zayed in 1976. The Minister of Higher 
Education is its chancellor and presides over a University Council composed of 
other ministers and influential business national leaders and university top 
administrators. The majority of UAEU students are female, with close to 11,000 
compared to 3,000 males in 2013–14. Instruction is gender segregated. The 
UAEU is the highest ranked university in the region. It was ranked 370th in 
2012/13 by QS World University Rankings and in the top 50 young universities. 
The university has nine colleges and offers both undergraduate and graduate 
degrees including PhDs in a wide range of disciplines.
 Two other public institutions were established later by the UAE Ministry of 
Higher Education, the Higher Colleges of Technology (HCT) which were ini-
tially set up as vocational training institutions across the seven emirates making 
up the UAE. HCT is a system of 17 separate campuses for men and women, 
serving around 20,000 students throughout the UAE. It was founded by federal 
decree in 1988. Since then, the mission of the HCT has undergone several 
changes. The goal of the HCT is to provide technical and professional diplomas 
to prepare Emirati students for the job market. Instruction is in English, and this 
requires most students to take one- year foundation in language and math courses 
to prepare them for college- level work. From primarily a two- year vocational 
training institution, the HCT system evolved into offering bachelor degrees and 
some graduate- level classes.
 The third public institution is Zayed University (ZU) with two campuses in 
Abu Dhabi and Dubai. It was established in 1998 based on an American model 
of education. ZU has a University Council that was established by Federal 
Decree No. 11 of 1999. The University Council, equivalent to a Board of Trus-
tees, is headed by the President of the University and must include “at least 
seven UAE citizens well known for their experience, balanced thinking and 
competence to be elected by the Cabinet of Ministers from various sectors of the 
UAE upon nomination by the university president”3 (ZU website, July 16, 2014). 
Although ZU began admitting male students in recent years, there are rumors 
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and the medium of instruction is English in most disciplines. Today, the ZU 
student body (around 7,000) remains almost exclusively female on both 
campuses.
 The three federal institutions offer a variety of undergraduate degree programs 
and a limited number of graduate programs some of which are open to inter-
national students. Starting in 2014 all federal institutions are required to obtain 
institutional accreditation by the Commission on Academic Accreditation estab-
lished by the Ministry of Higher Education (CAA) which until then was only 
required from private institutions (CAA website). The establishment of ZU and 
HCT is part of the grand plan of reforming the public sector of higher education to 
provide public alternative systems of education to national students. In fact, ZU’s 
establishment coincided with the burgeoning of the private universities across the 
GCC and the university’s system mirrors that of many private universities in the 
country. UAE nationals can also obtain scholarships for study at local institutions 
as well as abroad. Recently, there has been an increase of over 7 percent of UAE 
students choosing to study in the United States (Sabry, 2014).
 In addition to the federal national universities, other institutions are funded by 
the government of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi and open to all UAE citizens 
(ADEC website). These include Khalifa University, which is the largest and has 
two campuses, one in Abu Dhabi and one in Sharjah. Others listed in Table 5.5 
are relatively small institutions each specializing in a particular discipline in 
science, medical health sciences, IT, engineering or technology. These institu-
tions are financed by the government of Abu Dhabi either directly or indirectly 
through different government agencies such as ADEC (Abu Dhabi Educational 
Council) or ADNOC (Abu Dhabi National Oil Company). The number of stu-
dents in each of these institutions is relatively small from 600–1,300, although 
not all of these colleges have published enrollment numbers. It is worth noting 
that the ADEC list (see Table 5.5) includes the branch campuses of NYU Abu 
Dhabi, the Sorbonne and INSEAD discussed in Chapter 4. University Moham-
med V- Agdal Abu Dhabi (UM5A-AD) is also a branch campus of a Moroccan 
public university but very little information is available publicly on this arrange-
ment. The other institutions also have partnerships with foreign universities and 
industries in their fields of specialization.
Oman’s public university system
When it opened in 1986, Sultan Qaboos University had five colleges: Medicine, 
engineering, agriculture, education and science. One year later the College of 
Arts was added and since then three more colleges have been established: The 
colleges of commerce and economics in 1993, law (replacing the former college 
of sharia and law) in 2006 and nursing in 2008. The university is designed to 
maintain gender segregation with separate access for females and males and sep-
arate seating arrangements. In addition to its national university, Oman opened 
several institutes listed in Table 5.6. There are five technical industrial colleges, 
one institute of banking and 14 health institutes. Higher education in the public 
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sector is free of charge to all Omani students. Furthermore, the Ministry awards 
scholarships to study abroad to both undergraduate and graduate students. For 
example in the academic year 2011–12, the ministry granted more than 2,700 
scholarships for study abroad (Al Sarmi, 2014).4
 A particularity of Omani higher education lies in its controlling mechanisms. 
In addition to the Ministry of Higher Education, the ministries of health, social 
affairs, labor and vocational training, and the Central Bank of Oman are directly 
responsible for specific institutions as illustrated in Table 5.7 (Al Lamki, 2002). 
The Council of Higher Education established by decree in 1999 oversees all ter-
tiary education institutions and is in charge of developing education policies and 
strategies.
 There are many challenges facing public tertiary education in Oman. The 
duplication of administration, inefficient management and the lack of account-
ability due to the fact that higher education institutions are controlled by three 
ministries, the central bank and two councils is often blamed for unnecessary 
competition over resources and the difficulty to agree on strategies. In addition, 
the decline in revenues from oil has led the Omani government to stress the 
importance of developing well trained citizens to create an alternative economy 
that is less reliant on oil export revenues. However, the expansion has resulted in 
more graduates than the white- collar local job market can absorb. Specialists are 
predicting that the Omani labor market will be unable to absorb all higher educa-
tion graduates and that emigration toward neighboring countries in the GCC will 
increase (Al Lamki, 2002; Al Barwani et al., 2009).
Bahrain’s higher education institutions
The contemporary structure of Bahrain’s higher education system has taken 
shape relatively recently (see Table 5.8). The country’s major public univer-
sity, the University of Bahrain (UoB), was formed in 1986 through the merger 
of the University College of Arts, Science and Education and the Gulf Poly-
technic. These two institutions were originally founded in the late 1960s as 
the Higher Institute for Teachers and the Gulf Technical College. By 2010, 
the University of Bahrain had nine colleges and one professional college 
(Bahrain Teachers College).5 The student body numbered approximately 
18,000 with two- thirds female to one- third male. More than 90 percent of the 
students are Bahraini citizens, and, unlike most other Gulf countries, more 
than 60 percent of the faculty members are nationals as well (Higher Educa-
tion Review Unit, 2010). The dominant position of the UoB has been further 
reinforced by the 2011 decision to merge the independent College of Health 
Sciences with the UoB. The UoB is now directly involved in the training of 
nurses and other health care professionals (College of Health Sciences, Uni-
versity of Bahrain, 2011).
 In addition to sponsoring the aggressive expansion of the UoB, the Bahraini 
government established the more vocationally oriented Bahrain Polytechnic in 
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 technology, information and communications technology, visual design, and 
web media. The number of students who attend the polytechnic is approxi-
mately 1,000. Sixty percent of the students are female (Bahrain Polytechnic 
home page).
 Another institution located in Bahrain but sponsored by all the GCC Minis-
ters of Higher Education is the Arabian Gulf University. It was founded in 
Bahrain in 1981 shortly after the creation of the GCC itself. The original purpose 
of this project was to establish a medical school that would train GCC citizens. 
Since then, the university has modestly expanded to include a College of 
Graduate Studies that focuses on environmental issues and a French Arabian 
Business School in partnership with the well- known French Ecole Superieure 
des Sciences Economiques and Commerciales (ESSEC). Altogether, the Arabian 
Gulf University graduates approximately 250 students every year (Arabian Gulf 
University home page). The university has several chairs endowed by GCC 
Emirs. Given the greater emphasis on formal education in Bahrain during its 
mid- twentieth-century history, it was not surprising that the GCC states would 
choose to locate a regional university in Bahrain rather than in the less educa-
tionally developed countries at that time. By the first decade of this century, 
however, it would be hard to argue that Bahrain is a leading higher education 
innovator in the GCC.
 This overview shows that in most GCC countries the public tertiary system 
has dramatically grown in the last 50 years. The majority female student body in 
all the national universities previewed above may partly be explained by the fact 
the local institutions are not the only option available for students who want to 
pursue higher education. Male students had more opportunities to study abroad. 
GCC citizens could often obtain generous state funding to send their children to 
Western universities as well as other Arab universities abroad. Studying abroad, 
preferably in the United States or the United Kingdom, is generally perceived to 
be a status symbol and more impressive on one’s CV, by students, parents and 
employers (Sabry, 2014). The result is that the well- connected and those with 
higher GPA averages obtained scholarships to pursue university education 
outside the country. This tendency has generally resulted in a two- tier output of 
university graduates in which the national universities products are considered 
less prestigious. Another reason could be that male students opt to work in 
Table 5.7 Oman’s higher education governing bodies
Council of Higher Education All institutes of higher education
University Council Sultan Qaboos University
Ministry of Higher Education Colleges of education and private colleges
Ministry of Health Health institutes
Ministry of Social Affairs, Labor Technical industrial colleges and vocational  
  training
Central Bank of Oman Institute of Banking
Source: Sultan Qaboos University, Ministry of Higher Education, Ministry of Health and Ministry of 
Social Affairs, Labor and Vocational Training (1999). From Al Lamki (2002).
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Table 5.8 Bahrain public HEIs
Institutions Colleges Enrollments
University of Bahrain 
(1986)
College of Arts
College of Business Administration
College of Engineering
College of Information Technology
College of Law
College of Science
College of Applied Studies
Bahrain Teachers College
College of Physical Education and 
Physiotherapy
College of Health Sciences
18,137 (2013)





Engineering Technology (Associate 
Degree) (www.polytechnic.bh/default.
asp?action=category&id=361)
Information and Communications 
Technology (www.polytechnic.bh/
default.asp?action=category&id=51)












College of Medicine and Medical Sciences
College of Graduate Studies
French Arabian Business School
College of Health Sciences 
(1976)
(merged with university of 
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family businesses after high school graduation and the less wealthy ones join the 
military or police training academies.
 The national universities enjoyed a monopoly in the GCC until the end of the 
twentieth century when higher education opened its doors to privatization. Com-
petition with the newcomers exposed major weaknesses and chipped away at the 
prestige of the national universities. In addition, the transformations of the GCC 
economies, the import of large numbers of expatriate workers to lead a rather 
aggressive integration into the global market exposed national universities 
graduates’ inadequate skill sets to join the private sector job market. Govern-
ments reacted by adopting several reforms to raise their profile and improve their 
competitiveness.
Reforming the GCC public university
In the 1980s, increasing criticisms were levelled at the national universities as 
being an anachronism, providing education that was inappropriate for a new 
epoch of economic globalization (Ghabra, 2010). Ghabra was one the first voices 
to call for Western- inspired reform of Kuwait’s and the GCC’s higher education 
systems. He complained about the bureaucracy and lack of innovation within 
Kuwait’s higher education system. Ghabra and Arnold (2007, 3) observed that: 
“Many Arab state- owned universities have been reforming their methods of 
instruction, but this reform has been slow because of the size of the bureau-
cracy.” They claimed that the education provided by Kuwait University did not 
encourage the creation of well- rounded students who could be critical and innov-
ative thinkers and called for the creation of a private co- educational institution 
that would be founded on American liberal arts principles, thus suggesting that 
the creation of a more competitive higher education environment was needed to 
challenge Kuwait University’s monopoly position. In Qatar, Sheikha Mozah, the 
Qatari Emir’s wife (present Emir’s mother) and president of Qatar Foundation 
(QF ), was even more critical in her assessment of Qatar University in 2009. She 
observed that:
In its earlier years, Qatar University had been regarded by many observers 
– both inside and outside Qatar – as one of the better universities in the 
Middle East. By a number of measures, however, the University’s perform-
ance had been deteriorating for several years before the reforms were 
launched. Among the most prominent problems were the lengthening time 
that students required to complete their degree programs and the growing 
fraction of graduating students who did so with very poor grades. Qual-
itative indicators of student engagement also suggested problems – particu-
larly among male students. . . . At the beginning of the reform effort, 
students, faculty, and administrators agreed that no university community 
existed in any meaningful sense.
(Moini et al., 2009)
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Calls for reforming the public education system were coming from all corners. 
International organizations looking into the obstacles facing economic develop-
ment in the Arab world pinpointed serious shortcomings of the educational 
system and its inability to produce human resources capable of leading their 
societies’ development (UNDP, 2003; Galal, 2008; World Bank, 2009). GCC 
governments responded by launching major reforms of the entire educational 
landscape. In addition to opening the higher education landscape to privatiza-
tion, the reforms ranged from establishing additional public universities and col-
leges that offer special market- driven programs, to major curricular, structural 
and administrative changes in the national universities. The reforms share 
common features which include the following:
1 Reforms of national universities through the adoption of American models 
of higher education.
2 Adoption of imported curricula that are not aligned with secondary schools 
outcomes in terms of students’ competencies and socio- cultural backgrounds.
3 A top- down approach based on short- term politico- economic considerations.
4 Implementation of education policies and practices that create universities 
as teaching institutions rather than centers of research.
5 Use of foreign experts who are not organically committed to national 
agendas to lead the reform drive.
6 Utilization of a human capital model approach emphasizing professional 
education at the cost of a more general higher education (see Chapter 3).
7 Adoption of English as a medium of instruction with consequences on 
socio- cultural and economic development (see Chapter 8).
The following sections focus on the first five features of the reforms in the 
“education revolution” outlined above while the other features are discussed 
elsewhere.
Reforms of national universities through the importation of Western 
models
By the beginning of the twenty- first century GCC governments invited inter-
national experts to conduct reforms of public universities that radically trans-
formed them. A “Westernization” wave swept the public universities which 
initially had been established by Arab academics from neighboring countries 
largely based on European models. The reforms implemented across the five 
GCC countries share the following key characteristics. First, Arab (non- national) 
administrators were replaced by Westerners and Western trained staff and 
faculty to transform the public universities into American model institutions. 
Former US university administrators held top positions at the Ministry of Higher 
Education and were in charge of running public universities (Mills, 2008a, 
2008b). They oversaw the design, content and implementation of the reforms. 
The Western experts’ involvement took place through several arrangements, 
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from establishing partnerships with universities from the United States and the 
Commonwealth countries to inviting consulting groups and think- tanks to design 
the reforms.6
 Second, program offerings were aimed at professionalizing higher education 
to prepare graduates for the labor market with a strong focus on business, IT, 
engineering, health sciences and communication programs. To achieve this goal 
the curriculum was modeled on the American system and American and British 
textbooks were adopted. Western trained faculty with experience in teaching 
“the American way” were hired and English became the medium of instruction 
for all subjects that had value in the labor market (see Chapter 8). The UAE and 
Qatar went further by adopting hiring policies that expressed preference for 
American and other Western administrators to lead the reforms. Finally, the 
reforms also introduced a number of steps to ensure quality assurance by creat-
ing national accreditation bodies and applying for external program accreditation 
(discussed in Chapter 6).
 Many of the reforms were motivated by the belief that importing Western 
curricula is expedient given the pressures of globalization and its fast- paced 
challenges. Stakeholders felt that they were in a race against time to join the glo-
balized world and that the most efficacious way to reach development was to 
import the knowledge available from the West. The mission of the university 
was defined as providing professional training to young citizens to serve their 
countries’ fast- paced economic development. It was believed that university 
education should align and link everything it does with national needs by “sup-
porting the business community and the economic development of the country” 
(personal communication, March 2009).
 Another reason often cited as justifying this “Westernization” was the serious 
criticisms levelled against the Arab educational system in the Arab world. 
Drzeniek- Hanouz and Yousef (2007: 8) argued that “aside from quantitative 
targets, the quality of outcomes in tertiary schooling needs to be enhanced to 
reverse the low valuation of educational credentials by the private sector.” As 
we noted in Chapter 3, the Arab Human Development Report identified three 
key areas where progress is lacking. These are “freedom, empowerment of 
women and knowledge” (2002: vii). The World Bank Report on Education in 
the MENA region leveled similar criticisms. To participate in knowledge acqui-
sition and production, higher education should enable its graduates to develop 
critical thinking, problem solving and lifelong learning skills required in the 
twenty- first century global knowledge society through the transplantation of 
Western educational models. Education in the Arab world has often been 
equated with rote learning, outdated teaching methods and a teacher- centered 
approach (Boyle, 2006) that do not enhance citizens’ productive capacities as 
researchers, innovators and producers of knowledge (Bollag, 2006; Mazawi, 
2007).
 The story of QU is particularly instructive. The creation of elite branch cam-
puses open to academically talented national citizens and expatriates did raise 
important questions about the status of QU. Even if the degrees offered by QU 
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would be less prestigious, authorities realized that QU needed to offer a credible 
university educational experience for its students. Government officials recog-
nized that the new branch campuses were too small and their admissions stand-
ards too high to replace QU which must remain as the main educational 
establishment providing university- level education to most national citizens. As 
Sheikha Mozah Al Misnad, President of QF (Moini et al., 2009: xviii) 
recognized:
The Education City branch campuses cannot accommodate – and were 
never intended to accommodate – the large majority of Qatari secondary 
school graduates who sought academically oriented higher education but did 
not qualify for or chose not to attend foreign universities. For these gradu-
ates, Qatar University was the traditional and still most appropriate option.
The rigorous admission criteria of the Education City elite branch campuses 
further exposed the poor quality of education in Qatar and led the government to 
initiate reforms at all levels of the public education system. To reform QU, 
Sheikha Mozah, who heads Education City, commissioned the RAND–Qatar 
Policy Institute (RQPI) “to conduct an in- depth examination of the conditions 
and resources needed to turn Qatar University in a model national university” 
(Moini et al., 2009: xiv). The criticisms levelled at QU were many and were lev-
elled at both its administrative structure and its educational outcomes. The 
RAND assessment found that the university administration was overly bureau-
cratic and failed to provide academic units and faculty with the autonomy neces-
sary to create and operate high quality academic programs. At the same time, the 
university itself was too dependent on budgetary and personnel decisions by the 
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Civil Service Affairs and Housing. The 
result was the worst of both worlds: Excessive centralization of authority com-
bined with arbitrary and chaotic decision- making that was rarely guided by a 
consideration of the university’s needs. With respect to educational outcomes, 
Sheikha Mozah pointed to evidence that QU was failing to graduate students 
with the skills needed in the twenty- first century. To tackle the problem, Qatar’s 
ruler decided to create a Senior Reform Committee (SRC) comprised of Ameri-
can and British experts recruited by the RQPI and selected senior faculty and 
administrators from QU. The SRC was chaired by the president of the university 
and the head of the RQPI project team (Moini et al., 2009: 21).
 The RQPI7 and the Office of Institutional Research and Planning set up by the 
government, with input from other constituencies, performed an evaluation of 
QU, resulting in far- reaching reforms and the formulation of its 2010–13 Stra-
tegic Plan. The SRC (not a decision- making body) submitted its recommenda-
tions to the ruler in June 2004. The plan was to have QU function mainly as an 
undergraduate university focused on teaching. Its objectives were to improve the 
quality of education, the effectiveness of its administration and services and to 
expand its scholarly capacities and service to the community (Qatar University 
website, History). This entailed revising personnel practices that would increase 
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salaries in return for more rigorous faculty evaluation. The report also recom-
mended the establishment of an autonomous Board of Regents that would 
oversee a university administration that granted more autonomy and power to 
academic units. In addition, it advised QU to submit its academic programs to 
Western accreditation. The RAND- led reforms also called for the change of the 
language of instruction from Arabic to English in all social sciences and humani-
ties in addition to the other scientific disciplines already using English. Such a 
change had serious repercussions as the majority of Qatari students could not 
meet the language admission requirements and even those who did were having 
problems in their courses taught in English.
 In order to implement some of the recommendations, supportive faculty were 
selected to create courses of study that would emphasize instruction in English 
and introduce a new assessment process. The reforms required the hiring of 
senior scholars that would increase the visibility and prestige of the university 
but also meant potential loss of job security for Qatari nationals and took away 
substantial budgetary and personnel powers from the Ministry of Finance and 
the Ministry of Civil Service Affairs and Housing. At the academic level, the 
reforms were put in place with little preparation or advance notice of affected 
faculty. The result was considerable confusion. Heads of academic departments 
were generally not prepared to assume their new responsibilities for personnel 
management and budget planning, and the university did not initially have 
resources in place to support the department heads with these responsibilities. 
Some department heads resisted the changes, and personnel policies and budget 
planning were in some disarray during the first academic year of reform imple-
mentation. Qatari faculty who could not teach in English and senior faculty who 
opposed the changes were marginalized. Parents and students protested the new 
standards of GPAs, complaining that these had been imposed without adequate 
warning. And the Faculty Performance Appraisal System had to be revamped 
significantly after pilot testing.
 It seems that resistance to the reforms led to an even speedier attempt to intro-
duce them even if the change came with significant short- term costs. Those who 
wanted to reform QU were clearly aware of the difficulties inherent in moving 
rapidly, but they also saw advantages in doing so. The most significant of these 
was that the rapid pace left little time for opposition to the reforms – within the 
university itself or within the larger community – to become entrenched. These 
“shock and awe” tactics were successful in the sense that almost the entire new 
faculty recruited to QU came with advanced degrees from Western institutions. 
In addition, seeking accreditation of academic programs from British and Amer-
ican organizations has become a feature of QU’s approach to quality control.
 The UAE tertiary public system reforms, although on the surface may appear 
not as profound as QU’s, also went in the same direction. The three federal insti-
tutions had as their president the long- serving Minister of Higher Education for 
the United Arab Emirates – Sheikh Nahyan bin Mubarek al Nahyan – until 2013. 
During his tenure, there was a clear preference for Western- oriented reforms and 
use of English as a medium of instruction. For example, the UAEU, the flagship 
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university of the nation, embarked on changes to its academic programs and 
started using English as a medium of instruction for many of its disciplines by 
the early 2000s. To achieve this end, the minister replaced the university’s Arab 
leadership with American administrators to oversee the transformations of the 
university (Mills, 2008a).
 In addition the federal government added two new tertiary institutions, the 
HCT system and Zayed University for women. The decision to create a voca-
tionally oriented tertiary institution such as the HCT was innovative at the time. 
The HCT opted for English in the delivery of all of its programs and emphasized 
its link to the UAE labor market. The HCT website states that its programs “are 
developed in consultation with leading UAE corporate and governmental 
employers.” Moreover, the establishment of Zayed University (ZU) in 1998 was 
partly in response to criticisms of the UAEU’s educational outcomes and their 
falling short of preparing nationals with the skills needed in the labor market. 
ZU was from its start modeled on the American system and run by American 
leadership. It also adopted English as its medium of instruction in most of its 
colleges. One of its published goals on its website in 2011 clearly stated that it 
will “continue to appoint Western educated and experienced faculty, most of 
whom are native English speakers.”
 While ZU and the HCT campuses were designed to offer programs that were 
complementary rather than directly competitive with the UAEU, the implications 
for the UAEU were clear. It would have been difficult for the first and largest 
federal university to maintain its traditional academic programs and policies 
while the others offered a more “attractive” Western- style education and pro-
moted their adoption of English and use of the latest technologies in teaching. 
The UAEU soon followed the same reforms of Westernization.
 The other three public universities in Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman also took 
similar steps toward the Westernization of the curriculum, quality assurance and 
pedagogy and the use of English to replace Arabic as the language of instruction 
for all scientific subjects. One could speculate as to why the Westernization of 
the administration was not as pronounced in these three nations as it was in the 
UAE or Qatar. Historical factors as well as political considerations may explain 
some of these differences. Bahrain and Kuwait had the oldest educational 
systems in the region and could rely on their own educated citizens to a greater 
extent to administer the university. In Kuwait, there is the further established tra-
dition of the greater political and parliamentary participation of academics who 
have a say in decisions regarding the university.
Backlash against extensive Westernization
The changes in higher education outlined above did not end there. Higher educa-
tion in the GCC has been highly dynamic and in a state of constant flux particu-
larly since the beginning of the second decade of this century. The eroding 
position of public universities in the face of private ones, the reliance on outside 
consultants, administrators, and the marginalization of national academics in the 
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decision- making process of the reforms raised existential questions. A significant 
number of GCC observers, including academics, politicians, education and lan-
guage defenders, and parents, began to worry about the impact of the reforms on 
achieving stated visions for the future direction of their nations and the preserva-
tion of national identity.
 The reforms adopted by public universities to make them into the image of 
American institutions had significant impact on national students’ access to 
higher education. An important percentage of national students saw their chances 
of being admitted to national universities diminished given new admission 
requirements including English proficiency prerequisites. Their chances of 
obtaining scholarships were also jeopardized because of these new requirements. 
Some governments allocated scholarships only to students choosing specific 
majors such as engineering and technology. The reforms also impacted national 
faculties by limiting their participation in the leadership and decision- making 
process of their national educational system. In the society at large, the reforms 
generated mixed feelings and ambivalence about the outcome of the Westerniza-
tion of education on cultural preservation, language and identity.
 On January 24, 2012, the SEC in Qatar reversed a major reform policy and 
decreed that Arabic would return as the medium of instruction in several col-
leges which included the College of Arts and Sciences, the School of Business, 
Law and Sharia and Islamic Studies, International Affairs, Media and Mass 
Communication. It however, maintained English as the medium of instruction in 
the natural sciences, pharmacy and engineering (Lindsey, 2012; Qatar University 
opts for Arabic teaching medium, 2012). Engineering and pharmacy majors with 
low proficiencies in English and/or mathematics must first complete a founda-
tion program (QU Undergraduate Catalog, 2013–14) before they can join their 
college.
 This abrupt shift back to Arabic came with its own challenges in terms of 
requiring new textbooks, curricular changes and faculty reorientations. Faculty 
members that were not competent Arabic speakers in the Arabized disciplines 
had to be shifted to new positions or let go.8 It should be pointed out that these 
reform reversals did not affect the pre- university levels where the use of English 
continues to be expanded and the teaching in and of Arabic has not undergone 
any serious revamping. It would not be surprising if this misalignment between 
policies in pre- university and tertiary education resulted in more mayhem in the 
future and led to new, abruptly implemented reforms (Qatar University opts for 
Arabic teaching medium, 2012).
 Similar misgivings about the Westernization policies in education have been 
expressed across the GCC. In the UAE, the appointment of a new Minister of 
Higher Education by the end of the academic year 2012–13, led to seismic shifts 
in federal higher education institutions. The first move was to abruptly replace 
foreign presidents and provosts with Emiratis. The change in top leaderships also 
brought about change in middle tier administration and administrative processes. 
Within a period of less than a year, ZU has had two presidents, the latest one 
adding the ZU presidency portfolio to her position of Minister of Development 
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and International Cooperation in the federal government. As of the 2014–15 aca-
demic year, ZU’s president and provost are UAE citizens while most of the 
administrative and academic leadership remain Western expatriates. The univer-
sity’s future direction remains unclear at this stage and faculty are uncertain 
about their future. The university has charged its Arabic Language Center with 
Arabizing the curriculum. Although this is still work in progress, its prospects of 
success remain uncertain.9 As part of the 2013 changes, there are rumors that the 
HCT may be returning to its original mission as a technical and vocational 
college. However, the HCT website accessed in July 2014 still affirms that the 
“HCT confers degrees at the Master’s, Bachelor and Applied Diploma levels.”10 
The UAEU has also experienced changes in its American leadership which was 
replaced by UAE academics.
 These erratic changes in Qatar and the UAE are the outcome of reforms that 
are motivated by political considerations, short- term economic outlooks and a 
top- down approach. It is difficult to see how they can fulfill the national goals 
expressed in every country’s vision. However, an important factor remains the 
lack of academic preparedness of students being admitted to higher education.
Secondary education outputs and university expectations
Misalignment of high school outputs with university requirements
There is a general acknowledgment that primary and secondary education systems 
suffer from many problems. International agencies have repeatedly pointed to the 
low quality of pre- university education in the Arab region as a major obstacle stand-
ing in the way of Arabs’ competiveness on the global stage (UNDP, 2003; World 
Bank, 2009; World Economic Forum, 2013). One of the major reasons behind 
universities’ weak outputs is attributed to the weak inputs in their student intake. A 
general observation about freshmen entering universities in the GCC is that they are 
generally not well prepared for university study. Instructors complain about stu-
dents’ language proficiencies (both in Arabic and English), their study skills, time 
management, critical thinking and analytical skills. Most tertiary institutions have 
had to set up foundation years to improve weak learning skills. And in many cases 
this compensatory step has not been enough to prepare students for the academic 
programs they join. Furthermore, the financial and time costs of remedial programs 
have often driven the direction taken by pre- university public schooling reforms.
 This low quality of high school education outcomes is well documented by 
low rankings on most international standardized tests. Even in the UAE, which 
has made the most progress in improving the quality of its education, students’ 
scores remain below international averages in PISA (Program for International 
Student Assessment) and TIMMS (Trends in International Mathematics and 
Science Study) results. For example, in the 2012 PISA scores, the UAE was 
forty- eighth in math, forty- fourth in reading and forty- sixth in science out of 65 
participating OECD members (Pennington, 2014). All the other GCC (and Arab) 
countries that participated in these tests scored even lower than the UAE.
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Reforming pre- university education
In the UAE it was the “Vision 2020” launched in 1999 that initiated a series of 
reforms. Several types of schools have been implemented by the Ministry of 
Education such as “Model Schools,” “Schools of Tomorrow (MAG),” and “Part-
nership Schools,” alongside regular public schools based on various recom-
mendations from successive external consultants (Singapore, the United 
Kingdom, the United States, New Zealand, Australia, Finland, the Parthenon 
group, McKinsey, and others) (ADEC, 2010; Ahmed, 2012, 2013). Many of 
these reforms have focused on improving English language skills, math, science 
and the use of technology to better prepare students for university. Several initi-
atives by the government were centered on providing iPads to every student. For 
example, the Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashed Al Maktoum IT Education Project 
(ITEP) was launched in 2000 in Dubai and included a professional development 
program to enable teachers to use ICT to improve teaching practice and acquire 
the needed skills to use ICT in ways that promote learning (Lightfoot, 2011). 
However, these reforms of the public primary and secondary educational sectors 
have not stopped the majority of UAE parents who now send their children to 
private schools.
 The RAND Corporation overhaul of the Qatari educational system from ele-
mentary schools to universities had the “the mission of upgrading the nation’s 
human capital as quickly as possible” (Rubin, 2012: para. 3). In a report based 
on the RAND Corporation intervention Gonzalez et al. (2008: 30) remark that in 
Qatar: 
the Ministry of Education, the Supreme Educational Council, Qatar Univer-
sity and Qatar labor force survey show that graduates of Qatar’s K- 12 public 
education system score far below international standards in core subjects 
and that there are too few graduates in the science, engineering and techno-
logy fields, which are the fields particularly in demand in the private sector. 
The Qatari reforms began at the K- 12 levels with the introduction of state- funded 
‘independent schools’ designed to decentralize the system, increase autonomy 
and accountability and offer more choice for Qatari parents and students 
(RAND–Qatar Policy Institute). The reforms emphasized the development of 
critical thinking skills and instruction in English to better prepare graduates for 
university study.
 Like its neighbors in the GCC, Oman embarked on a series of reforms of its 
pre- university system. The Ministry of Education adopted what it called a Basic 
Education Curriculum (BEC) aimed at providing its youth with “life skills” to 
help them participate in the global economy. The BEC is designed to meet both 
global pressures and local goals of building on its heritage as an Islamic Arab 
society and Omanization of its workforce (Donn and Issan, 2007). These educa-
tional reforms are part of strategic five- year plans adopted by the Omani govern-
ment, following UNESCO and other international recommendations. They are 
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based on the objectives of diversifying the country’s economy by encouraging 
other sectors outside of oil industries and Omanization of the labor force to 
lessen Oman’s dependence on foreign expatriates. To improve the quality of 
education the reforms implemented in 1998 included the 12 aspects discussed in 
a UNESCO publication spanning from structural changes and procedures, out-
lining clear objectives, teacher training assessment, curriculum and materials, 
encouraging privatization, and enhanced financial resources. In his assessment 
of education reforms outcomes, Rassekh (2004: 33) outlines several achieve-
ments of the reforms, which include:
equalizing opportunities among its citizens, particularly between men and 
women. The quality of education has improved dramatically and the initi-
ation of students to new information technology has advanced at a rapid 
pace. Better- trained teachers have been employed and the mechanism of 
professional development and upgrading of teachers and other educational 
personnel has proceeded satisfactorily. Vocational training and technical 
education have expanded rapidly, though not to the degree required in order 
to respond adequately to the Omanization objectives.
In 2008, the Kuwait Ministry of Education announced its strategy of general 
education 2005–25. The strategy revolved around the creation of a national 
authority for standards and quality control, a review of curricula and teaching 
methods, use of information and communication technology and the set- up of 
programs of pre- service teacher preparation. However, in 2009, the World Bank 
had warned Kuwait that its educational practices must change if its high school 
diplomas are to be recognized by the international community. In particular, the 
World Bank pointed to the short number of contact hours and warned that 
Kuwaiti high school graduates were running the risk of not receiving equivalen-
cies in major international universities (Gangal, 2009). In November of 2013 the 
Minister of Education announced plans for a national curriculum, outsourcing 
certain administrative functions to the private sector, to alleviate teachers’ heavy 
loads, and regulating the private sector. It was expected that the new national 
curriculum would serve as a framework for both the public and private systems 
in the country and would allow it to assess the quality of delivery of education 
(Oxford Business Group, 2013a).
 The government of Bahrain launched its “schools of the future” project in 
2003 to transform its public education from a traditional to a modern system by 
emphasizing e- learning and “an IT based system that prepares future generations 
to establish an advanced information society and build a knowledge- based 
economy” (King Hamad’s schools of the future project, 2003). Eleven pilot 
schools were chosen to start the program to be expanded progressively to cover 
all schools in Bahrain. The National Education Review Initiative launched in 
2006 (NERI) which is part of the Vision 2030, claims that educational reforms 
have helped Bahrainis make substantial progress in achieving their goals of 
transforming the educational outcomes to match the needs of their economic 
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goals (Oxford Business Report, 2013b). However, the review carried out in 2010 
by the Quality Assurance Authority for Education and Training (QAAET) found 
extensive discrepancies in the implementation of the project. Lightfoot (2011: 5) 
reports: 
On the whole, the reports [on Bahrain’s and the UAE’s ICT initiatives] indi-
cate that: many of the far- reaching “knowledge economy” skills, which the 
education reform policies were seeking to promote, are underdeveloped. On 
the contrary, in many, or most, cases, ICT implementations have seldom 
moved far beyond teachers using data projectors and interactive whiteboards.
 There are many factors that can explain the identified inadequate secondary 
school outcomes. These include the instability of education policies, pedagogical 
and methodological approaches, teacher qualifications and lack of parents’ 
involvement with their children’s schools experiences (Badry, 2015; Al Sumaiti, 
2012). Moreover, it is possible that students’ motivation is affected negatively 
by questions of identity as a result of the fast- paced impact of globalization 
(Badry, 2012). In addition, students are imbued with a sense of entitlement that 
leads them to exert little effort to learn. The welfare state nature of these coun-
tries and the consumerist approach to education increase the sense of entitlement 
and decreases students’ motivation and engagement in the learning process. Uni-
versity education is for some students a holding pen, a rite of passage but not 
necessarily a gateway to knowledge. The goal is more to get a degree than to get 
knowledge. Many young nationals know that they can easily access employment 
in the public sector or join their family business, which often consists of the 
passive supervision of expatriate- run establishments.
Assessing the reforms
The GCC countries recognize the deficiencies in their pre- university education 
and are investing heavily to revamp it based on recommendations from inter-
national consultants. It is important to recognize, however, that the youth bulge 
that characterizes GCC societies constitutes a real challenge in the face of gov-
ernments’ development plans (Al Munajjed and Sabbagh, 2011). Despite all the 
efforts, results have not matched expectations and are not commensurate with 
investments in education so far. Sakr (2008: 1) remarked that: 
when it comes to education reform, the striking shared aspect . . . has been 
the frankness with which ministers of education have acknowledged poor 
performance to date. In fact, they sometimes seem to be competing to outdo 
one another in self- criticism, while agreeing on the need for development 
and launching various initiatives. 
An area that the reforms have emphasized is the introduction of IT in schools; 
this is based on the assumption that providing young learners with iPads will 
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lead to improved learning experiences in schools. “The promotion of education 
reforms that relate to the development of 21st-century learning skills has become 
synonymous with the investment in ICT infrastructure in schools” (Lightfoot, 
2011: 4). However, the key is to have investments directed to where quality 
matters as Faryal Khan, UNESCO’s program specialist for education, pointed 
out. It is not possible to unequivocally evaluate whether these investments are in 
areas that make “a difference in key drivers of quality” (Pennington, 2014) 
because of lack of data and transparency. Based on long personal experience in 
the region, it is clear that areas such as teachers’ qualifications and training do 
not receive the investments needed to improve learning in pre- university educa-
tion (Badry, 2015). In addition, another problem with the reforms is that they are 
not grounded in the socio- cultural, economic and political contexts (especially in 
the wealthier countries such as Qatar, the UAE and Kuwait). Little effort is made 
to engage with parents in order to buttress the legitimacy of these reform efforts.
 Gulf policy- makers are aware of some of these issues. For example, given the 
heavy reliance on expatriates in the economy of all GCC states, one of the major 
expectations from educational reforms is to help reduce the reliance on foreign 
labor by replacing them with educated and skilled nationals. Nationalization or 
Gulficization (Hertog, 2014) is one of the major goals driving educational 
reforms at all levels.
 The above review of the pre- university educational reforms across the GCC 
countries suggests that despite substantial investments and multiple initiatives, 
they have fallen short of their two major objectives: preparing their graduates 
with the appropriate skills to join the private sector of the economy in order to 
advance nationalization and reduce the heavy reliance on expatriates, and devel-
oping the necessary competencies in those students who pursue higher education 
to enable them to become “knowledge workers” and contribute to a national 
knowledge- based economy.
The public university: teaching and research missions
The role of the university as a research center in addition to its teaching function 
is usually what distinguishes high ranking universities from the rest. Research 
output of higher education is an indicator of socio- economic and technological 
progress and is credited with the transformation of societies into knowledge 
hubs. Research is also central to the reputation and standing of the university 
itself and is important in the professional advancement of its faculty. Spending 
on research is usually taken as an indicator of development and varies greatly 
between the developed and developing worlds as Table 5.9 reveals. Common to 
all vision statements of the GCC countries is the goal of transforming GCC soci-
eties into knowledge- producing communities by encouraging research. In order 
to achieve this goal one would expect GCC public universities which are under 
government control to reflect these national aspirations. It is therefore surprising 
to see a low percentage of expenditure on research and development that is less 
than 1 percent.
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 This number has led many, including the UNDP and other international agen-
cies and academics, to criticize the quality of higher education and research so 
far achieved in the Arab world (UNDP 2002, 2003; McGlennon, 2006). The fact 
that this includes the rich GCC countries is surprising. McGlennon (2006: i) 
observes that: “The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have developed 
world levels of GDP per capita and yet investment in R&D remains at develop-
ing world levels.” According to the government- controlled Emirates Industrial 
Bank (EIB), “average GCC allocations for scientific research stood at around 
0.03 per cent of the gross domestic product in 2009 compared with nearly 2.6 
per cent in Switzerland and 2.7 per cent in the United States” (Edarabia, 2014). 
The report goes on to assert that “the region’s economic development with all its 
elements depend almost entirely on imported technology at a time when member 
states possess sufficient human and financial resources needed for the creation of 
major research institutions.”
 The GCC countries have made much greater progress in many economic 
measures compared to other Arab countries as Table 5.10 shows. The global 
competiveness index rankings show that all the GCC countries are ranked within 
the top 40 countries out of 144 countries listed. The next closest Arab countries, 
Jordan and Morocco, come in at sixty- fourth and seventieth of the countries 
included in the rankings. However, their low public funding earmarked for R&D 
shown is comparable to other poorer Arab countries (see Table 5.11) and their 
achievement in developing a knowledge economy are relatively similar to that of 
the rest of the Arab world.
 There are additional factors within and outside the university that stand in the 
way of transforming the university into research centers. These include the pri-
oritization of undergraduate studies, the focus on skills to meet immediate labor 
market needs, the lack of adequate facilities to conduct research and factors 
related to faculty. Although universities claim that they value research they 














Japan and NICs 
China











































Source: UNESCO (1998) (data for 1994).
124  GCC public universities
remain primarily teaching universities as reflected in faculty teaching loads 
and research funding policies (Al Enezi, 2007). The fact that few universities 
offer doctoral degree programs limits the availability of research assistants and 
faculty are expected to teach at least 9–12 credits hours per semester. In addi-
tion, teaching obligations are the same regardless of rank or research portfolio. 
Since most of the universities are relatively new and undergo constant reforms, 
faculty are expected to spend an important amount of their time in service 
committees. As a result, those who are interested in research must devote their 
summer breaks to it.11
 Azad and Seyyed (2007) studied several factors influencing faculty research pro-
ductivity among the faculty of business schools at three GCC public universities, the 














Source: Adapted from the Arab World Forum p. 10: www3weforum.org/docs/WEF_AWCR_
Report_2013.pdf.
Table 5.11 Public expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP
Country HDI rank Percentage of GDP 
spent on R&D 
(2011)
Percentage of GDP dpending on 
education in 2012 (very high human 
development 5.3; high human 
development 4.6; medium human 
development 3.7; low human 
development 3.8)
Qatar 31 – 2.5
KSA 34 – 5.6
UAE 40 0.49 –
Oman 56 0.13 4.3
Bahrain 44 – 2.9
Kuwait 46 0.09 3.8
Source: Adapted from Human Development Report, 2013 and the World Bank report, http://data.
worldbank.org/indicator/GB.XPD.RSDV.GD.ZS/countries/1W-IL-US-EU-SG?display=graph.
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UAEU in the UAE, KU in Kuwait and King Fahad University of Petroleum and 
Minerals in Saudi Arabia. They found “that the university’s expectations for 
time allocation for the two activities of scholarship/professional growth and 
research are significantly lower than those of the faculty’s preferences; and the 
opposite is true for teaching and service” (2007: 101). The second factor inves-
tigated was what the authors referred to as two areas of “self- knowledge and 
individual competencies,” which included faculty perceptions relating to their 
satisfaction with their personal academic achievements and performance. 
Results suggest that faculty feel that their potential and competencies for 
research in their fields are good but this potential is underutilized by their insti-
tutions. The third cluster of factors were classified under work environment as 
represented in Table 5.12. Table 5.12 presents statistical analysis of the signifi-
cance of these factors in faculty perception of their role in research productivity 
and their level of satisfaction with each factor. Findings show that faculty con-
sider all the factors listed to be significant in encouraging research but that they 
were not satisfied with most of them. The only factors deemed satisfactory were 
availability of data and journal resources, IT support and travel support to 
attend conferences. Surprisingly, access to external grants was not considered 
significant in influencing faculty research productivity. The authors attributed 
this finding to university rules that tend to limit the financial benefits to the 
faculty, department or college. The last cluster of factors was social contingen-
cies, which included: 
1  family responsibilities; 
2  health related considerations; 
3  financial pressures and constraints; 
4  social demands and expectations; 
5  external professional commitments. 
Among these factors family responsibilities and financials pressures were the 
most significant, which supports earlier studies about the negative influence of 
social contingencies on faculty research productivity in the region.
 In another study, Chapman et al. (2014) examined the degree of identification 
and commitment of faculty to their institutions through interviewing faculty in 
five universities across the UAE. “Findings suggest that the extensive use of 
expatriate staff on short- term contracts can work against the development of 
institutional loyalty or commitment.” Although employees felt that their work 
was valued by their institutions and were dedicated to quality teaching, their 
“high professional instability” and the feeling of being disposable does not 
encourage them to become “national builders” (Swan, 2014).
 Others have attributed poor research outputs to perceived lack of academic 
freedom engendered by the political environment in the Arab world. 
Romanowski and Ramzi (2010), in their article “Faculty perceptions of academic 
freedom at a GCC university,” quoted from a speech by Her Highness Sheikha 
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We cannot talk about a culture of quality without talking about massive 
political and social reforms throughout the Arab world, and indeed the 
world in general. It is useless to “play” at being free in schools while society 
squelches this freedom. Actually, it can even lead to more instability. Recent 
studies have shown, internationally, that extremist and violent organizations 
are heavily populated with educated, politically disenfranchised youth, 
whose education taught them to expect the right to participate politically, 
but their environments refuted this expectation. 
(Opening speech at the conference on Arab Women Past and Present: 
Participation and Democratization, Doha, Qatar, March 3–5, 2006)
The Sheikha’s speech follows one of the recommendations of the Arab Human 
Development Report (2003: 76) stating that Arab governments should be per-
suaded that “restricting intellectual freedom is tantamount to depriving society 
of its capacity to generate the meaningful, innovative and productive knowledge 
that is a precondition for survival and success in the 21st century.”
 In much of the advanced world, industry plays an important role in research 
funding. This is not the case in the GCC. The nature of industry in the GCC does 
not offer research opportunities. Companies such as the giant oil companies, 
which totally depend on foreign companies for equipment and servicing, are 
contractually expected to limit their engineers to being executors of functions, 
thus curtailing creativity and innovation.
 An additional challenge is a competitive attitude between Gulf countries and 
even between emirates within the UAE. This competition limits collaborative 
research across borders or even inter- institutions. It must be noted, however, that 
recently many efforts have been launched by the Qatar Foundation in particular 
to encourage collaborative research, but these are still in their infancy.
 There are some exceptions however (see Table 5.13). In Abu Dhabi, the Masdar 
Institute is focused on research related to creating a sustainable environment. Col-
laboration between industries and research institutes and universities is beginning. 
Oil companies and banks are beginning to award research grants, particularly to 
local universities (emirate rather than federal in the UAE). In Abu Dhabi, the Pet-
roleum Institute and the Masdar Institute have many partnerships which are also 
governmental. In Qatar, the Qatar Foundation has also been actively engaged in 
funding research that pertains to Qatar. Every year several calls for research in the 
areas of science, social science, technology and humanities are launched.
 After a decade of reforms and serious investments, results remain below 
expectations.
 The urgency of creating a tertiary education system that prepares GCC 
citizens and residents to enter a fast developing economy understandably led to a 
focus on the role of universities as teaching institutions. The GCC countries 
needed citizens with professional and vocational training to respond to economic 
and business development plans.
 However, promoting research in order to achieve all GCC nations’ future 
visions of transforming their societies into knowledge- producing societies is yet 
128  GCC public universities
to receive the support it needs to become a reality. Governments are beginning 
to recognize the importance of research support. Across the region, they are cre-
ating research institutes and foundations with a wide variety of research agendas 
as illustrated in Table 5.13.
Conclusion
There is little evidence in both educational policies and practices that show that 
the GCC public institutions have succeeded in combining the acquisition of 
instrumental/professional knowledge with reflexive knowledge grounded in local 
Table 5.13 Main research centers in the GCC
Qatar Qatar Foundation
Office of Institutional Research and Planning
RAND-Qatar Policy Institute
Qatar National Research Fund
Qatar Computing Research Institute
Qatar Environment and Energy Research Institute
Qatar Biomedical Research Institute
The Social and Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI) – established 
by Qatar University
UAE National Research Foundation (NRF)
Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research (ECSSR)
Centre of Excellence for Applied Research and Training (CERT)
Gulf Research Center (GCR)
Masdar Institute of Science and Technology
Ras Al Khaimah Center for Advanced Materials (RAK CAM)
Mohammed bin Rashid School of Government
Oman The Research Council
International Research Foundation
Kuwait Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research – KISR
The Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait
Kuwait University
Bahrain Bahrain Centre for Studies and Research (BCSR)
Gulf Research Center
Bahrain Research Center
Shaikh Ebrahim Bin Mohammed Al Khalifa Center For Culture And 
Research
CBRE Bahrain
Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland – Medical University of Bahrain
Sources: Qatar: www.qu.edu.qa/offices/research/academic/; http://qnl.qa/find-answers/research-insti-
tute-directory/research-institute-directory; UAE: www.masdar.ac.ae/; www.ecssr.com/ECSSR/app-
manager/portal/ecssr; www.certonline.com; www.indexuae.com/Top/Education/Research_Institutes 
(this website has the list of almost all the research institutes); Oman: home.trc.gov.om/tabid/40/lan-
guage/en-US/Default.aspx; www.omanirf.org; Kuwait: www.kisr.edu.kw/; gckuwait.com/institu-
tional/center-for-research-and-studies-on-kuwait; Bahrain: www.cirs-tm.org/org-eng.php?pays=Bahr
ein&matiere=techno; www.eldis.org/go/home&id=4442&type=Organisation; www.rcsi-mub.c; 
www.shaikhebrahimcenter.org/.
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culture. Reforms so far have focused on an education that prepares students to 
enter the entrepreneurial global economy. But they seem to have fallen short of 
achieving even this goal when the actual participation and productivity of GCC 
graduates in the development of their countries is measured. In pursuing the goal 
of education as a major engine of development, educational choices and prac-
tices have tended to isolate social development from economic integration which 
has so far missed the mark of drawing the national population into the global 
economy. The very low participation of nationals in the private sector raises 
serious doubts about the effectiveness of these policies and suggests that changes 
in the incentive system that structures the labor market needs to accompany 
educational reforms (see Chapter 9).
 Substantial investments have helped expand educational opportunities for 
GCC nationals and residents but they have done little to sow the seeds for a 
future knowledge society. The transplantation of top- down reforms are 
motivated by short- term economic constraints that are not likely to achieve 
the two long- term goals of nationalization of the labor force and the creation 
of a knowledge society, as stated in the national visions of each GCC 
member state and restated in mission statements of all public higher 
universities.
Notes
 1 Today literacy rates are comparable to rates in Europe and range between 90 and 98 
percent.
 2 The switch back and forth between Arabic and English is discussed in more detail 
later in this chapter.
 3 Zayed University website, available at: www.zu.ac.ae.
 4 Abdullah bin Mohammed Al- Sarmi (Undersecretary of the Ministry of Higher Educa-
tion, Sultanate of Oman). “From one university to 54 higher education institutions: 
The experience of Oman in higher education.” Posted on QS Showcase Asia, Middle 
East and Africa, February 11, 2014, http://qsshowcase.com/main/category/showcase- 
middle-east/ (accessed June 4, 2015).
 5 The nine non- professional colleges are information technology, business administra-
tion, law, arts, engineering, science, applied studies, physical education and physio-
therapy, and health sciences. See University of Bahrain website, available at: www.
uob.edu.bh/english/ (accessed June 17, 2013).
 6 This is the case for the entire educational system from K- 12 to tertiary levels.
 7 The RAND Qatar Policy Institute (RQPI) and RAND Education is a partnership of 
the RAND Corporation and the Qatar Foundation for Education, Science, and Com-
munity Development.
 8 On the other hand, Qatar’s community colleges, North Atlantic Qatar and the Com-
munity College of Qatar, are allowed to maintain English as the medium of 
instruction.
 9 There have been so many changes to the goals of this institute as well as its leadership 
in the last year that make it impossible to describe what it stands for. At one point its 
goal was to work on Arabizing the curriculum by asking faculty to create their own 
textbooks. The steps to implement such a project are to say the least very questionable 
as its conceptualization and implementation started with English teachers leading the 
project. This seems to have changed again. It is very hard to keep up with the reforms. 
No sooner are they announced than they are changed.
130  GCC public universities
10 
HCT mission: The Higher Colleges of Technology is dedicated to the delivery of 
applied and vocationally focused programmes that achieve national and inter-
national standards at the Diploma, Bachelor’s and Master’s levels. Delivered 
through excellent instruction based on “learning by doing” and in a technology- 
rich environment, supported by applied research, our programmes are designed to 
meet the employment needs of the UAE and support Emirati students in becoming 
innovative and work- ready. 
(Available at: www.hct.ac.ae/about/overview/ (accessed July 16, 2014))
11 One of the authors received a research grant to carry out the research for this book but 
was unable to use some of the funds to buy out time because of the rules governing 
research funds. When she asked the dean for a course release in 2012, he responded 
that she, like everyone else, has to find time to do her research and teaching loads 
should not be reduced “just because one has research plans.”
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6 Assessing quality
Adopting Western standards of 
accreditation
Introduction
Within the first few weeks of an introductory economics course students usually 
learn that a healthy economic system requires market competition. The struggle 
against other enterprises for consumer expenditures forces firms to provide 
cheaper and/or higher quality products and services as well as to design new 
commodities to meet consumer needs. This sort of competition is supposed to 
make consumers sovereign and raise economic welfare by promoting efficiency 
and economic dynamism. Producers will certainly benefit from a less com-
petitive regime in the form of higher profits, but the total society (represented by 
large numbers of consumers) will suffer. This simple model relies on premises 
that do not apply to the case of higher education. In this case, intensified com-
petition might not be associated with a higher quality product that is delivered 
efficiently.
 One key argument of the standard model is that consumers have good know-
ledge of the product or service they are consuming. A buyer of an apple usually 
has an understanding of what a high quality apple provides him or her. The con-
sumer knows what an apple will normally cost and can judge the apple’s charac-
teristics through sensory inspection. Armed with this information, a consumer 
can then make decisions about which and how many apples to buy and at what 
price. A potential consumer of higher education, however, is likely to have much 
less information about the quality of the educational service than the seller does. 
This information asymmetry can prevent the consumer from making an informed 
decision, while allowing the supplier to capture unwarranted economic rents. 
Without some extra- market intervention, it will be difficult for the market system 
to produce the economic benefits that are meant to accrue to the public (Stiglitz 
2001).1 
 An additional consideration for parents and students attempting to choose the 
appropriate higher education institution is that purchasing a service that will be 
delivered to the student for four or more years requires one to trust the provider. 
As soon as a specific decision is made to send a student to an existing higher 
education system, the bargaining power of the buyer is reduced. Parents and 
governmental authorities have to hope that the university or college is both 
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financially viable and can provide a suitable educational experience. The longer 
a student pursues her or his course of study, the more difficult it is for that 
student to decide to leave the educational institution if it proves to be unsatisfac-
tory. The costs of restarting education become increasingly onerous, and this can 
allow a higher education institution to pay less attention to educational quality 
for its captive group of consumers. This is a key factor that differentiates higher 
education as a commodity from products like apples. If one does not like the 
apple, it is possible to learn from that experience and “exit” that particular 
market for apples. Market competition encourages consumers to use this neg-
ative power to discipline suppliers. But in the education market the cost of 
exiting can be very high. Thus, a key process that allows consumers to exercise 
power and assert their sovereignty is much weaker.
Why regulation and accreditation?
As Albert Hirschmann noted in his book, Exit, Voice and Loyalty, the inability 
to discipline an organization by threatening to cut one’s relationship with it 
means that the only other key mechanism available to a group of individuals dis-
satisfied with the good or service they are consuming is to use the political 
process or the society’s social “voice” (Hirschmann, 1970). The particular insti-
tutions in the regulation and governance of higher education should be seen as a 
response to the dual problems of information asymmetry and the lack of cred-
ibility of an exit threat. The parents and high school students considering higher 
education might be able to make tentative judgments about the quality of a pos-
sible university or college by discussing this issue with friends and colleagues or 
by examining media reports. However, it is difficult for them to assess the bene-
fits of alternative educational opportunities particularly if the parents themselves 
have not experienced college education as they are less likely to have inde-
pendent knowledge of the actual educational process that their child will be 
experiencing.
 The issue of getting appropriate information about the functioning of higher 
educational institutions also concerns future employers. While most businesses 
and public agencies understand they will have to provide training to teach new 
employees the idiosyncratic technical and social skills specific to a workplace, 
employers expect higher education to supply a stream of qualified job applicants 
who possess high- level analytical and organizational skills as well as an appro-
priate work ethic that will make it relatively easy for them to learn how to do the 
professional jobs into which they are entering. Employers are generally not able 
to spend the time to evaluate the individual educational experience of each job 
applicant. Instead, they rely on the credential or the degree which the job appli-
cant has earned to begin the assessment of the candidate’s suitability. In other 
words, a college degree is supposed to provide an accurate signal to employers 
about the quality of the potential employee.
 These information problems facing the direct consumers (parents and stu-
dents) or indirect consumers (potential employers) of higher education suggest 
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that it would be unreasonable to expect that market competition alone could 
ensure educational quality because consumers have difficulty both assessing the 
quality of the commodity and exiting the educational relationship if they are dis-
satisfied. Beyond these information issues, there is also the issue of the particular 
type of market structure that the privatization of higher education has created in 
the GCC. In the countries we have studied, one important tendency we have 
noted needs to be highlighted. The privatization of universities and colleges has 
created a series of relatively small colleges that offer business and information 
technology degrees. Intensified competition in this sub- sector of the educational 
universe can be unstable. Because of low financial barriers to entry, it is relat-
ively easy to set up a college or university. On the other hand, this factor also 
means that it can be difficult for these institutions to maintain market share. The 
threat of bankruptcy or economic failure is real, and standard economic theory 
would predict that such monopolistically competitive market structures will be 
characterized by excess capacity and organizational churning as a result of the 
birth and death of a noticeable proportion of higher educational institutions 
(Chamberlin, 1933).
 We are used to such instability when we consider restaurants, small clothing 
boutiques, or other retail outlets that operate within monopolistically competitive 
market structures, and while economic failure can be a catastrophe for the busi-
ness owners and workers involved in such business breakdowns, these bankrupt-
cies usually have few significant social repercussions. On the other hand, a 
similar collapse of a higher educational institution has far greater ramifications 
because of the central role that attaining higher education plays in the lives and 
career plans of families. Given this reality, ruling authorities will be reluctant to 
allow colleges and universities to emerge and disappear in a completely unregu-
lated fashion. Governments find that they have to ensure that universities and 
colleges operating within their territory are financially stable and can provide a 
satisfactory educational experience for students, parents and employers. One of 
the ironies of introducing more competition in the higher educational sector is 
that the government is placed under increasing pressure to create more robust 
systems of educational regulation. In other words, market competition often 
results in the enhancement of the “voice” or power of governmental regulatory 
institutions.
The Westernization of regulation and accreditation in the 
GCC
The decision in the 1990s and early 2000s by GCC governing authorities to 
create a more competitive higher education system produced a variety of educa-
tional models that we have outlined in Chapter 3. One key finding is that the 
establishment of elite branch campuses in Qatar and Abu Dhabi, despite their 
visibility, do not represent the majority of higher educational innovations that 
the GCC governments promoted. Likewise, the Dubai neo- liberal educational 
mall approach avoids the problem of devoting considerable governmental 
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resources to regulation by insisting that all the foreign institutions established 
within Dubai Knowledge Village and the Dubai International Academic City be 
branch campuses under the control of a host institution. Most other governments 
have not followed this path, and the result is the emergence of a complex 
network of small colleges and larger universities that must submit to conditions 
set both by the government in terms of their academic program offerings as well 
as by their partnerships with external universities.
 The growth of cross- border collaborative arrangements and the establishment 
of institutions, that claim to use American higher educational principles, have 
led to the adoption of common methods of assessment and accreditation. Institu-
tions which offer joint degree programs must guarantee that all students receiv-
ing the degree are subject to similar curricula and evaluated in similar ways even 
if, for example, an MBA from a Western university is granted to students who 
never set foot on the home university campus. Any attempt to do otherwise risks 
undermining the credibility of the degree- granting institutions. Similarly, home 
campuses must vigilantly monitor and regulate their far- flung branch campus if 
they are to ensure that the quality of the academic programs being offered is 
broadly similar.
 Quality control mechanisms are different for those institutions that attempt to 
replicate Western higher educational practices, but are not directly linked to a 
foreign university or college. In these cases, the higher education institutions 
themselves and governments have created accreditation policies and evaluative 
procedures that attempt to ensure that each college or university follows gener-
ally recognized international standards. These standards are articulated by the 
International Network for Quality Assurance Agencies in Higher Education 
(INQAAHE). The goal of this body is to promote a rigorous process of assess-
ment that requires administrators and faculty to evaluate their own work 
practices.
 The INQAAHE believes that it is crucial for the faculty, administrators and 
indeed students to participate in this quality control process through the writing 
of a self- study report that assesses the institution’s governance, finances and aca-
demics. An outside body of experts then visits the campus and uses the self- 
study report to identify strengths and weaknesses of the college or university 
under investigation. The ultimate goal is to accredit both specific degree pro-
grams and the institution as a whole. In addition, all universities and colleges 
undergo periodic evaluations in order to continue to be licensed by the govern-
ment agency charged with certifying the quality of their education quality (see 
Table 6.1). All countries in the GCC with the exception of Qatar have govern-
ment accreditation agencies that are full members of the INQAAHE. (Qatar is 
probably an exception because of its reliance on a branch campus model to 
ensure academic quality.) The significance of these affiliations is that the GCC 
have embraced global standards of higher education that are closely linked to the 
practices of Western academia (INQAAHE, 2014).
 Free- standing institutions that are not branch campuses also have the option 
of pursuing additional institutional accreditation by an American accreditation 
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authority (all educational institutions must be certified by the national govern-
ment). Within the Gulf itself, the American University of Sharjah, Zayed Uni-
versity and the American University of Dubai have received accreditation from 
either the Middle States Commission on Higher Education (MSCHE) or the 
Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (SACS).2 Zayed University’s (a 
public university) successful accreditation represents the culmination of efforts 
by the previous Minister of Higher Education of the UAE (Sheikh Nahyan al 
Nahyan) to begin to subject public institutions of the UAE which are funded by 
the federal government to American educational standards.
 More common than this non- governmental institutional accreditation, which 
is largely linked to free- standing institutions that present themselves as Amer-
ican universities, liberal arts institutions also seek the Western accreditation of 
particular degrees. The Gulf has participated actively in the drive to receive 
American recognition of its engineering and business programs. With respect to 
engineering, the chief accrediting body, Baltimore- based ABET, has certified a 
large number of degree programs in applied science, computing, engineering and 
engineering technology outside the United States. Saudi Arabia and the UAE 
have used this service most extensively, but of the 68 non- American institutions 
whose four- year undergraduate degree programs have been accredited by ABET, 
24 have come from the Gulf (see Table 6.2), 31 have come from the Arab world, 
and if we include Turkey as part of the broader Middle East, 36 institutions have 
had programs accredited by this American institution.
 With respect to the accreditation of business school degree programs, the 
UAE has the most institutions that have received accreditation from the Associ-
ation to Advance Collegiate Schools of Businesses (AACSB) (see Table 6.3). 
This finding corresponds with our general conclusion that the universities and 
colleges of the emirates are consistently attempting to obtain Western recogni-
tion for their academic programs.
Table 6.1  Government higher education accreditation and assessment agencies: IQAAHE 
members
Country Name of agency
Bahrain National Authority for Qualification and Quality Assurance 
for Education and Training
Kuwait Private universities – Ministry of Higher Education
Oman Oman Academic Accreditation Authority
Saudi Arabia National Commission for Academic Accreditation and 
Assessment
Qatar No agency is a member of the INQAAHE.
United Arab Emirates  
  – Abu Dhabi
UAE Commission for Academic Accreditation
United Arab Emirates  
  – Dubai
University Quality Assurance International Board
Note
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The new regulatory institutions of the GCC: a recent history
When the national universities were first established in the GCC, the ministries 
of higher education of the respective national governments were responsible for 
overseeing their functioning and education quality. As discussed in Chapter 5, 
GCC governments initially relied on expatriate Arab experts both to operate the 
national universities and to assess their quality and control their finances. The 
major focus of this control was to make sure that the appropriate rules and pro-
cedures were followed rather than to evaluate the quality of the educational 
experience. The ease with which nationals were able to join lucrative govern-
ment jobs after graduation may have further contributed to reducing the pressure 
on national universities to adopt comprehensive quality assurance processes and 
regulations.
 The move to adopt the new regulatory approach began with the introduction 
of private institutions in the GCC. Four of the five smaller GCC countries3 
adopted similar approaches by creating regulatory bodies that are directly or 
indirectly linked to their respective ministries of higher education. The steps fol-
lowed have generally been modeled on UK and US accrediting practices that 
include the development of standards to be followed in preparing self- study 
reports by the institution seeking program accreditation. The self- study report is 
then submitted to external visiting teams of experts who evaluate the institu-
tion’s meeting of the standards. This section describes the organization and 
process of accreditation in each of the GCC countries.
 The UAE Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research was the first 
to establish an accreditation body, the Commission for Academic Accreditation 
(CAA), in August/September 2000. The CAA is responsible for granting licen-
sures and program accreditation to all non- federal tertiary institutions in the 
UAE. As of 2011, it has licensed 70 institutions and accredited 560 programs. 
The CAA states that one of its major goals is to “maintain and implement a 
quality framework which assures that institutions of higher education in the UAE 
operate in line with international academic, administrative, managerial, and 
operational standards” (Government of the United Arab Emirates, Commission 




Saudi Arabia King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals
United Arab Emirates American University of Sharjah
United Arab Emirates University
University of Dubai
Zayed University
Source: AACSB International. Available at: www.aacsb.net/eweb/DynamicPage.aspx?Site=AACSB
&WebCode=AccredSchlCountry (accessed February 13, 2015).
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for Academic Accreditation, 2010: 6). On its tenth anniversary, the CAA con-
ducted its own self- study of its standards and functioning which were assessed 
by external reviewers from the United States and Ireland. The CAA has also 
been recognized by the INQAAHE as “one of the 6 institutions in the world to 
meet their ‘guidelines for good practice’ ” (Government of United Arab Emir-
ates, Commission for Higher Education, 2011: 15).
 All UAE private institutions are required to be licensed and have their major 
programs accredited by the CAA in order for their degrees to be recognized by 
the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research. In addition, they need 
to apply for reaccreditation every five years. The process of accreditation begins 
with a self- study report submitted by the program being accredited and the uni-
versity to the CAA. The self- study must respond to 11 standards, each with its 
own stipulations. The next step in the accreditation process is a site visit of a 
team led by the CAA commissioner and between two and four external review-
ers (usually from the United States, the United Kingdom, and other Arab coun-
tries) who are deemed experts in the disciplines being accredited. During their 
visit, the reviewers check the self- study report against the actual documentation 
of all aspects of the educational program. These include institutional effective-
ness, governance, students’ facilities, financial resources, research and scholarly 
activities, faculty and staff resources, physical facilities, learning resources, 
quality assurance, public disclosures and community engagement. During its site 
visit, the visiting team conducts interviews with administrators, faculty and staff, 
students, alumni and employers before writing a report to the CAA commis-
sioner. The commission review culminates in a decision to approve, delay, put 
on probation or deny accreditation (Government of United Arab Emirates, Com-
mission for Higher Education, 2011a).
 In addition to the CAA, which is a federal agency, the Emirates of Dubai and 
Abu Dhabi have additional bodies involved in quality assurance control. Dubai’s 
Knowledge and Human Development Authority’s (KHDA) 
role in higher education is to provide academic authorization and support 
quality assurance for all Free Zone universities in Dubai. Students who 
graduate from these higher education institutions can have their degrees cer-
tified by KHDA for employment and other purposes in Dubai. 
(Government of Dubai, Knowledge Human Development Authority, 2014)
In order to carry out this role the KHDA set up the University Quality Assurance 
International Board (UQAIB). All higher education providers operating in Dubai 
free zones are required to renew their authorizations annually. The UQAIB relies 
on quality assurance processes in existence in those institutions or CAA assess-
ments in its own certification. However, the UQAIB reserves the right to under-
take its own audit in cases where existing assessments warrant it (Government of 
Dubai, Knowledge and Human Development Authority, 2014).4
 Oman established its accreditation procedures soon after the UAE implemented 
its policies. Starting in 2001, the Ministry of Higher Education established an 
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Oman Accreditation Council, which four years later became the Oman Academic 
Accreditation Authority (OAAA). This body attempts to follow the procedures 
regulated by the INQAAHE. Thus, not only are Western institutions playing a very 
important role in the formation of individual colleges and universities, but the 
methods of assessment and review are heavily influenced by the regulatory cul-
tures of Europe and the United States (Government of Oman, Oman Academic 
Accreditation Authority, 2014).
 A chief goal of this system has been to establish practices of self- study and 
assessment within each higher education institution. The evidence suggests that 
the Omani authorities have taken this charge very seriously. The OAAA has 
introduced a certification process that is similar to that implemented by the 
federal government of the UAE.
 After receiving the initial approval to establish a higher education institution, 
the institutions must undergo a quality audit, which uses an internally generated 
self- study by the college or university as a framework to guide the work of an 
external audit committee. (Normally, each panel or audit committee has five 
members.) This body, three- fifths of which are made up of higher education 
experts who do not work in Oman, visit the campus and issue a report that identi-
fies strengths and weaknesses of the institution. The college or university then has 
four years to respond to the report before a second visit culminates in a standards 
assessment that lead to the issuing of a higher education certificate. An institution 
can appeal a negative evaluation at any point and use the time that is purchased by 
this objection to persuade the regulators that the evaluation was incorrect or that 
further improvements have been made in the institution so that the negative assess-
ment is no longer relevant. In any event, the goal of the assessment process is not 
to create a high number of failed higher education institutions, but to pressure 
these colleges and universities to conform to international standards.
 This regulatory approach ensures that there will nearly always be a body of 
non- Omani experts actively involved in evaluating an Omani university or 
college. (The public institutions are also required to undergo the same assess-
ment process.) Between 2008 and December 2014, for example, there were 41 
published audit reports. The Oman authorities post many of their reports on their 
website. Thus, the evaluative practices are unusually transparent.
 Bahrain has largely replicated the Omani system and also makes its assess-
ment reports electronically available. The regulatory framework to supervise the 
expansion of private higher education started changing in 2005. At that time, the 
Higher Education Council was formed under the auspices of the Ministry of 
Education. This body became responsible for licensing and accrediting all higher 
education institutions in the Kingdom of Bahrain. In addition, Bahrain estab-
lished an independent agency responsible for evaluating the institutions and aca-
demic programs by using standard Western techniques of quality assurance. In 
2008, King Hamad issued a royal decree that created the Quality Assurance 
Authority for Education and Training (QAAET). This new organization is meant 
to evaluate all of Bahrain’s educational efforts, including primary and secondary 
education, vocational training, Bahrain’s system of national examinations, and 
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higher education. With respect to the latter, the main body responsible for evalu-
ating colleges and universities is the Higher Education Review Unit (HERU) 
within the QAAET (Government of Bahrain, National Authority for Qualifica-
tions and Quality Assurance of Education and Training 2014).
 Like the Oman Academic Accreditation Authority, the HERU performs both 
institutional and program reviews. It follows standard international practice by 
asking the higher education institution to do an exhaustive self- study which is then 
submitted to a panel of experts who review the material within the self- study and 
then visit the campus to reach their own independent assessment. Since its estab-
lishment, the HERU has pursued an aggressive schedule of reviews and assess-
ments. Between 2008 and March 2013, for example, 15 institutions had been 
rigorously evaluated and 12 of these have also been subject to a follow- up report. 
These evaluations have been quite stringent as have separate assessments of degree 
programs. Since 2008, at least 37 specific degree programs have been reviewed and 
assigned an evaluation of “confidence,” “limited confidence,” or “no confidence.”
 The institution that supervises the licensing and accreditation of private 
universities in Kuwait is the Private University Council (PUC), which was 
created by the Emir’s 2000 decree referred to earlier. Eight experts comprise the 
membership of the PUC. They are appointed to three- year terms and must have 
no institutional relationship with any private university. The powers of the PUC 
are broad and, in many ways, go beyond those of the governmental accreditation 
agencies in other GCC countries (Government of Kuwait, Ministry of Higher 
Education, Private University Council, 2014).
 The eight- member board of the PUC oversees a process that includes institu-
tional self- studies and site visits by a panel of academic peers. Unlike Oman, 
Kuwait mainly relies on academics who are working within Kuwait. Only 30 
percent of the outside peer reviewers are not based in the country. In this sense, 
Kuwait and Bahrain are very similar. On the other hand, unlike Bahrain, the 
evaluation of universities within Kuwait is much less transparent, since none of 
the reports are publicly available. Although detailed documentation is absent 
from the public record, it is clear that the PUC does not automatically grant 
licenses to institutions that want to set up operations in Kuwait. Up until 2011, 
only half of the applicants received licenses to open, and as of December 2014, 
only eight private universities or colleges have received accreditation.
 Another factor that distinguishes the PUC from other accreditation agencies 
is its more direct involvement in the day- to-day running of private universities. 
This is partly a reflection of the more participatory political structure available to 
Kuwaiti nationals, who can use parliament and government agencies to complain 
directly about the services provided by the state. In the case of the PUC, this 
means that it more aggressively gets involved in creating and enforcing regula-
tions that might in other countries not exist or, if they exist, not be enforced. In 
addition, the PUC has powers to limit enrollment as well as to communicate to 
the higher education institution any problems or criticisms coming from well- 
placed members of the Kuwaiti polity. Professor Marjorie Kelly of the American 
University of Kuwait summarizes the PUC’s power particularly well:
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The PUC has wide- ranging powers in that it (1) licenses institutions, pro-
grams, majors and minors, (2) accredits institutions, and (3) provides stu-
dents with scholarships – which then entitles the PUC to select their majors 
for them. Further, the PUC specifies the number of students who may attend 
an institution and can withhold scholarships from those over the limit when 
the maximum number is exceeded. It even has a say in campus construction 
projects that could facilitate a larger enrolment. Lastly, the PUC is the com-
munications channel between the government (whether the Ministry of 
Higher Education or Parliament) and Kuwait’s private universities. If a 
Member of Parliament has a complaint or the Ministry wishes to implement 
new regulations, it is communicated to campus officials via the PUC.
(Kelly, 2011: 203)
Kelly notes in her article that this power is in fact exercised, at least with respect 
to the American University of Kuwait. For example, the PUC has ruled that stu-
dents cannot specialize in minor fields that are not also available as majors. The 
enforcement of this regulation meant that AUK was forced to cancel eight unli-
censed minors in Arabic, business administration, Gulf studies, mathematics, 
natural sciences, public relations and advertising, psychology, and visual and 
performing arts. This micro- meddling can clearly reduce the academic flexibility 
of an institution. On the other hand, the PUC has insisted that at least 85 percent 
of all faculty members have PhDs, and one could certainly argue that this inter-
vention is important for the maintenance of quality when the attempt to maxi-
mize net revenue by private owners of universities could lead to a search for 
cheaper, less qualified teachers. Perhaps, most ominously, the PUC has occa-
sionally used complaints from members of the public to attack liberal arts educa-
tion itself. Still, it must be said that this “traditionalist” critique of Western 
education has not yet found much traction.
Assessing the quality of new higher educational institutions
In all of the GCC countries, the purpose of the many layers of this assessment 
system described above, is to separate the evaluation of the institution from those 
administrators who directly manage it. This, in principle, should allow govern-
mental authorities who might be concerned about the quality of a particular uni-
versity or college to acquire more accurate information.
What are the assessment teams looking for? What constitutes a good 
university?
Given their association with the INQAAHE, it is not surprising that the evaluative 
standards are relatively similar for all of the GCC countries and fall under two major 
categories, institutional effectiveness and academic quality. Most external reports 
begin with an evaluation of an institution’s system of governance. Review boards 
expect each higher education institutions to have a clear system of administration 
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that separates academic management from the ownership group. In practice, this 
means that the Board of Directors (which represents the owners) should be distinct 
from the Board of Trustees (that is responsible for the overall quality of the univer-
sity or college). The direct management of the institution by an owner is normally 
taken as a sign that the educational mission of the college is subordinated to the fin-
ancial, political or idiosyncratic demands of the owner. For this reason, review 
boards also focus on the organizational structure of the institution so that it is clear 
which academic administrator is responsible for which parts of the university 
mission. In addition, the assessment bodies want to be sure that affiliations with 
non- national higher educational institutions are meaningful and productive. Overall, 
the audit review wishes to ensure that the management systems of the institution’s 
finances and operations are clear, stable and responsive to the Board of Trustees – 
which is seen as the entity that has final responsibility for the quality and stability of 
the higher educational institution.
 In investigating the academic quality of the institution, the review panels 
check whether or not the institution is able to deliver a high- quality curriculum 
that produces effective learning. This involves implementing assessment systems 
that can evaluate student learning and teacher quality. For students, entry 
requirements are supposed to be clear and transparent; they are advised appro-
priately so that a high proportion successfully complete their degree program in 
a reasonable period of time; course and program outcomes are clearly stated and 
well aligned with assessment tools; academic integrity is enforced and students 
are able to find employment after graduation.
 For faculty, the expectation is that they are directly involved in developing 
curriculum as well as in student evaluation. Moreover, depending on the cat-
egory of the college and university, professors and instructors are expected to be 
active researchers or attract consultancy funding. With respect to teaching, the 
expectation is that an audited university or college will be able to demonstrate 
that the institution has implemented measures that allow administrators to effect-
ively evaluate teaching quality through student assessment as well as through the 
development of portfolios that can document student achievement. As with 
assessment procedures in the United States, the emphasis is on generating data 
that can be evaluated by outside bodies. Such information can obviously be of 
use to governmental authorities as well when they are attempting to ensure that 
these new colleges and universities are fulfilling the goal of providing high 
quality educational alternatives to the national population.
 One result of the drive to create new regulatory measures to assess the per-
formance of the new universities is that researchers now possess a considerable 
amount of information on the new higher education institutions of these coun-
tries. Bahrain and Oman have not only embarked on an aggressive assessment of 
all the new colleges and universities, but they have also chosen to allow the 
public to read many of their reports. The CAA in the UAE publishes on its portal 
the results of the accreditation process but the audit reports are not public. This 
provides researchers with an abundance of information which has not yet been 
tapped. Our review of these reports reveals several issues which suggest that the 
146  Assessing quality
drive to create more private colleges and universities has not necessarily 
upgraded the quality of higher education. The first issue concerns the difficulties 
many of these new institutions face in establishing the appropriate governance 
procedures that can ensure academic quality. A second problem relates to heavy 
teaching loads that generally affect both their teaching quality and potential for 
serious high- level research. Finally, these challenges are compounded by the 
inadequate academic preparation of high school students, even with the provi-
sion of foundation programs to improve students’ competence in English, math-
ematics and IT to enable them to perform university- level academic work.
The issue of governance
Established Western academic institutions have governance systems that are 
quite different from most workplaces. The professoriate is more intimately 
involved in the governance of their own institutions than most other profes-
sionals – even if formal power resides with university administrators who are 
normally recruited from the ranks of senior academic workers. Academic 
workers are largely responsible for the development and management of the cur-
ricula. Senior professors often play a major role in deciding on the future com-
position of the academic faculty. Tenured faculty have both job security and 
time to pursue research projects which interest them. Despite trends of conver-
gence and homogenization in higher education curricula, it is less clear that the 
transplantation of Western education models have carried these institutionalized 
governance practices with them. With the increasing trend of corporatization of 
higher education, it is worth noting, however, that this model is under some 
threat, even in the West where alleged cost pressures are leading to the hiring of 
a more contingent adjunct faculty and academic workers with temporary con-
tracts. Nevertheless, the question is worth asking: does the attempt to create high 
quality Westernized degree programs or academic institutions imply the adop-
tion of the participatory system of governance just outlined?
 The Bahraini and Omani auditing panels flag the issue of governance as a 
major problem in their reports. They begin by assessing evidence showing that 
the academic policy- making decisions and the management procedures are often 
dictated by an owner or a Board of Directors. The panels recommend the cre-
ation of an independent Board of Trustees and academic governance procedures 
that include academic officers and the faculty. The premise behind this approach 
is that if the Board of Trustees operates effectively and contains respected 
members of the business community and civil society who have an independent 
voice, the university is more likely to be managed in a way that protects the aca-
demic integrity of the college and university. Moreover, it is assumed by the 
accreditation authority that investors or members of the Board of Directors will 
normally not have the expertise to manage an educational institution appropri-
ately. As the audit panel of the Al Zahra College for Women said in its report, 
“The separation of ownership, governance, and management is essential to avoid 
potential conflicts of interest and to ensure that the contribution of each is made 
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within the sphere of its own expertise” (Government of Oman, Oman Academic 
Accreditation Authority, 2010: 11).
 In Oman, it is clear from the reports that many of the private higher educa-
tional institutions fail to meet these governance accreditation standards. Accord-
ing to the 18 accreditation reports submitted for private colleges up until 2013, 
nine institutions failed to have a functioning Board of Trustees. Moreover, of the 
remaining nine, five of the Boards of Trustees did not seem to be able to assert 
oversight responsibilities for the educational mission of the institution. The most 
common problems cited in these sections of the report are excessive control by 
the Chair of the Board of Directors (who is often, one can assume, the principal 
owner), a failure of the Board of Trustees or Academic Councils to meet regu-
larly and keep minutes, and an insufficient delineation of responsibilities 
between the Board of Directors and other governing bodies.
 In Bahrain, the reports of the HERU reveal similar governance problems. On 
the one hand, most of the branch campuses are controlled by their parent institu-
tions in such a way that the institution cannot respond to the particular problems 
associated with running an effective higher education program in Bahrain. On 
the other hand, many of the other private, for- profit colleges are excessively con-
trolled by the owner of the institution. In both cases, the academic staff ’s ability 
to have some influence in the design of degree programs is limited. In addition, 
there is strong evidence that the colleges and universities organized in this way 
are more concerned about the cash generated by tuition fees than the ability of 
students to do the required academic work.
 The private institutions which seem to be more successful in meeting the cri-
teria of the accreditation authorities are moving toward a model of governance 
that most closely resembles that of a non- profit Western institution. For example, 
as an extreme case, the Board of Directors of Dhofar University in Oman has 
dissolved itself and transferred all authority to a Board of Trustees. On the other 
hand, it is clear that a relatively large proportion of the smaller IT and business 
colleges are having difficulty making this transition. The Omani auditing reports 
do not give enough institutional detail, but it is apparent that many of the owners 
do not wish to cede authority that could negatively affect financial returns. In 
other words, some of the ownership groups probably fail to recognize either 
explicitly or implicitly that a higher educational institution cannot be run as a 
normal business if it hopes to gain national or international recognition.
 It is important to note that there is insufficient evidence relating to issues 
associated with governance. Gathering complete data would require more 
detailed, institution- specific studies followed by the aggregation of information 
that could be extracted from these ethnographies. On a more general, impres-
sionistic level, however, the accreditation reports give us reason to question 
whether the transplantation of academic programs will automatically carry with 
them the participatory practices of academic governance. The creation of 
effective faculty senates and related regulations that promote academic adminis-
trative autonomy depend on the political culture of the host society and the 
potential for academic staff to use their voice to force changes in their own 
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universities and colleges. This is particularly difficult given that in most cases 
the majority of the faculty are expatriates whose residency requirements limit 
their freedom of action or simply do not feel engaged enough in meaningful 
long- term change. Moreover, the decision to privatize higher education and 
subject universities and colleges to international influences has been, more often 
than not, a top- down process driven by shifts in state policy and financial 
constraints.
Faculty working conditions and student preparation
The second problem addressed by the reports concerns teaching loads. A teach-
ing load of four to five courses per semester seems to be the norm for most insti-
tutions, and in some cases, there have been reports of faculty having to teach 
seven classes in a single semester. Given this teaching load, it is impossible to 
expect faculty to develop creative, engaging courses, and in a few cases, this 
issue is “resolved” by providing faculty members with PowerPoint slides and 
syllabi that they are then expected to follow. Some reports also suggest that 
faculty members are teaching courses outside their field of expertise. It is clear 
in these cases that it would be impossible to expect the academic staff to produce 
and disseminate research, and indeed, many reports note that pledges to enhance 
the research capabilities of the new universities and colleges are often not per-
suasive. For such institutions, we seem a long way from the idea that reforming 
higher education will lead to a dynamic “knowledge economy.”
 These difficulties are compounded by the issue that many of the students 
entering higher education are unprepared to do tertiary level academic work. The 
reports frequently mention the lack of academic preparation of many of the stu-
dents enrolling in these private universities. Often the problem centers on the 
inability to pursue higher education studies in English. Nearly all private higher 
educational institutions, for example, require students to pass standardized tests 
to demonstrate their competence in English, the medium of instruction in most 
subjects, mathematics and information technology. Low test results lead to a 
large number of students needing to spend between one to four semesters in 
foundation programs. But even this is not enough to raise proficiency levels. For 
example, all Omani audit panels’ reports express concern that students are 
passed through the foundation programs too quickly. More than half of the 
higher institutions were passing students onto degree programs even though they 
had not obtained the minimum TOEFL score (500) set by Omani national 
authorities. In addition, the audit report on Oman’s public Sultan Qaboos Uni-
versity noted that the requirement that incoming students only had one year to 
pass through the foundation program often placed pressure on the program to 
pass students through too quickly.
 These difficulties inevitably lead to negative academic evaluations by many 
of the external review panels. Bahrain’s HERU, for example, evaluated the 
majority of the degree programs negatively. Only 11 of the degree offerings of 
the 37 degree programs that were reviewed received the “confidence” grade; 11 
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other degree programs obtained the “limited confidence” evaluation; while the 
program review team stated that they had “no confidence” in the final 15 degree 
programs they assessed. Nine follow- up reviews led to improvement in six cases, 
but this still leaves a rather large number of programs being offered in Bahrain 
that do not meet minimal accreditation standards (Government of Bahrain, 
2013).
 Although accreditation reports from the rest of the GCC countries are not 
publicly available, other sources of information such as the RAND reports from 
Qatar, reports from ADEC and KHDA in the UAE as well as media reports in all 
GCC countries point to similar conditions everywhere. The poor preparation of 
high school graduates for university study is well attested and, as we indicated in 
Chapter 5, has led to significant reforms everywhere in the GCC primary and 
secondary educational sectors.
Repercussions of poor quality higher education: the case of 
Bahrain
The problem of inadequate quality of higher education has had at least one 
highly publicized regional repercussion. On September 27, 2007, the Bahraini Al 
Wasat newspaper reported on rumors that the Kuwait Minister of Education had 
decided not to recognize or accredit the degrees of a series of private universities 
in Bahrain (Awadh, 2007). This rumor was confirmed on May 29, 2009, when 
newspapers reported that the Kuwaiti authorities had announced that the degrees 
of 40 universities around the world would not be recognized by the Ministry of 
Education. Such a decision obviously is of great import for those Kuwaiti stu-
dents and their parents who have decided to get college degrees in Bahrain and 
elsewhere.5 Within Bahrain, six of the new private universities were on the list. 
Kuwaiti students who had already received degrees from these institutions would 
not be punished, but all other Kuwaiti students were directed to suspend their 
enrollments. New students were told that they should not accept admission into 
the now banned institutions (Government of Kuwait, Ministry of Higher Educa-
tion, 2009).
 Although some Bahrainis believed that the Kuwaiti decision was not related 
to assessment of educational quality, but rather a result of internal and inter- 
regional political rivalries, it is important to note that the Council of Higher 
Education of Bahrain also took drastic actions against some of these same insti-
tutions. During August 2011, the Council suspended five private higher educa-
tion institutions for one year and one private university for a semester. Later, 
some of these suspensions were revoked, but clearly Bahraini higher educational 
institutions suffered a substantial loss in reputation.
 Despite these findings, one should not necessarily assume that these institu-
tions cannot be reformed. In several, but not all, of the cases discussed here, fol-
low- up reports noted that the institutions under review did establish a functioning 
Board of Trustees and made an effort to improve working conditions for their 
faculty. Now that an impressive and transparent regime of supervision and 
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accountability has been established throughout the region, we should expect to 
be able to determine whether governmental Western- style regulation are capable 
of improving and upgrading higher education.
Conclusion
The reports and official documents we have reviewed show that all GCC coun-
tries, except Qatar, have created national bodies to oversee the quality of 
education being delivered by private institutions. Moreover, these new govern-
mental organizations are now beginning to subject public universities to the 
same accreditation procedures. Ruling authorities evidently feel the need for 
increased competition in the higher education sector to be coupled with the 
establishment of robust governmental regulatory agencies. Our analysis sug-
gests that quality assessment regulations are particularly important to pressure 
smaller colleges to provide a higher quality university education. In the 
absence of rigorous reviews of an institution’s academic integrity, some educa-
tional entrepreneurs will be tempted to cut corners and offer a cheap, but aca-
demically inferior, product. In fact, many of the negative evaluations are from 
relatively small, for- profit higher educational institutions that provide a limited 
set of degree programs in business and information technology. In these insti-
tutions, there is often limited attention paid to the academic quality of the 
student body. Authoritarian administrative controls by their owners have 
imposed onerous working conditions on faculty that make the delivery of high 
quality teaching and research unlikely. In addition, these institutions’ expecta-
tions of direct accountability to students and their parents are sometimes 
weaker because the cost of education is covered by government scholarships 
for most national students.
 The more ambitious universities and colleges that offer a larger menu of 
alternative degree programs and seem more committed to an introductory period 
of liberal arts education for their first- year and second- year students have been 
able to create a more sustainable, high quality educational experience. Such 
institutions (even if they are for- profit) tend to delegate the institution’s govern-
ance to well qualified administrators with respectable academic credentials, who 
in turn rely on faculty for the design and implementation of the curriculum as 
well as the evaluation of student performance. The research output of faculty in 
these new private institutions is still limited, but if some of the more established 
private or semi- private institutions begin to offer postgraduate degrees, particu-
larly PhDs, they will have to reduce classroom teaching for some of the faculty 
in return for greater research productivity.
 It is still too early to tell whether or not the combination of increased com-
petition and these regulatory interventions will be successful in raising the 
quality of education. It is still too early to come to definitive conclusions since 
all of the new higher educational regulatory bodies are less than 15 years old and 
all of the new colleges and universities are young as well. Nevertheless, the GCC 
states have introduced robust regulatory processes, and the assessment reports 
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that have and will be generated will provide an ability to assess the reasons why 
some higher educational institutions succeed and others fail.6
Notes
1 This problem can also apply to apples. Consumers normally will not know whether or 
not the apple was produced safely. Thus, we rely on governmental authorities to ensure 
that the fruit is not poisoned with substances that could endanger our health.
2 Other American- type universities in the Arab world have also sought and received 
accreditation from either the Middle States Commission on Higher Education (Amer-
ican University in Cairo and the American University of Beirut) or the New England 
Association of Universities and Colleges (the Lebanese- American University).
3 For KSA’s accreditation processes, see Chapter 7.
4 The Abu Dhabi Educational Council (ADEC) does not have a special body to license 
or accredit tertiary institution located in the emirate. Its Policy, Planning and Perform-
ance Management Division (PPPM) oversees the quality of education by coordinating 
with the CAA, the Federal Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research 
Commission.
5 The Kuwaiti ministry does not accredit degrees until the first cohort of students have 
graduated. It relies on information provided by the cultural office of the Kuwaiti 
embassy and then a committee of members from Kuwait University, the Council of 
Higher Education in Kuwait, the Institute of Higher Education, and the Public Author-
ity of Higher Education is constituted to decide whether or not the degree should be 
accredited so that the student graduates can present a reputable degree to employers 
inside Kuwait.
6 However, we must also be cognizant of the risk of over- regulating. Submitting to 
multitudes of accreditation processes may become an end in itself. It is sometimes felt 
to be too cumbersome, too frequent and in some cases to serve political ends. This, 
however, is not unique to the GCC higher education but is the consequence of global 
competition.
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Saudi Arabia is investing more than ever in higher education, with approxi-
mately 12 percent of the national budget (US$160 billion) earmarked for its 
development (Alankari, 2013: 3). This increased investment is justified by the 
government’s growing realization that the working- age population will increase 
from 3.99 million in 2004 to 8.26 million by 2020 (Aljughaiman and Grigor-
enko, 2013). This highlights how the education system in the largest Arab 
economy (in terms of total GDP), with the highest oil exports, the largest con-
ventional petroleum reserves, the highest population of foreign workers, and one 
of the highest birth rates is evolving. The Saudi government invests USD $22 
billion a year in university students, allowances and scholarships. Latest statis-
tics indicate that 1,058,155 male and female students, enrolled in 28 public 
universities, each cost the government US$19,000 a year. The number of stu-
dents abroad has reached 147,000 (74 percent are males and 54 percent are in 
the United States), and the percentage of Saudi high school graduates who enter 
university is, at 92 percent, the highest in the world (AlShehri, 2014).2
 In the last decade, the number of students enrolled in tertiary education, 
accommodated by 28 public and ten private universities, reached 1.2 million. 
Thus the focus in Saudi Arabia’s education system is not only on increasing the 
number of colleges and universities and student enrollment, but according to the 
Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE) the focus is more on improving the capa-
city of educational institutions to compete and participate in the global economy 
by maintaining international quality standards. The knowledge economy per-
spective of the Saudi economic planners stresses the importance of the market 
and the economy; higher education is meant to help insert Saudi nationals into 
globalized commodity production as creative professional workers as well.
 The Saudi Arabian government provides significant support to post- secondary 
students. Those who attend public universities pay no tuition and receive a 
monthly allowance. More than 48 percent of students in private universities are 
funded by the government’s “internal” scholarships and approximately 85 
percent of Saudi students studying abroad are supported by government funding 
through the King Abdullah Scholarship Program (KASP), which covers travel, 
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tuition and living expenses for recipients, their spouses and their children. 
Another important fact to consider when analyzing higher education is Saudi 
Arabia’s rigorous commitment to gender segregation – except for King Abdullah 
University of Science and Technology (KAUST), a postgraduate university 
established in 2008, located 350 kilometers south of Jeddah. Women and men 
study in separate campuses. King Fahd University for Petroleum and Minerals 
(KFUPM), which is in Dhahran, is an all- male university, and Princess Nora 
University (PNU), which is in Riyadh, is an all- female university.
 As we shall see, this commitment to gender segregation has an impact on the 
ability of women to gain access to the labor market for the high number of young 
Saudi women with higher education (Aljughaiman and Grigorenko, 2013; 
Jamjoom and Kelly, 2013). When women are only allowed to work in schools, 
hospitals and banks that strictly serve women, this limits their employment 
opportunities. Moreover, as stated by Aljughaiman and Grigorenko (2013: 309): 
although women are not restricted from all engineering fields – they can 
study internal design engineering and computer science engineering – other 
kinds of engineering like chemical engineering, petroleum engineering, 
electrical engineering, and so forth are not open to girls because there are no 
employment opportunities available for them in these fields. 
By controlling women’s access to labor market education, the Kingdom is not 
preparing Saudi women for the global economy; it perpetuates the socially 
accepted status quo (Baki, 2004).
 In addition to providing large- scale subsidies and imposing gender segrega-
tion, a third factor that distinguishes Saudi Arabia’s higher education is its strong 
emphasis on Islamic teaching:
While there is a particular focus on scientific and technological development 
in order to improve international competitiveness of the Kingdom, there is 
also a significant allocation of funds for programs aimed at deepening 
Islamic values, morals, and allegiance to family, society and nation, and 
appreciating and preserving national achievement.
(Smith and Abouammoh, 2013: 4)
The establishment and growth of universities in Saudi Arabia raises a variety of 
economic, social and cultural issues. Arguably the most salient is the question of 
quality and accessibility to all. Drawing on publicly available information on 
Saudi education as well as the researcher’s personal observations and experi-
ences from working in Saudi private institutions, this chapter argues that the 
emergence and growth of universities has led to significant changes in the status 
quo, including tangible and meaningful improvements to the accessibility and 
quality of Saudi higher education. At the same time, more time is required to 
evaluate the extent to which HE is participating in building a knowledge- based 
economy. While the government has one goal for education (promoting the 
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knowledge economy), there are other goals intrinsic to the educational project, 
such as promoting critical thinking so that graduates can more effectively 
reshape their environment.
 This chapter will also provide the reader with a comprehensive description of 
the significant and rapid structural transformations and reforms in higher educa-
tion in Saudi Arabia over the past decade. It will attempt to assess the educa-
tional, institutional, economic and socio- cultural viability of these changes, 
considering that HE essentially only began in 1957 with the first Saudi univer-
sity (Al- Eisa and Smith, 2013: 28). Critics (Smith and Abouammoh, 2013; Mazi 
and Altbach, 2013) agree that although SA is demonstrating remarkable energy 
in improving its HE system; there is a great need for strategic planning under-
pinned by conceptual discipline and procedural rigor; success can only be 
achieved with timely and strategic implementation and deployment of necessary 
human capital, administrative infrastructure, technology systems, grounding in 
local needs, and collaborative networks.
General context
Currently, KSA’s population is estimated at 28.8 million, eight million of whom 
are non- native. This figure is projected to rise to 44.8 million by 2025, with 
approximately 49 percent under the age of 20 (MoHE, 2012). These demo-
graphic changes are already having significant implications for the education 
system. More specifically, the high birth rate means that universities are under 
pressure to take extra measures to meet the growing demand for student 
enrollment.
 Saudi Arabia’s demographic characteristics are unique to the Gulf region. 
According to the World Bank (2013b), the Saudi population’s growth rate was at 
1.75 percent (2010 estimate) and in 2009 there were 28,686,633 Saudi nationals 
and 5,576,076 migrant workers (Saudi Arabia Demographics Profile 2013, 
2013). The high population growth rate has led to a rapid rise in the general 
youth population and in the number of high school graduates. Indeed, according 
to the MoHE (2010: 10), “the percentage of citizens less than 24 years of age is 
more than 62% and the number of high school graduates had increased by 443% 
from 1993 to 2008.” This expansion in the number of high school graduates is 
imposing unprecedented pressure on the Kingdom’s post- secondary institutions. 
Numerous studies have confirmed that the rising demand for HE in Saudi Arabia 
is challenging and highlighting the inability of the HE system to keep up with 
appropriate program options and job market preparation (Mosa, 2000, as cited in 
Alkhazim, 2003: 483; ICDL, n.d.: 1). During the 2000–1 academic year, around 
60,000 of the high school graduates who applied to higher- education institutions 
in Saudi Arabia were unable to find placements. In 2001, between 25,000 and 
30,000 Saudi students studied abroad at their own expense, and a further 6,000 
studied abroad with government support (MoHE, 2001, as cited in Alkhazim, 
2003: 483). These numbers have dramatically increased since then, and the 
estimated number of students who are being  supported by the government with 
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full scholarships for international studies has now reached 150,000 spread across 
75 countries. Some of these students pursue educational opportunities elsewhere 
in the Arab world in such countries as the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and 
Qatar. Others are studying in the West, especially in the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Canada and Australia.
The need for expansion: the need for foreign workers
According to the latest national statistics (2010), the Saudi population of 28 
million included over eight million non- nationals, who together comprised about 
33 percent of the labor force. The oil- driven economic boom of the 1970s and 
1980s increased the number of foreign workers, and at one point this group com-
prised around 95 percent of the private sector’s labor force (Okruhlik, 2005: 
155). This large migrant workforce underlines the need to offer more opportun-
ities for Saudis to address the skills shortfall through higher education. The 
expatriate labor force is the largest in the region, but its relative presence (in 
terms of percentages of the population or the labor force) is significantly lower 
than Kuwait, UAE and Qatar.
 While foreign workers play a valuable role in the Saudi economy, they do so 
at a significant cost. Most of their income is repatriated to their countries of 
origin, a phenomenon that represents an outright loss to the Saudi economy. The 
sheer scale of this outflow is immense: worker “[r]emittances for the first eight 
months of 2009 totaled $15 billion” (Baxter, 2010: §1). Furthermore, the exper-
tise that these employees gain while working in Saudi Arabia is irretrievably lost 
to the Kingdom when they leave. This expertise could instead be cultivated 
among Saudi citizens, who would eventually take their place as the core of the 
Kingdom’s elite workers.
 Economic expansion has ironically created an unemployment problem for 
Saudi nationals, which makes one of the long- term goals to get educated Saudis 
to replace expatriate professionals. Increasing Saudi participation in the labor 
market is therefore vital if KSA is to curtail its dependence on migrant workers. 
Expanding public and private higher educational institutions is seen as playing a 
pivotal role in effecting this change, and despite the fact that the expansion of 
higher education has opened many job opportunities, foreign workers and expa-
triate professors and lecturers continue to fill the majority of positions. It is not 
clear that the MoHE has any specific plans to reduce this reliance on foreign aca-
demic workers. 
Increasing the number of HE institutions and enrollment
The drive to expand this sector has led to a steep rise in both the number of 
higher education institutions and in enrollments (MoHE, 2011). The scale of this 
expansion can be seen in Tables 7.1 and 7.2.
 The enrollment rate in 2011 was 37.8 percent, higher than the world average 
of 26 percent and the regional average of 21 percent within Arab countries taken 
Reforming higher education in Saudi Arabia  157
as a whole (MoHE, 2011). Since King Abdullah succeeded to the throne in 2005, 
improving the higher education system has become the government’s top pri-
ority. One of the most prominent education reform initiatives is the King Abdul-
lah bin Abdulaziz Public Education Development Project, also known as 
Tatweer. Another initiative, which is considered a national priority to foster 
international competence of a nation, is the King Abdullah Scholarship Program 
(KASP); this initiative funds the international programs that sponsor over 
147,000 Saudi male and female students in 45 countries.
 The Saudi government’s strategy for higher education has a significant 
domestic component. The education authorities are primarily attempting to 
satisfy the overflow in demand for post- secondary education by expanding the 
number of universities and colleges within the Kingdom (MoHE, 2010). This 
expansion involves the establishment of both public and private universities, a 
process that has entailed the partial privatization of higher education. Over ten 
private universities and 21 colleges have been established since 2001 (when 
there were only seven universities in the country, all of them public and oper-
ated by the MoHE), accommodating more than 35,000 students (Mazi and 
Altbach, 2013). By 2010 this number had increased to 28 public universities, 
nine private universities run by private investors, 423 colleges of pure and 
applied sciences (see Tables 7.3 and 7.4), and 20 privately run colleges (see 
Table 7.5) (MoHE, 2010: 10). All offer bachelor degrees with only a few 
offering postgraduate diplomas and degrees. Public–private partnerships is a 
term that best reflects the situation of private- sector involvement in KSA, 
where the government’s decision to subsidise land rental loans and tuition fees 
Table 7.1 Growth of universities in KSA (2005–14)
2005 2014 Growth 
Public 11 29 123%
Private  4 10 100%
Total 15 39 113%
Population 22.7 28.1  19.4%
Number of universities per million people  0.7  1.2  71.4%
Source: Ministry of Higher Education (2014).
Table 7.2 Growth of colleges in KSA (2005–14)
Year 2005 2014 Growth
Public 301 395  31%
Private 13 39 200%
Total 314 434  38%
Population 22.7 27.1  19.4
Source: Ministry of Higher Education (2014).
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indicates the extent to which it is prepared to support private universities (Al- 
Dali et al., 2013: 130).
 The Saudi government is also responding to the growth in demand for HE by 
sponsoring selected students to study overseas (especially in Western institu-
tions). Even though increasing amounts of travel and tuition funding are being 
used to send students abroad to Western countries, the government’s core pri-
ority is to expand the domestic university and college sector, in particular 
through the creation of new institutions and domestic scholarships. In addition, 
as part of its drive to increase capacity, the MoHE offers 10,000 scholarships per 
year for domestic study, which cover 50 percent of the cost of tuition in most 
Saudi Arabian private universities. Half the tuition is covered for selected stu-
dents to attend private universities and colleges in the Kingdom and full 
Table 7.3 Public universities in KSA
University City Year founded
King Saud University Riyadh 1957
King Abdulaziz University Jeddah 1967
King Faisal University Al-Ahsa 1975
Umm al-Qura University Mecca 1949
King Fahd University of Petroleum and 
Minerals
Dhahran 1963
Islamic University Medina 1961
Al-Imam Mohammad Ibn Saud Islamic 
University
Riyadh 1974
King Khalid University Multiple locations 1999
King Abdullah University for Science and 
Technology
Jeddah 2009
Taibah University Medina 2003
Taif University Taif 2003
Qassim University Buraydah 2004
University of Ha’il Hail 2005
Jazan University Jazan 2005
Al Jouf University Al-Jawf 2005
King Saud bin Abdulaziz University for Health 
Sciences
Riyadh 2005
Al Baha University Al Baha 2005
University of Tabuk Tabuk 2006
Najran University Najran 2006
Northern Borders University Arar 2007
Princess Nora bint Abdulrahman University Riyadh 2005
University of Dammam Dammam 2007
Prince Salman University Al Kharj 2006
Shagra University Shagra 2009
Almajmaah University Majmaah 2009
Hafr Albaten University Hafr Albaten 2014
Jeddah University Jeddah 2014
Beesha University Beesha 2014
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coverage for students in all public universities through postgraduate education in 
all disciplines.
Private higher education in Saudi Arabia: a growing 
partner?
In recent years, Saudi Arabia has increasingly moved toward adopting a 
Western- style institutional model. For instance, the emerging private educational 
institutions are largely run on a Western model and prefer to hire Western staff 
and faculty to run their programs. The private Saudi universities, in seeking to 
build a prestigious reputation by pursuing American accreditation, attempt to 
attract teaching staff from North America, Europe and Australia with high sal-
aries and benefit packages (such as a child education allowance in international 
schools up to US$30,000, travel, free accommodation, and health insurance). 
These benefits are strictly for foreign academics; Saudi nationals receive only a 
stipend. The argument is that these packages are supposed to be highly attractive 
for academics to work and live in Saudi Arabia. Private institutions also hire 
foreign consultants in an attempt to replicate Western curricula. Some observers 
argue that these measures are meant to appeal to Saudi families that would prefer 
their children (and particularly their daughters) to attend local institutions with 
international characteristics instead of having them go abroad beyond the reach 
of their family’s protection and supervision.
 The emergence of private universities in Saudi Arabia and their role in the 
abrupt yet necessary expansion of higher education are of international scholarly 
interest. As Mazi and Altbach (2013) argue, Saudi private institutions are of 
mixed quality: some have achieved good standards and local, regional and inter-
national reputation, while some for- profit institutions have not. In 2013, the 
MoHE closed two private institutions in Jeddah and Riyadh because they did not 
meet the standards set by the General Committee for Licensing and Approvals of 
Colleges, while some private institutions gained full accreditation or semi- 
accreditation, such as Prince Sultan University, Effat University, Al- Riyadh 
College of Dentistry and Pharmacy, College of Business Administration, and 
Dar AlHekma College, which became a university in 2005. A number of key 
questions flow from KSA’s willingness to support the substantial privatization 
of this sector.
 The decision to establish private universities followed a national debate that 
concentrated on the issue of employability (see Bosbait and Wilson, 2005, for an 
elaboration on this issue). Studies such as Bosbait and Wilson’s have indicated 
that Saudi graduates lacked skills needed in the job market and thus were unem-
ployable, which is the reason given for the private sector heavily relying on 
foreign workers for years. “The belief developed that traditional university 
graduates were not sufficiently attuned to the practical skills required for Saudi’s 
future economy and that private education sector was better placed to deliver 
this outcome” (Al- Dali et al., 2013: 28). One of the reasons for the government’s 
plan to expand access to private higher education was that rapid economic 
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growth had created a cluster of middle- class families with not only the ability 
but also a strong desire to pay for a better education for their children.
 Another significant factor for the government’s willingness to support private 
higher education was the growing dissatisfaction with the caliber of graduates’ 
key workforce- related skills, such as critical thinking, problem solving, personal 
responsibility, as well as independence and a strong work ethic. The shortage of 
business skills among Saudi nationals is also a major factor driving the importa-
tion of large numbers of foreign workers. Thus, Nolan (2012: 14) suggests that 
“education reform was cited as a pillar of the efforts to diversify the Saudi 
economy, to ‘Saudize’ the Kingdom’s companies and to address labour market 
inefficiencies and growing youth unemployment.” The belief among many 
policy- makers, that existing public universities generally do not produce gradu-
ates who meet the requirements of Saudi Arabia’s growing economy, is often 
given as a major reason for the decision to expand the private education sector 
(Al-Dali, et al., 2013 Alkhazim, 2009; AlMunajjed, 2008). Indeed, the govern-
ment recently acknowledged the importance of higher education institutions 
responding to economic imperatives in an official report:
All the specializations in private colleges and universities are linked to the 
needs of the labour market, both current and future . . . [they] have been 
selected very carefully so as to ensure the distinction of their products and 
their fulfilment of national development requirements.
(MoHE, 2008: 12, emphasis added)
For instance, at a private university in the Eastern Province, the choices of 
majors offered to students were based on a needs survey of the job market, 
which included a large- scale job- market analysis. Thus, it is clear that the aim of 
privatization is to offer programs and degrees that will not only attract students 
but also qualify them for professional employment. More specifically, private 
universities are trying to overcome some of the barriers in order to make Saudi 
degree holders as appealing to employers as foreign workers with similar cre-
dentials. One of the most deeply rooted barriers to employment is associated 
with Saudi Arabia’s “banking concept of education” (Freire, 2003) – an instruc-
tional approach that emphasizes memorization at the expense of critical thinking 
skills. This raises an interesting issue. To get workers “ready” for a knowledge 
economy, they cannot just learn or memorize skills. They have to develop their 
intrinsic intellectual abilities. So there might not be a conflict between acquiring 
high- level skills and a non- utilitarian liberal education.
Quality and accessibility
Governance and accountability in post- secondary institutions
The Saudi authorities have demonstrated considerable interest in holding univer-
sities accountable for the quality of the education they deliver. This interest is in 
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part a reflection of the goal of building the national and international reputation 
of the Kingdom’s post- secondary institutions (Darandari and Cardew, 2013: 78). 
It appears that the government is turning to a range of accountability systems – 
for universities in general, not only for private universities – to achieve this 
purpose.
 One aspect of accountability is the government’s supervision of universities. 
All higher education institutions are under the umbrella of the MoHE, which in 
turn is under the control of the Higher Education Council. The MoHE deter-
mines and enforces all the rules, regulations and practices of higher education 
institutions in Saudi Arabia, including those of privately owned institutions. The 
public–private distinction is somewhat blurred by this governance structure 
because the MoHE supervises both types of institution. Both public and private 
universities are required to follow the MoHE’s rules and guidelines when 
seeking approval for new programs. Alkhazim (2009) suggests that this situation 
makes it seem like the private universities are de facto public universities. Others 
have referred to it as a public–private partnership since governance and financial 
support are managed by the MoHE (Al- Dali et al., 2013). This state of affairs 
contrasts with that of the other member nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(Al- Dali et al., 2013), where “[p]rivately owned educational institutions [. . .] are 
not strictly controlled by the state” (Brandenburg, 2010: 6). A few private educa-
tion institutions had received NCAAA (National Commission for Assessment 
and Academic Accreditation) accreditation for the programs they offer. Also a 
few public universities are on the list of accredited institutions and offer accred-
ited programs. Recently four public universities (one of which is the newly 
established  KAUST in 2009) appeared in relatively high positions in the Shang-
hai Ranking, which is not the subject of this chapter (Academic World Univer-
sity Ranking, 2014).
Teaching and learning
Higher education teaching and learning in Saudi Arabia has received inter-
national attention in the past decade. Traditional pedagogy, rote and didactic 
learning, and the emphasis on memorization rather than critical thinking and 
problem solving are major hurdles for quality HE. Teaching and learning heavily 
influences graduates’ ability to engage in the workforce, and if not well trained 
they become an obstacle within the knowledge- based economy. This challenge 
of graduates’ lack of skills can be overcome by a shared vision between indi-
vidual teachers, department heads, colleges, institutional leaders, and the national 
government itself through the MoHE to ensure that graduates are equipped with 
the skills needed in the job market (Alnassar and Dow, 2013). Public and private 
universities and colleges started implementing a preparatory year to bridge the 
gap between secondary school and freshman year. In the preparatory year “there 
is explicit teaching of basic knowledge, explicit teaching of how to learn and the 
teaching of study techniques and skills” (Alnassar and Dow, 2013: 52). The 
MoHE has been trying to diversify and introduce innovation in teaching and 
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learning strategies in the classroom, but the outcomes have yet to be evaluated 
(Aljughaiman and Grigorenko, 2013: 310). To a certain extent in recent years, 
because of MoHE efforts of encouraging faculty training inside their home 
universities and overseas, it seems that teacher- centred approaches have been 
replaced by student- centred approaches and learning outcome based assessment 
models. Teacher- centred approaches are how teachers traditionally have taught, 
where students are passive and powerless and teachers “own” knowledge and 
are transmitters of it; in contrast, student- centred approaches empower students, 
and teachers become facilitators and supporters of learning. Delivering high- 
quality teaching and learning in higher education is paramount for progressing 
and transforming HE and building the knowledge economy.
 These educational reforms involve academics in the development of curricula 
or in university governance of academic standards. Many universities have 
established deanships of faculty development in which short programs are 
designed to support faculty members’ professional development and further 
develop faculty skills (Al- Ghamdi and Tight, 2013). Moreover, some univer-
sities have established awards and incentives for excellence linked to faculty 
members’ evaluation (Al- Ghamdi et al., 2010). Therefore, building human cap-
abilities – a term used by Amartya Sen instead of human capital in the context of 
educational reform, since it shifts the emphasis away from education as pure 
commodity production – should be the primary aim for Saudi universities (Fre-
diani, 2010). What measures are currently taking place to improve the quality of 
education remains a focus for further exploration.
Importation of Western curricula and teaching staff
Saudi universities are seeking national and international credibility and visibility 
– first and foremost through their pursuit of foreign accreditation (Darandari and 
Cardew, 2013). The desire for reputational enhancement also extends into 
universities’ curricular strategies. For instance, most if not all private higher 
education institutions in Saudi Arabia employ curricula transplanted from the 
West with few modifications, a practice that is continuing virtually unrestricted. 
Indeed, according to the MoHE: “because of the importance of benefiting from 
the experience of international universities, most private universities and col-
leges in the Kingdom have entered into contracts of cooperation and partnership 
with a number of prestigious international universities” (MoHE, 2010: 12).
 The Texas International Education Consortium (TIEC), for instance, has 
designed several curricula implemented in the Saudi educational system “based 
on the American model for academic programs and administrative organization” 
(www.tiec.org/, 2010). As can be seen from its website, TIEC claims to offer a 
comprehensive package designed for clients who are seeking to establish new 
university programs, with services ranging from curriculum design to staff 
recruitment and the acquisition and installation of technological support.
 However, it seems that many of these imported “packaged” curricula (which 
include textbooks and teacher resources) overlook the contexts, knowledge, 
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skills and needs that Saudi Arabian students bring with them to university. The 
chosen textbooks are not culturally appropriate, and many topics tackle aspects 
of the American lifestyle that are irrelevant to Saudi students’ lives and values or 
to Muslim Middle Eastern culture. Imported curricula make private higher 
education more imitative than creative (Mohrman, 2005). These institutions 
should make an effort to transition to using books created by local teaching staff, 
that are tailored to Saudi culture and to Saudi students’ needs, but this will take 
time (Al- Dali et al., 2013). Knowledge is socially constructed and sharing 
systems of meaning is significant to understand, value and accept that knowledge 
(Newell, 1999). Moreover, there should be an expectation that after two or three 
years the imported curricula will be reviewed and adjusted, where appropriate. 
The major challenge according to Al- Dali et al. (2013) is to create a faculty 
culture that understands the nature of the new practical curricula and diverse 
cognitive abilities of the students in today’s higher education. This would entail 
granting faculty members a great deal of freedom to design their curriculum, yet 
this would depend on the level of education the faculty members have.
 In saying this, it should be acknowledged that the imported curricula, which 
are mainly used in private universities, occasionally tackle subject matter gener-
ally overlooked in public universities. These courses sometimes cover crucial 
skills such as critical thinking and problem solving, logic and probability, profes-
sional development and competencies, communication (written, oral and techni-
cal), and leadership skills. Nevertheless, these courses need time to prove their 
effectiveness at challenging the deeply embedded tradition of rote learning in 
order to foster a culture of innovation and research (AlGhamdi and Deraney, 
2013). It is the hope that all public universities will begin to adopt teaching cur-
ricula that promote critical thinking as well.
 Efforts are taking place to reform public universities in terms of obtaining 
foreign accreditation. For instance, several engineering programs have been 
accredited by the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET); 
some business management programs have been accredited by the Association 
to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB); some dentistry programs 
have been accredited by the Association for Dental Education in Europe 
(ADEE); and some Diploma of Education programs have been accredited by 
British Quality Education (Darandari and Cardew, 2013: 110–111).
Challenges facing the system
There is no education system – even in the most developed countries – that does 
not need improvement and Saudi Arabian higher education is no exception. 
Quantitative expansion (i.e., more students, more teachers, more schools and 
more funding) is not enough; the MoHE seems to have shifted to considering 
qualitative improvements as well (quality of textbooks, qualification of teach-
ers), and that is significant (Aljughaiman and Grigorenko, 2013). Because Saudi 
higher education officials work with the vision of transforming their institutions 
into world- class universities and colleges, more rigorous and constructive research 
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highlighting the challenges facing higher education is needed to offer and suggest 
solutions. The following sections will shed light on some of these major 
challenges.
Reliance on foreign academic staff
As mentioned, private universities showcase their drive to build a national and 
international reputation by their aggressive importation of Western staff (i.e., 
faculty). The need for rapid expansion to accommodate the surge in high school 
graduates helps to explain this phenomenon, as the importation of faculty staff is 
seen as the easiest and fastest way to build up these institutions. The importation 
of foreign staff has resulted in the vast majority of faculty members in Saudi 
private institutions being citizens of Western countries, though a significant 
number of these individuals are of Arab descent. The number of foreign faculty 
members has surged since the establishment of private universities, and non- 
Saudis currently hold 90 percent of the faculty positions (Onsman, 2010). The 
MoHE (2012) offers similar statistics: around 30 percent of faculty staff in 
public institutions are non- Saudi. The reliance on expats is supposed to be a tem-
porary phenomenon (Al- Ghamdi and Tight, 2013; Shediac and Samman, 2010). 
It is assumed that more Saudi male and female graduates of KASP will fill many 
positions at universities and colleges in the Kingdom that are now occupied by 
foreigners. Yet, the plan is to have a portion of staff and faculty from different 
nationalities supporting Saudi faculty members as academic staff, which will 
create a multicultural environment in higher education institutions.
 The heavy reliance on foreign academic staff in institutions of higher learning 
in SA is especially regrettable given the fact that many Saudis who have been 
sponsored by the MoHE to earn doctoral degrees domestically or overseas, are 
unable to find academic positions at home (Alsherean, 2012). This reliance on 
non- Saudi professors with a population that keeps growing rapidly has also con-
tributed to excessive turnover rates. This phenomenon can be observed not only 
in Saudi Arabia but across the entire Gulf region. Despite the generous salaries 
and benefits, several factors lead many foreign academics to not stay for long. 
These include social conditions such as restrictions on academic freedom and 
free speech, the relative lack of support for research, and mobility restrictions on 
female staff (neither Saudi nor non- Saudi women are permitted to drive in the 
Kingdom). The high turnover rates are contributing to the “lack of rootedness” 
(Noori, 2010: 10) within Saudi Arabian universities.
Accessibility for women
Beyond the prevalence of foreign staff, another major challenge is increasing the 
ratio of female staff to students, since 60 percent of Saudi university students are 
female and with the segregation of campuses by gender more women should be 
appointed. Women’s education has expanded enormously since its advent in 
1959, when women went to private homes, Kuttab (Quranic schools), to memorize 
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the Holy Quran (Jamjoom and Kelly, 2013). This expansion is a result of gov-
ernment initiatives to educate women by providing financial bonuses for the 
spread of education in all cities, villages and nomadic areas, putting the principle 
of equal opportunity into practice and enabling a full intake of female students at 
all educational levels (Jamjoom and Kelly, 2013: 120). Also, increasing social 
awareness around the necessity of education for women who are going to be 
mothers became a mission for women’s education. A paradigm shift in recent 
years has emphasized the importance of educating women to participate in the 
workforce (Jamjoom and Kelly, 2013; AlMunajjed, 2012).
 Observing teaching in Saudi Arabia’s universities has brought attention to the 
fact that there is little emphasis placed on constructive approaches to curricula 
for female students and on empowering young women. For instance, despite the 
fact that private universities are seeking to emulate the West in even more 
obvious ways than public universities – by importing American and European 
curricula, hiring foreign staff, and courting international accreditation agencies – 
they have not decided to emulate the West in terms of placing a strong emphasis 
on improving women’s access to higher education. This is especially the case for 
private institutions, which continue to marginalize women in comparison to both 
male citizens and non- Saudi (Arab and non- Arab) men. In fact, the establish-
ment of private universities has only led to limited improvements in access to 
higher education for Saudi women, as many fields of study continue to limit or 
entirely forbid the admission of women. The recognition of women’s rights in 
ways that draw on Islamic principles is a fundamental truth that is inspiring a 
new generation of Saudi women to demand recognition of their role as active 
participants in all aspects of society (Ghanea, 2004: 722).
 Doumato (2010: 11) notes that there are senior positions, including five 
deanships, filled by women, but “the question remains, however, how these 
jobs will be created and in what sectors of the economy, as well as what kind 
of logistic accommodations will be devised so that sex- segregation on the job 
can be maintained.” The only public university headed by a female professor 
is Princess Nora University in Riyadh and two in the private institutions of 
Effat University and Dar Alhekma in Jeddah. All three are female- only institu-
tions. No one can deny the progress women have made in the historical trajec-
tory of higher education in Saudi Arabia, but perhaps the most significant 
challenge for higher education today, elaborated by Jamjoom and Kelly 
(2013), is the tension between how Saudi cultural values view women and the 
significant contribution that women can and should make to the social and eco-
nomic future of the Kingdom.
 In recent years, Saudi women have witnessed great improvement in their 
status on the social level; nonetheless, much progress remains to be seen in the 
coming years. Women now account for 25 percent of enrollment in postgraduate 
degrees at Saudi universities (Alankari, 2013: 4) and comprise over 62 percent 
of enrollment in BA programs. In KASP, a fifth of Saudi students abroad are 
female (Smith and Abouammoh, 2013). So one can be positively optimistic 
about the impact these developments will have on women’s issues in Saudi 
Reforming higher education in Saudi Arabia  169
Arabia. However, since the advent of private higher education, only a few new 
fields of study have opened their doors to women. These include computer engi-
neering, journalism, law (at two private colleges only), interior design (although 
only one exists at a public university), accounting, business administration, mar-
keting and finance. Effat University in Jeddah, the only private university that is 
headed by a woman, started as a college and was upgraded to become one of the 
first private universities in the country. It is the only private university to offer a 
Bachelor of Engineering degree for female students in the fields of architecture, 
electrical and computer engineering, and computer and information systems. 
Still, many fields of study are limited to men only, such as geology, piloting and 
some fields of engineering. Substantial reform of women’s access to higher 
education is required if there are to be any meaningful increases in the propor-
tion of Saudi women employed in technical and vocational areas, which cur-
rently stands at 26 percent (UNESCO, 1999, as cited in AlMunajjed, 2008). 
Increasing the number of female university graduates will certainly contribute to 
social and economic development in Saudi Arabia (Smith and Abouammoh, 
2013: 185).
 The emergence of universities has had a limited positive effect on access for 
women. Especially noteworthy is the establishment of KAUST, the first co- 
educational public–private university in Saudi Arabia, offering a variety of 
graduate degrees for both genders. As previously mentioned, Effat University in 
Jeddah provides programs and facilities for women across three faculties – busi-
ness, social sciences, and engineering – and has recently become the first private 
all- female university to gain accreditation from the National Commission for 
Assessment and Academic Accreditation (NCAAA), an organization established 
in 2004 that aims to upgrade the quality of private and governmental higher 
education to ensure clarity and transparency, and to provide codified standards 
for academic performance (MoHE, 2013). Al Faisal University is another private 
non- profit university that offers undergraduate degrees for both men and women 
in business, medicine, engineering, science and general studies. The university 
also offers postgraduate degrees in business administration, educational adminis-
tration and biomedical sciences.
Low levels of research and creativity in private universities
Another significant challenge surrounds the lack of strategy in gathering data 
about higher education. According to Smith and Abouammoh (2013), there is 
limited qualitative data collected at either the national or institutional levels. The 
need to establish high- quality data collection and analysis systems is, therefore, 
also a major priority.
 Rather than challenging the status quo, private universities are primarily pro-
moting market- driven programming. Seven private universities offer Masters of 
Business Administration and executive MBA degrees, while none offer a non- 
vocational degree in the humanities or arts, with the exception of Dar Al Uloom 
University, which offers a degree in English. Furthermore, the Saudi tradition of 
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rote learning and lack of emphasis on critical thinking is manifested in the near 
absence of innovative research in the Kingdom’s universities, including in the 
new private institutions. “Enhancing research productivity in higher education is 
a key pillar of the Saudi national development Plan for achieving the social and 
economic aspiration of the Kingdom” (Al- Ohali and Shin, 2013: 98).
 While SA is slowly developing a research- oriented academic culture, one of 
the only new research universities is King Abdullah University of Science and 
Technology (KAUST), which critics argue will emerge as a research power-
house in the coming years (Mazi and Altbach, 2013: 19). KAUST is not counted 
as a public university, yet it is a unique and specialized university with different 
goals and mission (its four research areas focus on energy, the environment, bio-
sciences and engineering). In other institutions, while there is some lack of 
research in the pure and applied sciences, it is most starkly evident in the social 
sciences and humanities. These are the fields that offer the greatest potential to 
challenge the status quo and, at a more basic level, to open the minds of youth to 
creative and critical thinking. In this regard, it should be noted that the teaching 
of secular philosophy continues to be dismissed and even banned. This prohibi-
tion extends to Islamic philosophy within both public and religious schools. In 
addition, most of the research that is generated in the social sciences and human-
ities is oriented toward policy rather than critical analysis of Saudi Arabian 
society (Al Lily, 2011a, 2011b).
 Research funding reinforces the disparities between the pure and applied sci-
ences on the one hand and the humanities and social sciences on the other. 
Funding for social science research does not even remotely compare to that 
available for research in the pure and applied sciences through entities like the 
technological organisation known as King Abdulaziz City for Science and Tech-
nology (KACST). This organization is Saudi Arabia’s most recognizable entity 
involved in financing, supporting and fostering scientific research in a wide 
range of scientific and engineering fields (KACST, 2010). Saudi universities are 
pressured to favor the pure and applied sciences, which may be due to aspects of 
the traditional thinking that have proven to be antithetical to innovative thinking 
and research. This focus, however, on Science Technology Engineering and 
Math (STEM) research is not a unique phenomenon to SA; it seems to be an 
international trend and has received attention from scientists and researchers in 
the field (Bui, 2013). Most of the curricula in private institutions, notably in 
health sciences and all STEM degrees, are delivered in English (except for 
Islamic studies, three courses required for all disciplines and Arabic courses). 
Public universities are moving toward converting the science fields to English 
and keeping other subjects in Arabic.
 Private universities are affected by additional factors that undermine their 
ability to develop into centers of academic excellence. Staffs in private institu-
tions are required to spend approximately 19 or more hours per week on teach-
ing, in contrast to the maximum of 14 hours per week required in public 
universities, because of the shortage of faculty members to the number of stu-
dents. This significantly curtails the amount of time and energy available for 
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research (MoHE, 2012; Alnassar and Dow, 2013). Faculty members’ teaching 
load could rise up to three to five courses and 20 hours of teaching per term to 
make up for the shortage of faculty and the high influx of students.
Excessive emphasis on labor market needs
Another undermining factor is the almost exclusive emphasis in private 
universities on granting degrees that are oriented toward satisfying the labor 
market. Despite the economic value of this approach, this fixation on the labor 
market compounds the pressure to avoid innovative thinking and research, 
especially in the social sciences. Prestigious career- oriented subjects such as 
medicine, nursing, dentistry and applied health sciences are given more atten-
tion, while the social sciences are neglected. Indeed, none of the emerging 
private institutions includes the social sciences as a field of study. Some 
voices even call for the closure of the existing social science and humanities 
programs, as they apparently fail to provide training oriented to the labor 
market (Al- Dhakeel, 2009). Only three private universities have programs in 
languages or translation, with only one offering another humanities subject – 
special education.
 The private universities remain a work in progress and thus, despite the fact 
that they are currently more imitative than creative, and despite the fact that they 
have not yet reached the level of challenging the status quo (that is, producing 
high number of graduates), they deserve some amount of credit for attempting to 
offer an additional option in higher education. In other words, it is still too early 
to judge their merits. There are certainly reasons for being optimistic that the 
private universities will achieve their educational quality goals. The fact that 
their curricula remain in a state of flux and are being subjected to international 
auditors’ scrutiny is likely to lead to long- term academic benefits. Their gener-
ally smaller class sizes also provide more opportunities for interaction between 
staff and students. In addition, they are more likely to be at the leading edge of 
technology implementation in the classroom, including making extensive use of 
Blackboard. Finally, private universities appear to offer freedom of expression in 
all areas, as well as a wide range of extracurricular activities for students and 
broader access to different ideas through exposure to diverse cultures (i.e., those 
of the diverse faculty members).
 The significant Western influences in private institutions remain controversial. 
This influence is in part a reflection of the fact that despite the Arab world’s long 
tradition of scholarship, Western universities have more experience in offering 
formal higher education, as many have been in continuous operation for decades 
or even centuries. Saudi universities therefore have relied – and continue to rely – 
on Western models since they are seen as the fastest and easiest way of establish-
ing the institutional structure necessary to launch new programs. On the other 
hand, the emphasis on Western models (and on faculty members imported from 
Western countries) is sometimes excessive to the point of excluding opportunities 
to develop new institutions in greater harmony with the Middle Eastern cultural, 
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historical and religious context. For instance, offering opportunities for Saudi 
faculty members to find teaching posts as an exchange service with international 
universities would be beneficial and reflect the importance of knowledge exchange. 
It is this emphasis on Western faculty that, to some extent, seems to be a reflection 
of a misguided inferiority attitude that traces back to the era of European colonial-
ism and cultural hegemony.
Moving forward
Since the advent of higher education, lucrative funding programs (such as the 
National 10-Year Development Plan) have given the government of Saudi 
Arabia strong direction over university governance structures (Al- Eisa and 
Smith, 2013: 29). An important question is whether the expansion of univer-
sities will take into account the need for diversity and researcher independ-
ence, which above all requires an expansion of people’s thinking beyond the 
strictures of the widespread and powerful religious ideology. Moreover, 
reforming higher education according to international standards implies that 
some of this power will have to be shared to create autonomy; this would be 
a first step toward reaching international standards and thus ranking. Al- Eisa 
and Smith (2013: 33) argue that “Saudi higher education would need a para-
digm shift from centralization to broader autonomy and from strict regulation 
to genuine competition among universities.” The authors argue, however, 
that only a few well- established and reputable institutions would be ready for 
semi- autonomous governance and potentially make it to international 
ranking: King Saud University (KSU) – the oldest higher- education institu-
tion in Saudi Arabia, which recently attracted substantial donations and is 
building the largest endowment in the history of Saudi higher education – 
and King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST), have 
attracted high- caliber international faculty with productive research records. 
However: 
the impact of KAUST on SA higher education is yet to be measured . . . the 
autonomous model of its governance would be tested and juxtaposed with it 
becoming a research excellence hub in the region as its mission is to 
improve research agenda in SA. 
(Al- Eisa and Smith, 2013: 29)
 The Saudi system of higher education has many issues to resolve, but like any 
other developing and growing sector there has been improvement (AlShehri et 
al., 2013: 143). The Saudi Arabian MoHE (2013) stated that Saudi Arabia has 
adopted a long- term strategic plan to ensure that the education system becomes a 
major driving force behind the transformation of an economy primarily 
dependent on oil revenues to one that reflects a diversified knowledge- based 
economy. It is important to acknowledge, however, that private higher education in 
Saudi Arabia is still in its infancy and these impacts have yet to be fully measured. 
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Saudi public and private HE institutions are in a constant state of capacity build-
ing, and various measures have been taken to benchmark with international 
standards to achieve this goal (Daranadari and Cardew, 2013).
Implications and recommendations
The early twenty- first century has seen the beginning of positive change and 
educational reform in Saudi Arabia. Many educational strategies have been 
implemented and more than ten universities and an even greater number of col-
leges have been established in response to a range of demographic, social and 
political challenges. These new universities are taking aggressive measures to 
ensure they meet rigorous international standards.
 Moreover, the MoHE has established several bodies and specialist centers to 
encourage, support and evaluate the quality of HE institutions and the programs 
they offer: the National Commission for Assessment and Academic Accredita-
tion (NCAAA); the National Centre for Assessment in Higher Education 
(NCAHE); the Centre for Higher Education Statistics (CHES); and the Centre 
for Higher Education Research and Studies (CHERS). CHERS is considered the 
cornerstone of strategic planning for the development of higher education insti-
tutions in Saudi Arabia. In this center, many policy objectives are carried out, 
such as drawing the frameworks for developing and increasing the number of 
universities as well as the restructuring of university specializations and advanc-
ing the harmonization of higher education outputs to national needs, including 
the requirements of the labor market (MoHE, 2013). The broad mandate of these 
centers is to ensure that the quality of teaching and learning, student outcomes, 
management and support services provided within institutions, and research 
satisfy high international standards (Daranadari and Cardew, 2013: 106). In 
addition, the massive scholarship program named after King Abdullah (KASP), 
which was introduced in 2005 and is entering its tenth stage in September 2014, 
is considered the “most comprehensive scholarship program ever supported by a 
nation state” (Smith and Abouammoh, 2013: 10).
 Leadership in the academy is a central driver of academic excellence and, in 
turn, high institutional ranking (Al- Swailem and Elliot, 2013: 42). In 2009, the 
MoHE created the Academic Leadership Centre (ALC) to offer training for those 
in academic leadership roles to develop the effectiveness and quality of their 
leadership. Al- Eisa and Smith (2013: 34) suggest that a shift toward innovative 
and creative leadership styles is essential for a knowledge- based economy to 
thrive; recent HE initiatives that encourage entrepreneurship and small busi-
nesses build on this idea (Al- Ohali and Burdon, 2013). In June 2009, the MoHE 
also introduced a national program called the Accelerated Program for Excel-
lence (APEX) to promote excellence in national universities. Some of the object-
ives of the program include:
• Aligning university efforts toward achieving world- class excellence in 
teaching, research and community services.
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• Encouraging partnerships with local and international research and indus-
trial organizations.
• Informing academic communities of what it takes to achieve world- class 
standards.
• Promoting excellence in research.
• Graduating students who have the skills to be employable and who are com-
petitive with graduates from other countries.
• Using ranking indices and benchmarks in the rankings as guidelines to 
achieve excellence.
If policy- makers and MoHE officials use these suggested strategies as guidelines 
to direct reforms, then higher education in Saudi Arabia will be on track to reach 
its aims and rank higher on the research front. In the new atmosphere that the 
MoHE is trying to create, teaching and learning can no longer be about “filling 
students’ minds with theoretical information” at the expense of teaching creative 
and critical thinking (Alnassar and Dow, 2013: 58). If any progress is to be made 
on increasing the quality and employability of Saudi graduates, then more focus 
is needed on expanding/enhancing teaching methods; improving students’ com-
munication, study and time management skills, and connecting students with 
their community. These objectives would greatly improve the educational atmo-
sphere of public universities. According to Alnassar and Dow (2013: 59) private 
universities are better at teaching these skills and preparing students for the 
workforce, especially those connected with international universities. Drawing 
on more advantages such as fewer students in the classroom and bringing on 
board a wide range of international expertise of faculty members and administra-
tors, these institutions will have a fast track on advancement and national and 
international recognition.
 There remain several worthy questions for further exploration, however: Will 
private universities promote the humanities, social sciences and fine arts? Will 
these reforms improve educational outcomes? What are the socio- cultural and 
economic implications of these reforms for the Arabic- speaking population of 
the region? Can Western educators develop and deliver educational models that 
successfully combine global needs with local aspirations? Are the new univer-
sities economically sustainable? Can they develop forms of governance that 
promote stability and intellectual creativity? These questions – together with the 
question of whether these improvements are actually increasing access to higher 
education for women – are of great significance to Saudi Arabia’s national 
debate on education reform.
 There has been an increasing emphasis from the Saudi government on develop-
ing universities into internationally competitive centers for knowledge and research 
(Onsman, 2010). Universities have been challenged by government initiatives over 
the last five years with at least some degree of success in terms of “developing 
programs and adopting teaching methods that provide students with knowledge 
and skills necessary for their entry to the global labour market” (Onsman, 2010: 
512). However, it is important to determine how much knowledge is contributing 
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to industrial development in SA because of the overdependence on oil, and 
whether HE institutions will actually help diversify the economy, including indus-
trial infrastructure, toward knowledge- based innovation (Al- Ohali and Shin, 2013: 
102). It is too early to determine if private universities thus far have lived up to 
their claims of world- class status – the aim of many universities worldwide, and 
Saudi Arabia is no exception. Even though these universities are investing heavily 
in importing Western staff and curricula, few resources are being directed toward 
the substantive development of their programs.
 Since many countries in Asia, such as China, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong and Singapore, have been investing in their higher education for decades 
with dramatic success (Al- Eisa and Smith, 2013: 10), Saudi Arabia is seeing the 
value and necessity of reforming its higher education into realms beyond peda-
gogy like governance structures, curricula, management, professional develop-
ment, and even industrial relations (Darandari and Murphy, 2013: 70). Despite 
some deficiencies, HE in Saudi Arabia has, according to Smith and Abouammoh 
(2013: 10), “enormous potential and is driven by enormous enthusiasm at all 
levels from government to individual academics . . . Such enthusiasm should be 
harnessed by strong and relevant strategies, supported by rigorous and timely 
feedback mechanisms.” Saudi Arabian higher education will no doubt see the 
fruits of such investment soon, and concerned, educated Saudis and outside 
observers can look to the future with optimism.
Notes
1 This chapter was contributed by Dr. Amani Hamdan, College of Education, University 
of Dammam, Dammam, Saudi Arabia. All correspondence regarding it should be 
addressed to its author. Email: Akhalghamdi@ud.edu.sa.
2 Some critics argue that this last figure (92 percent) is too high and indicates a problem. 
Surely not all 92 percent of high school graduates, which does not include post- 
secondary vocational training, are ready for, or even want to do, college- level work 
(Pavan, 2013).
References
Academic World University Ranking (2014). Available at: www.shanghairanking.com/ 
(accessed August 20, 2014).
Alankari, K. (2013). Foreword. In Smith, L. and Abouammoh, A. (eds.). Higher Educa-
tion in Saudi Arabia: Achievement, Challenges, and Opportunities. New York: 
Springer, 3–8.
Al- Dali, W., Fnais, M. and Newbould, I. (2013). Private higher education in the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia: Reality, challenges and aspirations. In Smith, L. and Abouammoh, A. 
(eds.). Higher Education in Saudi Arabia. New York: Springer, 127–136.
Al- Dhakeel, T. (2009). Doctora laekn atela [jobless doctor]. Alwatan, September 23. 
Available at: www.turkid.net/?p=1467.
Al- Eisa, E. and Smith, L. (2013). Governance in Saudi higher education. In Smith, L. and 
Abouammoh, A. (eds.). Higher Education in Saudi Arabia: Achievements, Challenges, 
and Opportunities. New York: Springer, 27–37.
176  Reforming higher education in Saudi Arabia
AlGhamdi, A.K.H. and Deraney, P. (2013). Effects of teaching critical thinking to Saudi 
female university students using a stand- alone course. International Education Studies, 
6(7): 176–188.
Al- Ghamdi, S. and Tight, M. (2013). Delivering high quality teaching and learning for 
university students in Saudi Arabia. In Smith, L. and Abouammoh, A. (eds.). Higher 
Education in Saudi Arabia: Achievements, Challenges, and Opportunities. New York: 
Springer, 49–61.
Al- Ghamdi, S., Al- Gaied, A. and Abu- Rasain, M. (2010). Faculty Education in Saudi 
Arabia: A Suggested Model (in Arabic). Riyadh: Research and Studies Center in 
Higher Education.
Aljughaiman, A.M. and Grigorenko, E.L. (2013). Growing up under pressure: The cul-
tural and religious context of the Saudi system of gifted education. Journal for the 
Education of the Gifted, 36(3): 307–322.
Alkhazim, M. (2003). Higher education in Saudi Arabia: Challenges, solutions, and 
opportunities missed. Higher Education Policy, 16: 479–486.
Alkhazim, M. (2009). Altaleem alali fee almezan [Higher Education in the Balance]. 
Lebanon: Toawa.
Al Lily, A.E.A. (2011a). On line and under veil: Technology- facilitated communication 
and Saudi female experience within academia. Technology in Society, 33(1–2): 
119–127.
Al Lily, A.E.A. (2011b). Teaching across gender lines: A Saudi technological innovation. 
In Selwyn, N., Oliver, M. and Eynon, R. (eds.). Learning, Media and Technology: 
Doctoral Research Conference (July 4, 2011). London: Knowledge Lab, 4–11.
AlMunajjed, M. (2008). Women’s Employment in Saudi Arabia: A Major Challenge. 
New York: Booz & Co.
AlMunajjed, M. (2012). Where the real worth is. Arabian Business.com. Avail-
able at: www.arabianbusiness.com/where- real-wealth- is-457262.html (accessed 
January 22, 2014).
Alnassar, S.A. and Dow, K. (2013). Delivering high quality teaching and learning for uni-
versity students in Saudi Arabia. In Smith, L. and Abouammoh, A. (eds.). Higher 
Education in Saudi Arabia: Achievements, Challenges and Opportunities. New York: 
Springer, 49–61.
Al- Ohali, M. and Burdon, S. (2013). International collaboration. In Smith, L. and Aboua-
mmoh, A. (eds.). Higher Education in Saudi Arabia: Achievements, Challenges, and 
Opportunities. New York: Springer, 95–102.
Al- Ohali, M. and Shin, J.C. (2013). Knowledge- based innovation and research productiv-
ity in Saudi Arabia. In Smith, L. and Abouammoh, A. (eds.). Higher Education in 
Saudi Arabia: Achievements, Challenges, and Opportunities. New York: Springer, 
95–102.
AlShehri, F. (2014). 44 billion is the expenditure of Saudi government on university stu-
dents yearly. Makka.
AlShehri, M.Y., Campbell, S., Daud, M.Z., Mattar, E.H., Sayed, M.G. and Abu- Eshy, 
A.S. (2013). The development of medical education in Saudi Arabia. In Smith, L. and 
Abouammoh, A. (eds.). Higher Education in Saudi Arabia: Achievements, Challenges, 
and Opportunities. New York: Springer, 137–150.
Alsherean, D. (writer and TV producer) (2012). Althamena [TV talk show]. In MBC 
(Producer). Riyadh: Middle East Channel.
Al- Swailem, O. and Elliot, G. (2013). The learning experiences of Saudi Arabian higher 
education leadership: Characteristics for global success. In Smith, L. and Abouammoh, 
Reforming higher education in Saudi Arabia  177
A. (eds.). Higher Education in Saudi Arabia: Achievements, Challenges, and Oppor-
tunities. New York: Springer, 37–49.
Baki, R. (2004). Gender- segregated education in Saudi Arabia: Its impact on social norms 
and the Saudi labor market. Education Policy Analysis Archives, 12(28): 1–12.
Baxter, E. (2010). Saudi employed 1.5m foreign workers during crisis. Available at: 
www.arabianbusiness.com/590683-saudi- employed-15m-foreign- workers-during- 
crisis.
Bosbait, M. and Wilson, R. (2005). Education, school- to-work transitions and unemploy-
ment in Saudi Arabia. Middle Eastern Journal, 41(4): 533–545.
Brandenburg, T. (2010). The political economy of internationalization of higher educa-
tion in the Sultanate of Oman. Unpublished manuscript. Mainz, Germany.
Bui, L. (2013). Report: Humanities, social science education needed along with STEM. 
The Washington Post, June 19. Available at: www.washingtonpost.com/local/educa-
t ion / r epor t -  human i t i e s - soc ia l -  s c i ence -educa t ion -  needed-a long-  wi th -
stem/2013/06/18/76076df6-d83e-11e2-a016-92547bf094cc_story.html.
Darandari, E. and Cardew, P. (2013). Accreditation and quality assurance. In Smith, L. 
and Abouammoh, A. (eds.). Higher Education in Saudi Arabia: Achievements, Chal-
lenges, and Opportunities. New York: Springer, 103–117.
Darandari, E. and Murphy, A. (2013). Assessment of student learning. In Smith, L. and 
Abouammoh, A. (eds.). Higher Education in Saudi Arabia: Achievements, Challenges, 
and Opportunities. New York: Springer, 61–72.
Doumato, E. (2010). Women’s rights in the Middle East and North Africa. Available at: 
www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/special_report/section/174.pdf.
Frediani, A. (2010). Sen’s capability approach as a framework for the practice of devel-
opment. Development in Practice, 20: 173–187.
Freire, P. (2003). Pedagogy of the Oppressed. New York: Continuum.
Ghanea, N. (2004). Human rights of religious minorities and of women in the Middle 
East. Human Rights Quarterly, 26: 705–729.
Jamjoom, F. and Kelly, P. (2013). Higher education for women in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia. In Smith, L. and Abouammoh, A. (eds.). Higher Education in Saudi Arabia: 
Achievements, Challenges, and Opportunities. New York: Springer, 117–127.
King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology (KACST) (2010). City for Science and 
Technology. Riyadh: KACST. Available at: www.kacst.edu.sa/en/Pages/default.aspx.
Mazawi, A.E. (2005). The academic profession in a rentier state: The professoriate in 
Saudi Arabia. Minerva, 43: 221–244.
Mazawi, A.E. (2009). Dis/integrated orders and the politics of recognition: Civil upheav-
als, militarism, and educators’ lives and work. In Borg, C., Mayo, P. and Sultana, R.G. 
(eds.). Mediterranean Studies in Comparative Education. Malta: Impressions Ltd., 
69–89.
Mazi, A. and Altbach, P.G. (2013). Dreams and realities: The world- class idea and Saudi 
Arabian higher education. In Smith, L. and Abouammoh, A. (eds.). Higher Education 
in Saudi Arabia: Achievements, Challenges, and Opportunities. New York: Springer, 
13–27.
Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE) (2001). Statistics of Higher Education in Saudi 
Arabia. Riyadh: MoHE.
Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE) (2008). Ministry of Higher Education National 
Report. Riyadh: MoHE.
Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE) (2010). Ministry of Higher Education’s Plan to 
Achieve Excellence in Science and Technology. Riyadh: MoHE.
178  Reforming higher education in Saudi Arabia
Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE) (2011). Ministry of Higher Education National 
Report. Riyadh: MoHE.
Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE) (2012). Ministry of Higher Education National 
Report. Riyadh: MoHE.
Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE) (2013). Center of Research and Strategic Studies. 
Available at: www.mohe.gov.sa/en/aboutus/Institutions/Pages/Center- for-Research- 
and-Strategic- Studies.aspx (accessed January 24, 2014).
Mohrman, K. (2005). World- class universities and Chinese higher education reform. 
Available at: www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/soe/cihe/newsletter/News39/text013.htm.
Newell, S.M. (1999). The transfer of management education to China: Building learning 
communities rather than translating Western texts. Education and Training, 41(6/7): 
286–293.
Nolan, L. (2012). Liberalizing Monarchies? How Gulf Monarchies Manage Education 
Reform. Doha: Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper.
Noori, N. (2010). Overlapping spheres of governance: Accreditation agencies and 
American- style universities in the Middle East. Unpublished manuscript. Cambridge, 
UK.
Okruhlik, G. (2005). The irony of islah [reform]. The Washington Quarterly, 28(4): 
153–170.
Onsman, A. (2010). Dismantling the perceived barriers to the implementation of national 
higher education accreditation guidelines in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Journal of 
Higher Education Policy and Management, 32(5): 511–519.
Pavan, A. (2013). A new perspective on the quest for education: The Saudi Arabian way 
to knowledge society. Higher Education Studies, 3(6): 25–34.
Saudi Arabia Demographics Profile 2013 (2013). Available at: www.indexmundi.com/
saudi_arabia/demographics_profile.html (accessed November 2013).
Saudi Arabia: ICDL as an Official Academic Curriculum (n.d.). ECDL Foundation. 
Available at: www.ecdl.org/index.jsp?p=906&n=2271&a=4278 (accessed December 
21, 2013).
Saudi Gazette (2010). Census shows Kingdom’s population at more than 27 million. 
Available at: www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentid= 
2010112487888 (accessed November 24, 2012).
Shediac, R. and Samman, H. (2010). Meeting the employment challenge in the GCC: The 
need for a holistic strategy. Booz & Co. Available at: www.strategyand.pwc.com/
media/file/Meeting_the_Employment_Challenge_in_the_GCC.pdf.
Smith, L. and Abouammoh, A. (eds.) (2013). Higher Education in Saudi Arabia: Achieve-
ment, Challenges, and Opportunities. New York: Springer.
Statistics and Facts on Saudi Arabia (2013). Available at: www.statista.com/topics/1630/
saudi- arabia/ (accessed January 30, 2014).
World Bank (2012a). Public spending on education, total (%GDP). Available at: http://
data.worldbank.org/indicators/SE.XPD.TOTAL.GD.ZS.
World Bank (2012b). Population growth annual % (2013). Available at: http://data.world-
bank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW (accessed December 25, 2013).
8 Arabic in higher education
Questions of national identity and 
pragmatism
In every society and throughout history, the need to communicate among dif-
ferent speech communities has often led to one of the socially or geographically 
defined dialectal varieties of a common language to become the dominant 
medium of communication in inter- group interactions. The dominant variety 
usually corresponds to the dominant group’s dialect and eventually becomes the 
linguistic norm for that particular language. Historically, this linguistic evolution 
is common to most standardized languages such as Standard English, French, 
Italian, Spanish and other European languages. The distance between the 
Standard and the spoken variety that children are exposed to first in their home 
environment varies depending on the language itself, the socio- economic and 
educational background of the parents, the attitudes prevalent in that speech 
community toward linguistic variation and different registers, as well as a multi-
tude of other contextual factors. While linguistic variation is tolerated at the level 
of the spoken language, speech communities are less accepting of it in academic 
and written discourse. The case of Modern Standard Arabic (MSA), and its 
earlier antecedent, Classical Arabic, is similar in some respects and different in 
many others. While it is the official language of the 22 Arab states, MSA (which 
has evolved from Classical Arabic) does not belong to a socially, geographically, 
politically or economically dominant group. It is nobody’s mother tongue but 
has been the unchallenged and recognized official standard variety of all Arab 
states until recent times.
 Since the start of the post- colonial era, MSA has been facing important chal-
lenges, particularly in being the main language in education. These challenges 
are the result of pressures from both foreign languages and the spoken dialectal 
varieties. Educational systems in the GCC countries, like in most other Arab 
countries, are grappling with these language issues. However, added to this lin-
guistic situation, the GCC’s linguistic context is even more challenging due to 
rapid socio- economic transformations, the recency of the educational systems 
and demographic imbalances where expatriate populations range between 60 and 
90 percent of total populations.
 This chapter discusses some of the linguistic and socio- economic factors 
interfering with the promotion of MSA as the official and main language of 
education in the GCC. We will argue that despite numerous policy decisions and 
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official statements affirming that Arabic (in all its varieties but principally MSA) 
is a central component of national and Pan- Arab identity that must be promoted 
as the official language of the GCC nations, efforts to implement language pol-
icies in the GCC (and the Arab world in general) seem to face hurdles not only 
due to the powerful push from English as a global language but also due to lin-
guistic and socio- pragmatic factors tied to both the Arabic language itself and 
attitudes toward different varieties of the language in Arab societies in general. 
These factors have led to a devaluation of proficiency in MSA as a useful com-
modity in the GCC even though it still has some of its symbolic and nostalgic 
value.
The status of MSA today
It is no secret that proficiency in Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) has declined 
among literate young generations in many of the GCC countries and elsewhere 
in the Arab world. Different studies across the GCC reveal that millennial gener-
ations recognize that they have weak Arabic literacy skills and hold relatively 
negative perceptions of MSA’s value as a useful language in the labor market 
and knowledge society (Badry, 2011, 2012, 2015; BBC Arabic, 2014;1 Findlow, 
2006). A recent series of articles in the UAE’s National newspaper highlights 
the debate going on in the Federal National Council (FNC) in the UAE about 
whether or not there is a need for a law to protect the Arabic language. Based on 
“The council’s education, youth and media committee, which studied the declin-
ing use of the language and Arabic literacy skills, [it was decided that] a law was 
needed to protect the mother tongue” (Salem, 2014).
 There are many factors responsible for the decline of Arabic which are 
sometimes simplistically attributed to the power of English under globalization 
without a careful consideration of other contextually intrinsic factors. The 
dominance of English in the last decades is not unique to the GCC. English is 
increasingly becoming the sought after additional language by most non- 
anglophone nations. Its status as the language of international communication 
in business, technology, research and media, has led policy- makers all over the 
world to stress the need for high proficiency in English by adding it as a 
medium of instruction in their educational systems (Grin and Korth, 2005; 
Strubell, 1996; Tankersley, 2001; Wannaqat, 2007). Whether it is in Europe, 
China, Singapore or South Korea, the place of English in the curriculum is 
being emphasized (Ahmad et al., 2007; Baetens- Beardsmore, 1998; Choi, 
2010; Farrell and Fenwick, 2007; Giri, 2007). For example, schools and 
universities in France and Spain, two colonial languages of the past, have 
taken steps to allow for more time for English in their school systems. In fact, 
English is no longer only taught as a subject but is also used as a medium of 
instruction for part of the curriculum to develop their millennial generations’ 
English proficiency “for future study, work and life” (Zhu, 2004, cited in Feng, 
2007: 148). Bruthiaux (2003: 9) attributes this power of English and its status 
as the global language to
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the emergence of the United States as sole superpower and the growth of 
international trade. . . . For better or worse, this geopolitical shift favors an 
American worldview along with its principal linguistic vehicle, English. 
Meanwhile, those with the ambition to take part in international exchanges 
tend – rightly or wrongly – to regard possession of English as the key to 
professional success and greater well- being.
In the face of this “English invasion,” most countries in the West and East have 
been able to maintain their national/official language as their primary medium of 
instruction at all educational levels. Moreover, outside schools, the national lan-
guage continues to be used everywhere, from street signs, official documents, 
national newspapers to all social interactions in business and family settings. 
This use of the mother tongue in a variety of communication domains reinforces 
its primacy among societies’ members. In contrast, in many former colonies of 
the South, mother tongues have not been so lucky. Already dealing with complex 
linguistic diversity which was delegitimized by colonial languages, former 
colonies have had to use English (or other colonial languages) as a common 
lingua franca. In many cases, while English is officially treated as an additional 
language in education, in practice full literacy in mother tongues has become a 
secondary goal of education. It is a fact that in some contexts, official national 
languages have remained as part of the curriculum to varying degrees but their 
development and perception as prestigious and valued commodities can be 
described as a continuum ranging from development (e.g., Hebrew), benign 
peripherization (e.g., Arabic) to endangered status (e.g., many African and other 
indigenous languages in Latin America and Oceania).
 Across the Arab nations, the status of MSA in educational systems is not 
uniform. Since their independence, beginning in the late 1950s, the position of 
MSA has been fluctuating between basic maintenance to benign peripherization 
depending on the various reforms decreed by policy- makers in the last 60 years 
and the country being examined. In the GCC, educational reforms seem to rest 
on short- term goals that do not take into account socio- linguistic, pragmatic and 
political realities on the ground. The perceived urgency of catching up to the 
knowledge economies of the advanced world by using English has played a role 
in the declining proficiency in MSA.
The nature of reforms and their impact on Arabic
In the GCC most stakeholders concede that there are risks associated with the 
increasing use of English in schools and its impact on MSA proficiency. Gov-
ernments repeatedly reiterate the need to maintain Arabic in the face of the “flat-
tening effect of globalization” (Cabinet releases). Newspapers and TV programs 
are replete with articles, editorials and programs raising concerns about the 
future of Arabic (Ahmed, 2012; Al Baik, 2008; Al Lawati and Al Najami, 2008; 
Al Najami, 2007; Salem, 2014; Zacharias, 2012). However, the educational 
reforms implemented on the ground do not seem to respond to these concerns. 
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Education reforms in the GCC have generally been motivated by short- term 
goals of “catching up” to the developed world. Using English, particularly in 
higher education, is seen as a short cut to accessing the knowledge needed to 
transform the region into a “knowledge economy” since “most scientific research 
is . . . reported in English” (Ahmed, 2012). To prepare students for university 
study in English has necessitated stressing its position at pre- university levels as 
well. Governments across the region have devoted important resources to 
improving the teaching of English, from hiring native speakers of English as 
teachers, to developing materials in English, using IT, introducing it earlier in 
public schools (Drummond, 2010) and adopting a CLIL approach (Content and 
Language Integrated Learning) in model schools such as the MAG school in the 
UAE, Independent schools in Qatar, or the reformed Basic Education in Bahrain 
and Oman or Kuwait. These pilot models are expected to be gradually expanded 
throughout the whole educational systems. In comparison, efforts to improve the 
teaching of Arabic have been rather insignificant. Teachers using Arabic as a 
medium of instruction complain that relative to their colleagues who teach in 
English, they are paid less and feel they have little support. They point out that 
not much is done to remedy the paucity of interactive Arabic materials, to integ-
rate IT in their teaching, nor to offer them professional development opportun-
ities.2 As discussed in Chapter 5, the emphasis on English at pre- university levels 
was necessary to prepare graduates for universities where English is the medium 
of instruction in engineering, sciences and technology throughout the GCC terti-
ary systems. In some national universities it has also replaced Arabic in social 
sciences, business and communication studies.3 In the private sector, English is 
the de facto language of instruction and university culture everywhere in the 
GCC (see Chapter 4)
 The strong belief in a causal relation between English and development is 
evident in various strategic plans. For example, the UAE’s former Minister of 
Higher Education, Sheikh Nahyan, who presided over the three public univer-
sities until 2013, emphasized the need for English and led the shift to English as 
medium of instruction. Swan reports that “[d]espite opposition, he [the Minister] 
was determined to make young nationals competitive on the global stage” and as 
the HCT provost, Dr. Drummond, stated: “Sheikh Nahyan had the vision and 
determination to switch instruction to English language to foster international 
capabilities and global competitiveness for UAE citizens” (Swan, 2013). In 
Qatar, the reforms recommended by the RAND Corporation also mandated an 
earlier introduction of English to prepare students for English medium univer-
sities. The other Gulf states opted for a less aggressive route in replacing Arabic 
in their pre- university systems but had the same English medium of instruction 
approach to higher education. For example, in Oman, the reforms adopted start-
ing in 1998 maintained Arabic in the pre- university public school system 
although English as a subject was introduced earlier as a foreign language start-
ing with the first grade. At university level, engineering, sciences, business and 
IT majors have adopted English as their medium of instruction across most 
public universities and all private universities. Kuwait University seems to be 
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the only university not requiring advanced English proficiency in its admission 
policies (e.g., a TOEFL of 310 compared to 500 at least in other GCC 
universities).
 This prioritization of English is quite often supported by parents’ demands 
that their children be prepared in English for higher education and jobs in the 
English- dominated global market. Increasing numbers of nationals in the GCC 
are sending their children to private schools and universities to be educated in 
English. For those parents who want their children to have a truly bilingual 
education their options are very limited as it is difficult to find schools that give 
equal importance to both Arabic and English in their curriculum (Abdel- Jawad 
and Abu Radwan, 2011; Badry, 2015).
 The push for English at all tiers of the educational system, without equal 
attention to MSA, has consequences that go beyond linguistic behaviors as there 
are 
no more powerful means of “encouraging” individuals to assimilate to a 
dominant culture than having the economic, social and political returns 
stacked against their mother tongue. Such assimilation is not freely chosen 
if the choice is between one’s mother tongue and one’s future. 
(UNDP, 2004: 33)
These educational practices have led to many public discussions about the chal-
lenges that stand in the way of the Arabic language becoming a twenty- first 
century language for Arabs across the Arab world and globally (Al Jazeera.net, 
2012). Opinions and editorials sounding the alarm that Arabic is “dying” abound 
in newspapers and TV programs (Al Baik, 2008; Al Jazeera TV; Al Najami, 
2007; Lewis, 2010). Almost every year initiatives are launched by governments, 
academies and associations holding meetings in Beirut, Cairo, Dubai and Qatar, 
to discuss the necessity to protect and safeguard the Arabic language. There are 
centers and associations for the protection of Arabic in majors Arab cities and 
language charters have recently been proclaimed in Dubai and Qatar.
 Pressures are coming from legislators, parents and intellectuals who are ques-
tioning educational reform outcomes. In a recent article, published by The 
National, entitled “Abu Dhabi parents: ‘Teach our children in Arabic’ ” it was 
reported that the majority of the 50,000 parents surveyed in Abu Dhabi are 
calling for a reversal of the current approach of using English to teach math and 
science and to use Arabic instead. Dr. Masood Badri, ADEC’s head of research 
and planning, concedes that “Arabic is not being given attention” in schools and 
confirms that “[p]arents feel their language and culture are being neglected. This 
is true” (Ahmed, 2012). He goes on to justify this neglect by attributing it to 
scant Arabic materials and resources in scientific subjects which rationalizes the 
use of English. The public’s pressure is being echoed at higher levels of govern-
ment. In the UAE, some FNC (Federal National Council) members are calling 
for laws that would make instruction in Arabic compulsory for government 
universities. Jamal bin Huwaireb, cultural consultant for the Dubai government, 
recently “launched a similar Twitter campaign calling on authorities to use 
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Arabic as the main medium of teaching, and the idea has caught fire” (Bilingual 
education crucial for the UAE, 2013).
 Mounting pressures from stakeholders have forced policy- makers to recon-
sider the aggressive push for English in education and the negative impact such 
policies have on the preservation of national and Arab cultural identity across 
the GCC (more so in Qatar and the UAE than elsewhere). In 2012–13, changes 
began to be implemented. In the UAE, a new minister of higher education was 
appointed and public higher education is being restructured (see Chapter 4). One 
of the first steps of the new reforms was to replace Western leadership with 
nationals. There are also plans to increase the proportion of the required Arabic 
courses from the present 15 percent of Zayed University’s curriculum and add a 
new course on the UAE in Arabic as a requirement for all students (personal 
communication).4 ZU also launched “The Institute for the Arabic Language” that 
is looking into Arabization of curriculum. It also opened an early childhood 
bilingual program linked to its Abu Dhabi campus. At pre- university levels, 
ADEC has begun to offer training programs for Arabic teachers and Dubai 
Educational Council (DEC) is launching a certification program for Arabic 
teachers in schools. All these efforts are still in their initial stages.
 In Qatar in 2012, the Supreme Education Council (a government body), in a 
reversal of the 2003–4 decision which had made English the medium of instruction 
at Qatar University, ordered the university to reinstate Arabic as a medium of 
instruction in law, international affairs, media and business administration (English 
vs Arabic, 2012). Although no official explanations for this reversal were made 
public, it followed mounting attacks in the media against QU. The imposition of 
English as medium of instruction in the public university had closed doors for many 
public high school graduates whose English proficiency was below admission 
requirements. This decision effectively shut out a sizeable number of young Qataris 
from higher education mainly because of their low English proficiency. Reinstating 
Arabic also responded to a combination of political realities after the Arab Spring as 
well as practical matters. The English policy had effectively led to the redundancy 
of Qatari faculty and reduced new faculty’s chances for employment in the only 
public university of the country.5 Recognizing the need for better proficiency in 
Arabic among future graduates, Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service 
in Qatar (SFS- Q) launched a program in Arabic language teaching to address this 
problem. Al Tonsi, one of the leaders of this program, explained that:
The new initiative will enable a student of business to continue learning 
about his or her major but also much expand the ability to read and write in 
the clearest of Arabic. The same is true for a media student or a political 
science student. They will then know business or media or political science 
not just in English, but also in Arabic.
(SFS- Q website)
SFS- Q’s website describes the initiative, stating that “a range of special purpose 
courses, content courses and literature courses will be designed, in addition to 
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new teaching materials and textbooks, new assessment methods and an expan-
sion of extra- curricular activities.” A similar program is in place at ZU (UAE) 
where students in all majors are offered “a language lab course.” According to 
ZU’s provost, this lab teaches students from all English medium majors (engi-
neering, business, sciences and IT) the Arabic translation of key concepts in their 
disciplines. QU’s return to Arabic, the SFS- Q initiative and the ZU efforts to 
promote Arabic are limited in their scope and English continues to be the 
medium of instruction for all science, engineering and technology majors.
 Despite all calls and the few initiatives to do something about Arabic, it is 
likely that these efforts will have limited success, partly due to a disconnect 
between policy pronouncements and realities on the ground where employment 
opportunities in business, technology and science clearly favor the use of English 
over Arabic and where meta- messages sent throughout society associate English 
with the future and MSA with the past.
 These calls notwithstanding, dominant discourses in the Gulf continue to 
ignore the importance of recognizing the impact of multiglossia and consider 
MSA as the only “true” Arabic. It is not unusual to hear that “good Arabic” is a 
“pure” language that must be developed only from within and reject external 
influences. There are purists who believe that any foreign intrusion into Arabic 
is a threat to its authenticity and see danger when young speakers code switch or 
borrow foreign words in their speech. Such discourses ignore the fact that all 
languages (including Arabic when it was a “global language” in its past) evolve 
by borrowing from other languages, using a variety of internal processes and 
external borrowings to change with their societies’ changing environment. In an 
article published on Al Jazeera.net, Al Jundi defends the superiority and unique-
ness of the Arabic lexicon in that its word formation process of “Ishtiqaq” (deri-
vation), which is unique to Semitic languages, allows it to coin a wealth of new 
words to refer to scientific and technological concepts without having to borrow 
from external sources. He points out that the productivity of the root and pattern 
system allows Arabic “to evolve without changing” and supports his argument 
by citing numerous examples of words denoting new meanings that are derived 
from original Arabic roots.
 Opponents of this purist approach rightly highlight the fact that the lag of Arabic 
in scientific and technological terminology is due to the Arab nations’ lag in these 
fields rather than to the Arabic language itself. In a conference recently held in 
Cairo about the crisis of the Arabic language, presenters debated whether the prob-
lems facing the use of the Arabic language today are real or perceived. It was 
remarked that like all other languages of the world, there is nothing unique to 
Arabic needing to expand in order to express new concepts and developments. 
Another point raised in these discussions was that Arabic weaknesses stem from 
orientalist colonialist representations of Arabs and Arabic which have been internal-
ized by Arabs themselves leading them to approach Arabic (MSA) as a “difficult 
language.” What is evident today is that regardless of whether this perception has 
been nurtured by orientalist and colonialist influences or not, it is generally true that 
high proficiency and fluency in MSA is not very widespread among Arabs.
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 Equally important in the mix of factors affecting the future of MSA as an aca-
demic language are linguistic, affective and socio- pragmatic factors which must 
be considered in any effort to make MSA a language of knowledge production 
in the twenty- first century.
Linguistic and affective factors
Arabic as a diglossic language
One of the factors that can explain some of the difficulties facing the development 
of proficiency in MSA is the diglossic or rather the multiglossic nature of Arabic. 
Diglossia refers to linguistic contexts in which two varieties are used by the same 
speakers of a linguistic community for clearly separate functions (Ferguson, 1959). 
In the Arabic diglossic context, MSA (acquired through literacy) is reserved for 
use in formal situations and all written communications while dialectal (spoken) 
Arabic (the native variety) is expected to be used in informal intimate and 
everyday interactions. Historically, the diglossic distribution of MSA (or its histor-
ical antecedent, Classical Arabic), and the dialectal varieties has been a relatively 
stable phenomenon partly due to very low rates of literacy across the Arab world 
in the past. Knowledge of Classical Arabic and later MSA has been limited to a 
minority of religious scholars and intellectuals since everyday interactions are in 
the dialectal variety. For religious purposes memorization of the Quran (written in 
Classical Arabic) is sufficient to recite it in prayers.
 Access to literacy coupled with Pan- Arab nationalist sentiments across the 
Arab world in the post- colonial era helped spread MSA among wider segments 
of the population and led to shaking the stability of its diglossic functional distri-
bution. MSA became a strong symbol of national identity and Pan- Arab national 
unity and began to be mixed with the dialectal varieties. In informal and even 
semi- formal oral communication, code- mixing (of MSA, dialectal Arabic and a 
foreign language) has become the norm today. Moreover, the spread of Arabic 
satellite media and increased contact between Arabs from different regions of 
the Arab world often leads speakers of one region to accommodate others in 
cross- dialectal communication thus giving rise to what is today known as Edu-
cated Spoken Arabic (ESA). ESA is a collection of intermediate varieties that 
mix MSA with dialectal grammatical and lexical features and minimize the use 
of idiosyncratic colloquialisms to increase the chances of comprehension across 
dialects. Today, these many intermediate varieties have led to a fluctuating mul-
tiglossic socio- linguistic environment across the Arab world.
 In a study of the varieties used in three Arabic- speaking satellite TV stations, 
Al Shamrani (2012) found that while MSA tends to be used by news broadcast-
ers, there was a mix of the two varieties by guests in interview programs, reveal-
ing that even in contexts formerly reserved for MSA, dialectal forms are being 
used. The study also found that in entertainment and sports programs, dialectal 
Arabic was predominant. Even in those formal oral contexts where MSA is 
expected, it is customary to hear speakers start in MSA and gradually fall back 
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into a mixed code (i.e., an ESA variety), either due to limited fluency in MSA or 
for pragmatic reasons to maximize comprehension.6
 Such mixing between the dialects and MSA is not new. Ferguson (1959) 
called it a middle variety and described it as: 
a kind of spoken Arabic much used in certain semiformal or cross- dialectal 
situations [with] a highly classical vocabulary with few or no inflectional 
endings, with certain features of classical syntax, but with a fundamentally 
colloquial base in morphology and syntax, and a generous admixture of col-
loquial vocabulary. 
(Ferguson, 1959: 340, cited in Al Shamrani, 2012)
Educated Spoken Arabic (ESA) is the contemporary version of this middle 
Arabic that is used by educated Arabs in cross- dialectal, official and semi- official 
contexts. The spread of literacy and the globalization of communication has 
helped it become a widespread phenomenon (Badawi, 1973; Meiseles, 1980; 
Mitchell, 1986).
 One could draw a parallel between the development of ESA and the earlier 
process which led to the birth of what we know today as Classical Arabic when 
it emerged as the common variety among pre- Islamic Arab tribes. Before Islam, 
Arabian Peninsula tribes spoke different dialects of Arabic which they adjusted 
to facilitate communication in contact situations such as trade and poetry com-
petitions (e.g., Suq Okadh). Their accommodation gave rise to a “koine,” defined 
as a linguistic variety based on dialects sharing the same base language and char-
acterized by a neutralization of major regional and social features between them. 
It is this koine that was used in pre- Islamic poetry, later in the Quran and subse-
quently codified and standardized as Classical Arabic by the Arab grammarians 
for writing and speaking in formal contexts. At present, however, suggestions to 
recognize ESA as a potential real variety that deserves consideration and holds 
promise of resolving issues related to diglossia triggers strong emotional neg-
ative reactions among Arabs in general and purists in particular. In the Arab 
psyche there is only one “real” Arabic, Classical Arabic (CA) and its descendant 
MSA.7 Any other form is perceived as a degenerate corruption of Arabic. Reli-
gious sentiments emanating from the desire to keep the sacred language of the 
Quran alive play a major role in these attitudes.
Affective factors
The multiglossic context of Arabic is sometimes wrongly equated with differ-
ences found between any standard language and its vernaculars. In English, for 
example, although there are clear differences between Standard English (Amer-
ican or British, for example) and its various spoken varieties, Standard English 
is functionally appropriate in both spoken and written registers and in formal and 
informal contexts. Native speakers of English could learn to speak a standard 
variety as a native language and outside of school. In contrast, MSA is nobody’s 
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native language. It is limited to formal contexts and written communication and 
violating this functional distribution feels unnatural and a subject of mockery 
(Haeri, 1997). Another difference is linked to status associated with Standard 
forms. While Standard English (or French), for example, is associated with 
higher social classes and educated elites, Standard Arabic is not. In fact, often it 
is the opposite. Arab elites have generally been educated in European languages 
and do not have high proficiency in Arabic. Modern secular higher education, 
originally introduced by colonization, relied heavily on foreign languages as 
media of instruction as mentioned above.8 As a result, highly educated elites 
generally continue to use a foreign language for all formal and academic func-
tions. Haeri’s case study of Egypt illustrates this point.9 
Often the higher one’s social class, the less likely it is that one will learn it 
[MSA] well. Upper class Egyptians, for example, generally attend foreign 
language [schools] . . . and although multilingualism is a mark of their class, 
Classical Arabic is not necessarily one of the languages they learn. 
(Haeri, 2000: 68–69)
Contrary to expectations where knowing the standard variety confers some form 
of power, proficiency in MSA is a valued commodity in narrow circles such as 
poetry, literary and religious domains. These domains have emotional and nos-
talgic values but little market value in today’s Arab societies. It is proficiency in 
English (or French) that opens important social and business doors that cannot 
be opened with proficiency in MSA alone although it may be a plus. Educated 
young Gulf Arabs generally admit to having low proficiency in writing in MSA 
and prefer to use English in written communication in formal contexts (Abdel- 
Jawad and Abu Radwan, 2011; Badry, 2011; Al- Issa and Dahan, 2011; Hopkyns, 
2014). In fact, they willingly confess to their low writing skills in MSA. It is 
fashionable and a symbol status to admit that one’s Arabic literacy skills are 
weak because it suggests that the person is “modern” and has been educated in a 
Western/private institution either at home or abroad. Speaking English is often 
associated with better education and is an ostentatious sign of upper social stand-
ing. A statement made by a 30-year- old quoted in The National10 illustrates this 
paradox in language values when she said: “If I open my mouth and speak in 
English, people say, ‘Oh she’s amazing’. If I open my mouth and start speaking 
Arabic, it’s like, ‘Oh she’s regular’ ” (Zacharias, 2012).
Impact of diglossia on literacy development in Arabic
In addition to the socio- linguistic and affective factors discussed above, lin-
guistic differences between MSA and the home dialect are important and may be 
as significant as those that exist between what is considered two separate lan-
guages in other contexts from a purely linguistic perspective.11 Psycholinguistic 
research reveals that the distance between MSA and dialectal varieties may 
explain some of the problems observed in reading acquisition among young 
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Arabic native speakers and that overlooking them in teaching methodologies 
may explain some of the attested low levels of literacy development of Arabic- 
speaking children.12 Haeri (2000: 71) claims that expecting Arabic- speaking 
children to learn to read and write in MSA in the early grades of schooling is 
analogous to “a situation in which Italian children today were faced with classi-
cal Latin as their medium of education.” The differences are at all levels of lan-
guage, from lexical, phonological, morpho- syntactic to semantic (Abu- Rabia, 
2000; Ibrahim, 2011; Saiegh- Haddad, 2003). Although the MSA lexicon and 
that of the dialects share common roots in large part, high frequency words are 
usually idiosyncratic to regional dialects. There are also many differences in 
morpho- phonological features. Experiments carried out on young children learn-
ing to read MSA revealed that recognizing these differences and building on 
them better prepares children for literacy in MSA. In an experimental study 
investigating “children’s ability to perform phonological awareness tasks,” 
Khamis- Dakwar (2007), for example, found that children who were exposed to 
MSA sounds that are not part of their dialect earlier performed better in early 
reading tasks than those in the control group.
 There are additional particularities tied to the Arabic script that have been 
identified by linguists but not taken into consideration in the pedagogical 
approaches to teaching Arabic literacy. Learning to read in Arabic requires the 
development of perceptual and processing skills that may differ from those used 
in learning to read a Latin script on which most teaching reading approaches are 
based. The Arabic script represents vowels as supra- segmental diacritics which 
are not present in intermediate to advanced reading materials. After the initial 
stages of decoding, reading Arabic requires from the reader a degree of know-
ledge of the grammar of an inflected language13 such as Arabic and an important 
lexical inventory to be able to guess the unrepresented vowels. The reader basi-
cally needs to “know” the words to be able to read them. Given the fact that the 
academic lexicon is either absent or quite different from what the young reader 
is familiar with, this is an added obstacle to guessing and deciphering unvowel-
ized script. To overcome these “difficulties” the approach to teaching Arabic 
may be helped by drawing a reader’s attention to the common typological prop-
erties of the Arabic lexicon such as its lexical derivation processes to establish 
connections between the two varieties and facilitate the transition from the 
dialect to MSA.
Pedagogical and socio- linguistic factors
Other pedagogical factors leading to lower proficiency in MSA are related to 
teaching methods that are heavily focused on grammatical accuracy much more 
than fluency, as well as attitudes linked to diglossic functional distributions of 
MSA and the dialects. The emphasis on correct grammar and eloquence raises 
expectations and inhibits spontaneous use of MSA by both students and instruc-
tors alike. It makes users pay more attention to form rather than content. In addi-
tion, using MSA in informal contexts is regarded by native Arab speakers as 
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“unnatural” and pragmatically inappropriate.14 Furthermore, a close examination 
of actual opportunities students have for listening, speaking, thinking, solving 
problems and interacting in MSA, when it is used as the medium of instruction 
is associated with “boring stuff.” MSA is for doing grammatical exercises, 
speaking correctly, reading and memorizing texts on such subjects as religion, 
civic education and history. This partly explains why, although a considerable 
amount of time is allocated to learning MSA in GCC public education schools, 
social and affective constraints limit its practice and are not in line with findings 
in language learning studies that show that the more exposure to and varied use 
of a language, the better chance one has for becoming proficient in it.
 The dominant prescriptive approach in language teaching focusing on cor-
rectness standards based on a language variety very few master has generally 
been counterproductive in Arabic literacy development. An alternative to this 
approach would be allowing the use of ESA especially in the early grades to 
minimize the distance between the spoken and the written varieties. While it is 
recognized only as a spoken variety, in reality, many written texts today are 
closer to ESA than MSA.15 Furthermore, teaching methodologies used in teach-
ing MSA are considered outdated as they are said to focus on rote learning and 
do not promote the critical thinking skills and inquiry methods needed in the 
twenty- first century. Traditional Arabic educational systems were even blamed 
for fomenting Islamist fundamentalism in the aftermath of the 9/11 events by 
Western powers.
 Pragmatically, opportunities for using MSA even in its traditional domains of 
written communication have been reduced with the intrusion of global English as 
the lingua franca in a workplace dominated by expatriate workers from different 
linguistic backgrounds. Even written interpersonal interactions through social net-
working are predominantly in English as young Arabs find it “easier” to chat, 
message or use Facebook and Twitter in English, their dialect or “Arabizi” (a 
mixed code of Arabic and English written in a modified Latin alphabet that uses 
numbers for sounds specific to Arabic). In educational institutions, when Arabic is 
the medium of instruction teachers often resort to dialectal forms to explain the 
material being taught. Interpersonal interactions both inside and outside the class-
room are in the dialect, thus further limiting exposure to MSA.
National identity versus pragmatism
The challenges discussed above are serious and have been the subject of many 
conferences and public discussions. The weak writing skills in MSA among 
young Gulf youths is well documented in many studies and news reports (Al- 
Issa and Dahan, 2011; Al Jazeera.net, 2012; Al- Kaff-Al- Hachemi and Under-
wood, 2013). These weaknesses are increasing among growing numbers of 
students and are particularly prevalent among higher socio- economic graduates 
who attend private universities.
 While calls for using more Arabic in schools continue to rise from all stake-
holders in practice, the percentage of national parents opting for private education 
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continues to rise. Available statistics show that over half of UAE nationals, 57.4 
percent (KHDA reports), enroll their children in private schools. In Kuwait it is 
around 50 percent according to recent news reports. Similar trends can be 
gleaned from news reports in other GCC countries. Students who graduate from 
public universities across the Gulf believe that they have been short- changed in 
their education because they did not have “enough English.”16 At the level of 
policy, more resources are devoted to the teaching of English at all levels. This 
discrepancy between the call for the protection of Arabic and actual practices is 
not unique to the GCC countries, however. Haeri’s study of attitude differences 
toward MSA17 found that men emphasized Arabic’s significance 
in forging pan- Arab identity, in resisting colonial domination, and as a cul-
tural and political weapon against more recent forms of foreign domination, 
[however] their actual use of Classical Arabic [MSA] forms did not match 
the overt importance they attached to this language. 
She concluded that there is a “lack of match between what individuals assert to 
be the language that fits their cultural, political, and religious ideals, and their 
actual linguistic production” (Haeri, 2000: 69).
 There are other factors that also cast doubts about the maintenance and devel-
opment of MSA in the future. In his article “Language and identity in the 
Arabian Gulf,” Holes (2011) notes the emergence of a “prestigious” Gulf Arabic 
variety across the region resulting from increased communication, increased lit-
eracy and globalization forces. This development suggests that the homogeniza-
tion process in Gulf societies is actually strengthening the dialects and not MSA. 
Holes explains this phenomenon by stating that MSA: 
does not carry the type of prestige that matters in everyday interaction 
between ordinary Arabs, whatever their level of education. Prestige in this 
context comes from the status accorded to the dominant local variety of 
Arabic, so it comes as no surprise that it is the dialects of the large capital 
cities of the Arab world which carry this so- called “covert” prestige (as 
opposed to the “overt” prestige of Modern Standard Arabic). 
(138)
 Holes gives examples of young Arabs who are reluctant and uneasy to use 
written Arabic because they do not feel competent in it. He reports on young stu-
dents who say they “never” use MSA to communicate in writing. This inability 
or lack of desire to write in MSA among young Gulf youths in universities is a 
recognized phenomenon documented in many studies and reports and supported 
by personal experience in interactions with students throughout the years.18
 Despite calls to promote literacy in MSA coming from all sectors of society, 
and despite the available financial resources being devoted by the GCC govern-
ments to “enrich” Arabic to become the language of knowledge production and 
transmission, the educational policies being implemented in the GCC have, in 
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practice, downgraded Arabic in favor of English. Haeri (2000) describes this 
type of ambivalence toward Arabic which pervades the debates among intellec-
tuals regarding identity issues in the post- colonial era by stating that:
As anxieties about modernization, decolonization, independence, and polit-
ical pluralism mounted in the course of this century, Classical Arabic came 
to stand, often simultaneously, as a language incapable of responding to the 
modern world, as the supreme vehicle for an indigenous and authentic mod-
ernity, as an essential ingredient of Arab identity regardless of religion, and 
as a language that insures a specifically Muslim identity. The non- classical 
varieties, likewise, came to be regarded as impediments to “progress” that 
needed to be overcome “exactly like poverty and disease” (N Mahfouz 
quoted in Dawwarah 1965:286). They also represent the “real self ” (El- 
Messiri 1978), true symbols of local national culture, and transnationally 
divisive because unlike Classical Arabic, they differ from country to 
country.
(Haeri, 2000: 63)
These apparent dilemmas can be understood as there are 
no more powerful means of “encouraging” individuals to assimilate to a 
dominant culture than having the economic, social and political returns 
stacked against their mother tongue. Such assimilation is not freely chosen 
if the choice is between one’s mother tongue and one’s future. 
(UNDP, 2004: 33)
However, achieving a balanced bilingual program that develops equal profi-
ciency in both languages is feasible when language in education policies are 
based on realistic assessments of wider socio- political and global contexts sur-
rounding the education enterprise. As Joshua Fishman (2012: x) in the preface to 
his book, Do Not Leave Your Language Alone, observes, “speech and writing 
communities the world over are not only expected to exert themselves on behalf 
of their own languages, but to feel remiss if they fail to do so when their lan-
guage resources are threatened.” A major means of such exertion can be through 
serious language planning efforts, which we turn to next.
Language planning
When nations decide to promote a linguistic variety for specific functions they 
resort to language planning (LP). Language planning refers to interventions at 
socio- political and linguistic levels regarding the corpus and functions of a lan-
guage variety in a given state/nation (Ferguson, 2006). The socio- political 
involvement deals with the status of the language as the official language mainly 
in official discourse, government, business and education while the linguistic 
intervention focuses on standardizing the selected variety through interventions 
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at all linguistic levels (grammar, lexicon, writing, spelling, etc.). In standardiza-
tion, language academies and other linguistic bodies are generally entrusted with 
the mission to set the parameters for acceptable variations and changes to be 
allowed in a standard language. This canonization is usually achieved through 
dictionaries and grammatical treaties. Setting these standards, however, is not 
always without controversy and is the subject of debates between those who 
believe in preserving the purity and authenticity of the language and those who 
see language as a living organism which must adapt to changing environments 
by being more open to external influences. These two perspectives are wide-
spread throughout the world’s linguistic communities but once a variety is 
adopted as the Standard, education is one of the important institutions entrusted 
with implementing the state’s language policy and teaching the Standard. In the 
Arabic context, school is the main if not the only institution responsible for the 
development of MSA proficiency among Arabic speakers.
 Standardization and corpus planning in the Arab world have been the purview 
of Arabic language academies. Qahtani (2002) provides a historical overview of 
the five academies that have successively been set up across the Arab world: 
Damascus, 1919; Cairo, 1932, Baghdad, 1947; Rabat, 1964; and Amman, 1976 
to oversee what is generally referred to as Arabization. Their mission is to pre-
serve and protect the Arabic language and make it the common language of all 
Arabs. One of the major goals of the academies is to reduce the influence of the 
colloquial varieties and stop foreign borrowings into MSA. Arabization encom-
passes both the status and corpus dimensions of language planning. Its major 
objective is to enable MSA to become the official language by intervening lin-
guistically to expand the Arabic lexicon using lexical derivational processes and 
defining standards of correctness at all linguistic levels (phonology, morphology 
and syntax). Throughout their years of existence, the academies have produced 
volumes of new terminology, particularly in the sciences but their efforts have 
not succeeded in stemming the influx of foreign lexical items into Arabic, nor 
have they been able to maintain a clear separation between the dialects and 
MSA. Even though MSA remains dominant in formal writings, language users 
resort to literal translations of English lexemes to fill lexical gaps, sometimes 
yielding funny sounding and opaque combinations in Arabic.19 In addition, the 
academies’ attempts to replace borrowed words from English (or other foreign 
languages), such as telephone, computer, feedback and brainstorming, regularly 
used by Arabs, with unfamiliar derived words, ignore the natural tendency of all 
languages to evolve through contact and integration of loan words. Overall, the 
academies’ output has generally been judged as less than satisfactory and, 
despite their efforts, they have not succeeded in developing tools to stop outside 
influences nor have they made Arabs stop using Arabized terminology, borrowed 
lexical items and dialectal phonologies.20 At the grammatical level, Arabs’ 
formal interactions generally adopt the simplified inflections of ESA in commu-
nicative contexts where MSA is usually expected. The overly prescriptivist 
approach of the academies and the lack of coordination among them have been 
unable to check the unplanned and sometimes chaotic lexical innovations across 
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the Arab world that increase the risk of dividing the MSA landscape further into 
increasingly differentiated regional varieties.21
 In addition, historically, languages have survived and evolved when they were 
used as instruments for knowledge production in a multiplicity of disciplines. To 
reach this objective, translation of books from the more advanced civilizations is 
more effective in filling possible knowledge gaps rather than importing that know-
ledge in its original language. In the Arab world, translations of scientific and 
technological books are scarce compared to translations from English into other 
languages. For example, the 2003 UNDP report states that the entire Arab world 
translates less than 20 percent of the amount of translated works into Greek or 
Spanish every year (Zakhir, 2008). To remedy this state of affairs, the Gulf region 
has established centers and encourages projects on translation such as the Abu 
Dhabi “Kalima” project, the translation research institute at NYU Abu Dhabi in 
the UAE and the Translation and Interpreting Institute in Qatar (Lindsey, 2013).
 Arab states’ political and socio- economic realities may be considered an 
added obstacle to standardization and planning. Political rivalries among Arab 
states make it more difficult to recapture Arab peoples’ “imagined community of 
Arabness” with the one Arabic language being its major force. In addition, there 
is no agreement between those who believe that only MSA is the “real” Arabic, 
those who argue that Arabic needs to be receptive to change while maintaining 
its standards and those who promote dialects and downplay the importance of 
MSA (Fassi- Fehri, 2013). This lack of consensus hampers efforts towards code 
selection and codification of one standard variety.
Language reforms and the wider socio- political context
One of the priorities of Arabization in post- independence language- in-education 
policies in the newly independent Arab states had to do with replacing the colo-
nial language with Arabic but it faced several challenges in education. These 
included the translation and production of appropriate textbooks in MSA, the 
development of modern and culturally relevant curricula, and the availability of 
teachers who are proficient in MSA and trained in modern teaching methodolo-
gies. In the Arabian Gulf region, however, public educational systems did not 
inherit a colonial school system (see Chapter 4) but they imported existing 
educational traditions from other Arab states, such as Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and 
Jordan. At the beginning, GCC educational systems adopted Arabic as their 
medium of instruction and imported curriculum and teaching staff from other 
Arab countries. By the end of the twentieth century, the fast- paced integration of 
the GCC economies and societies into the global market and massive influx of 
expatriates to staff all sectors of the economy led to a greater need for English as 
the language of communication. Important changes in education policies were 
initiated and Arabic was replaced by English as a medium of instruction in 
science, mathematics and technical subjects in public education. The opening the 
GCC educational space to private institutions reinforced the dominance of 
English (see Chapters 4 and 5).
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 The above discussion demonstrates that weakened position of Arabic in 
education was not only the result of globalization pressures but also the status of 
Arabic as an instrument of knowledge transmission because most current scient-
ific and technological knowledge wasn’t available in it.
Alternative approaches: considering context in bilingual education 
policies
Cummins (2000) observes that in order to understand the conditions that lead to 
successful bilingual education, research and policy need to examine not only lin-
guistic and psychological factors but also the important socio- political environ-
ments surrounding the school. In his discussion of the US context and the 
under- achievements of “social groups that have experienced long- term devalu-
ation of their identities in the broader society,” Cummins (2000: 34) points to the 
“need to shift to a sociological and sociopolitical orientation” to understand and 
find effective solutions to the problems facing education. While the context dis-
cussed by Cummins is different from the GCC countries in many respects, a 
number of parallels can be drawn. Both sets of students (minorities in the US 
and Arab students in the GCC) face a devaluation of their linguistic and cultural 
identities in both the school and social environments. As Cummins argued, “stu-
dents’ identities are affirmed and academic achievement promoted when teach-
ers express respect for the language and cultural knowledge that students bring 
to the classroom” (2000: 34). In the GCC educational systems, despite the signi-
ficant number of hours where students are exposed to Arabic, either as a subject 
or medium of instruction, academic proficiency in Arabic receives less quality 
attention compared to efforts poured onto English. Arabic teachers have less 
access to material resources or support, no IT facilities or professional develop-
ment and training. Even the recent reinstatement of Arabic as a language of 
instruction in some of the public universities is limited to some of the “less 
valued disciplines” in the labor market. While this is a step in the right direction, 
it does not address the fundamental issue of its market value that led to its mar-
ginalization in the first place. Language in education policies must encompass 
the whole educational system, from kindergarten to university, and must address 
the important socio- pragmatic and pedagogical aspects tied to Arabic discussed 
above.
 Another assumption that needs to be reviewed is the belief that because stu-
dents speak a dialect of Arabic, then MSA can be considered their first language.22 
As the discussion earlier demonstrated, there are important differences between the 
dialect the child used at home and MSA to be used for literacy in school. These 
differences are at all levels of language. For a literacy pedagogy to succeed it 
needs to start with the premise that Arab children come to school unfamiliar with 
MSA and that they need strategies to help them transition from their dialect to the 
Standard as the research cited above has demonstrated. This entails radical changes 
in Arabic teaching methodologies and teacher training. For example, Younes 
(2014), in discussing teaching Arabic to non-native speakers, proposes an integrated 
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approach that introduces students of Arabic as a foreign language to both MSA 
and dialectal Arabic simultaneously. While this is an active ongoing debate about 
how to prepare learners of Arabic in the United States to function appropriately in 
an Arabic- speaking context, it may be worthwhile to consider such an approach 
even in the Arab context.
 The need to recognize the relation between MSA and the dialects is impera-
tive in the GCC since a significant number of children do not even have enough 
exposure to their Gulf Arabic dialect as their caregivers (nannies and sometimes 
foreign mothers) are from outside the GCC and are not fluent speakers of Gulf 
Arabic. For these children, the gap between the home and school language is 
even wider but it is not recognized as such (Al- Kaff-Al- Hashemi and Under-
wood, 2013; Al Sumaiti, 2012; Scheele et al., 2010). Furthermore, research 
shows that even when possessing conversational competence in a language, this 
does not automatically translate into academic language competence. To become 
a proficient user of academic language, young learners need focused attention 
and practice in the literate register (Cummins, 2000; Riches and Genesee, 2006; 
Garcia, 2009). Various studies from different linguistic contexts reveal that it 
takes between five and nine years of schooling to develop academic proficiency. 
Another finding from bilingual acquisition studies is that second language learn-
ing builds on and benefits from an acquired threshold level of academic skills in 
the first language (Cummins, 2000). When Arabic literacy is made a priority in 
the early years of schooling, learners are better equipped with transferable skills 
for the acquisition of academic proficiency in a second language.
 The introduction of English earlier in the curriculum is based on the popular 
belief that in second language acquisition, “younger is better.” While the age 
variable has been widely discussed in the literature, its impact seems to be inter-
related with a host of linguistic, psychological, social and environmental factors 
that are outside the scope of this chapter (see for example, Singleton, 2001; 
Swain and Lapkin, 2005). The research findings suggest that developing high 
academic proficiency in a second language can be achieved at any age provided 
that the other conditions are favorable to it. Furthermore, research also shows 
that academic skills acquired through the first language facilitate the acquisition 
of those skills in the second. For example, data analysis of several studies 
reported by Cummins supports Beykont’s findings that: 
the rapidity with which bilingual students approached grade norms in 
English reading by Grade 6 was strongly related to their level of Spanish 
reading at Grade 3. The better developed their Spanish reading was at Grade 
3, the more rapid progress they made in English reading between Grades 3 
and 6. 
(Reported in Cummins, 2000: 35)
It would therefore be more beneficial for young learners to first develop a certain 
level of proficiency in MSA before they are exposed to the second language. 
Even more alarming, the push for introducing English earlier and spending more 
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time on it in class has generally not produced the academic proficiency levels in 
English expected among high school graduates either.23 Test scores on various 
standardized English reveal that a very small percentage of the graduates have 
the requisite skills in English for university studies tests (see Chapter 5).
Conclusions: where do we go from here?
Although the reforms adopted by Gulf states expanding the use of English through-
out their educational systems may not have intended to devalue knowledge of 
Arabic and in Arabic, nonetheless, they are “embedded within larger social man-
agement systems that buttress fundamental assumptions about the source and the 
substance of legitimate knowledge, and are thus closely tied to a more overarching 
politics of knowledge” (Leeman and Martinez, 2007: 36–37). It is a fact that pres-
sures on Arabic from English are similar to those being exerted on most other lan-
guages under globalization (Probyn, 2005). English has become the de facto world 
language of science, technology and business. Arabs, like others, need to master 
English to become active participants in knowledge production of the twenty- first 
century. The worry is when English displaces the national language in the educa-
tional system, as is the case in many of the Gulf states. Today, Arabic tends to be 
associated with past greatness of a culture that has lost prominence in con-
temporary knowledge production even among Arabs themselves. The adoption of 
English in higher education has reinforced the perceived link of Arabic to the past 
and old traditions and English to the future and knowledge societies. Moreover, 
various UNDP and other IGOs’ reports highlighting the “inadequacies” of Arabic 
education in the last decades have reinforced perceptions that link Arabic to out-
dated and unsuccessful teaching methodologies that are used to justify the margin-
alization of Arabic in education at all levels.
 In the socio- political, attitudinal, pedagogical and linguistic context discussed 
in this chapter, the revolving revolutions characterizing GCC educational 
reforms tend to search for quick fixes to complex linguistic realities. The dif-
ferent policies that have been put in place show a lack of long- term planning and 
their reversals are based on short- term assessments. In addition, the top- down 
approach in the decision- making process where decisions are decreed based on 
political considerations, is not likely to yield educational outcomes that serve 
long- term national visions to make Arabic the language of the future.
 The major challenge to Arabic in the GCC does not have to be the use of 
English in education as long as it is not the only valued language. For Arabic to 
find its place in knowledge construction, it must be used in university for 
research in twenty- first-century fields. One way to help change perceptions 
toward Arabic immediately among faculty and students is to allocate significant 
funding for research using Arabic as its medium of communication and trans-
mission; another is to keep Arabic language programs in the mainstream of uni-
versity curriculum rather than as a sideshow. Finally, Arabic instructors should 
be given the same rights and obligations as other faculty members in the same 
university.
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 On a macro level, there are many resources devoted to the protection of 
Arabic across the GCC and the Arab world which could achieve better results 
if they were unified to avoid duplication as well as competition as to which 
center outdoes the other. There are many academies, associations and confer-
ences all working toward the protection and promotion of MSA. The multiplic-
ity of these efforts shows that there is awareness about the problem. However, 
they appear to be counterproductive rather than leading to workable solutions. 
A single academy with representatives from all regional dialects may lead to 
more unified approaches to solving problems associated with variety selection 
for literacy development in Arabic. Some of its urgent tasks may be to codify 
the language based on current usage rather than a prescriptive approach. All 
linguistic means, including derivation, borrowing, innovation, extensions, are 
legitimate ways to come up with a language variety that could be used in text-
books across the Arab world. To speed up the development of Arabic, avail-
able knowledge must be translated from foreign languages into Arabic and a 
clear dissemination road map across the Arab world, or at least the major 
regional groupings, should be developed. Only the use of Arabic as the main 
language of education can change today’s reality. Today, MSA is one of the 
few remaining components of Arab identity across the 22 Arab states and its 
relevance as a language of knowledge production is threatened. Language 
planners need to exert themselves to find effective ways to empower MSA (or 
its descendent ESA) as a valued language in academic and professional 
discourse.
Notes
 1 BBC Arabic (December 18, 2014). Talking points program. Guests and participants 
discussed the decline of Arabic and speculated on reasons behind the decline and pos-
sible recommendations.
 2 Personal communication with science and math teachers in a MAG school in Dubai, 
Fall 2011.
 3 See Chapter 4 for the discussion on the recent changes in policies about Arabic as a 
medium of instruction in non hard sciences at Qatar University. Private universities, 
however, continue to teach all disciplines in English.
 4 Larry Wilson, ZU provost, June 2013.
 5 However, the change created other problems with expatriate faculty who had been 
hired to teach in English.
 6 A good illustration of this are speeches by leaders such as Jamal Abdel Nasser of 
Egypt or King Hassan II of Morocco. Starting with MSA and switching and or mixing 
the dialectal variety communicated better with the people both in terms of linguistic 
comprehension as well affective connectedness.
 7 In Arabic there is only one term, “fuSHa,” to refer to both CA and MSA. To distin-
guish between the two, the adjective “mu’aSera” (contemporary) is sometimes used.
 8 A notable exception to this trend was Syria where Arabic remained the language of 
instruction in university in all fields. Also, traditional universities such as Al Azhar in 
Egypt or Al Qaraouine in Morocco continued to use Arabic as a medium of 
instruction.
 9 This state of affairs can be generalized across the Arab world.
10 An Abu Dhabi newspaper in English.
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11 Spoken dialects form regional groupings on a continuum from East to West where the 
two ends of the continuum are the most distant and may be mutually unintelligible. 
So, based on linguistic considerations alone, Arabic varieties at the end of this contin-
uum could be considered separate languages synchronically.
12 For the discussion of the impact of diglossia on literacy development in Arabic, see 
Maamouri (1998); Abu- Rabia (2000); Saiegh- Haddad (2003); Khamis- Dakwar et al. 
(2011). 
13 Inflected languages use case markings to express grammatical functions at the level of 
the word. For example, English is no longer a heavily inflected language except in its 
pronouns where the distinction between subject pronouns such as “he,” the object 
pronoun “him” and the possessive pronoun “his” is maintained. In MSA, most content 
nouns are marked for their grammatical function in the sentence (subject, object, geni-
tive, etc.)
14 When foreigners learn MSA in school and try to interact in it with native speakers, they 
are immediately judged as unaware of the rules of use. Similar comments are often 
made about some North Africans who resort to MSA to interact with Arabs from the 
East in informal contexts because the latter say that they don’t understand them. They 
are said to “speak funny, because they use grammatical Arabic” (Nahawi).
15 ESA seems to be the post- modern evolution of Modern Standard Arabic. A rich 
corpus collected from newspapers and satellite TV stations such as Al Jazeera and Al 
Arabiya can serve as the basis for standardization in today’s corpus linguistic 
approaches.
16 This is constant complaint from students I teach in an MATESOL program. Although 
they admit to low proficiency in Arabic as well, they don’t seem to mind it as much.
17 The distinction between Classical Arabic and MSA is not relevant to the present dis-
cussion and these two terms can be used interchangeably. Classical Arabic refers to 
the language of the Quran and it is the variety that has evolved into Modern Standard 
Arabic used today in formal contexts.
18 My students have conducted several surveys of students over the last eight years 
looking at biliteracy in English and Arabic and the results consistently reveal that stu-
dents recognize that they have very low literacy skills in MSA.
19 For example, the English compound words “brainstorming” and “feedback” are liter-
ally translated as “al ‘asf addihni” and “taghdia muakisa,” using compounding which 
is an unproductive morphological process in Arabic, rather than coining new words 
by employing the very productive root pattern derivation process of Semitic 
languages.
20 Eastman in Al Qahtani (2012).
21 When one compares Media Arabic in North Africa, to that used in the Levant or Gulf 
regions, one can identify differences in semantic extensions are applied. North Afri-
cans tend to map their concepts onto French semantic fields while in the Middle East, 
English serves as a base.
22 This is of course not always the case. It is not always the case that Arab children 
speak any dialect as their native language. Very often parents insist on preparing their 
children to enter kindergarten in English and therefore expose them to it from the 
start. Also many children are raised by foreign nannies who speak Pidgin Arabic and 
some English. See Badry (2015) for a discussion of this issue.
23 Personal communication with ZU Provost, Dr. Larry Wilson, June 20, 2013.
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9 Higher education revolutions
Short- term success versus long- term 
viability?
The preceding chapters have shown how, in a relatively short period of time, 
GCC governments were able to build a national system of public higher educa-
tion alongside a variety of private institutions that have made higher education 
more accessible to those seeking it. This accessibility has been particularly bene-
ficial to women who now can study at home compared to the past when few 
parents allowed their daughters to pursue higher education abroad. In addition, the 
children of expatriate workers, both males and females, who have grown up in 
the GCC no longer have to leave the region in order to receive a college degree.
 In addition to accessibility, the introduction of private universities has also 
forced public universities to become more accountable and has led to reforms in 
their curricula, delivery methods, admission requirements and administration. 
The competition resulting from these changes has also introduced quality assur-
ance measures and processes throughout the educational landscape. A less 
impressive change resulting from the educational revolution has been in the area 
of research production although the recent emphasis on developing research 
centers and the establishment of think- tanks is creating open spaces that are sup-
posed to encourage critical discussions and participation in global research 
networks.
 At the same time, these revolutionary educational reforms are not without 
controversy. Their embrace of the new predominantly utilitarian mission of the 
university is problematic for a coherent evolution of Gulf societies based on their 
present realities and their own visions for the future. The revolutions which have 
swept the GCC higher education raise two key questions: 
1  Can the type of educational reforms adopted in the GCC accomplish the 
overarching goals of modernizing and joining the global world while main-
taining and preserving cultural and linguistic identities of the GCC soci-
eties?
2  Can changes at the level of higher education work in isolation from trans-
formative changes at other educational and socio- political levels?
 We have attempted to show in this book that the high expectations placed on 
education to revolutionize GCC societies are not likely to be realized, if other 
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policies and practices outside the higher educational system do not support the 
desired changes. While education is a major means for development, it must be 
supported by changes at other levels of social, economic, and political structures 
and processes. If it is to succeed, it must provide citizens with fair “opportunities 
for education, employment, civic participation, and social and cultural fulfill-
ment as human beings, in the context of a fair distribution of the society’s 
resources among all its citizenry” (Boulding and Parker, 2005: 179).
 This chapter assesses the degree of alignment of educational practices at the 
level of their content, delivery and administration with GCC nations’ constitu-
tions and their declared early twenty- first century visions. In our analysis, we 
rely on data from published official declarations and documents as well as 
mission statements, goals and curricular trends of major universities in the 
region. These sources are complemented with interviews of university execu-
tives when possible. Our analysis is based on the findings described in the 
previous chapters of this book and draws on our personal experiences as aca-
demics and administrators in UAE higher education.
National visions and the role of educational reforms
The five GCC countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the UAE) focused 
in this book, not only share a common past but they also have a common vision 
for their future. A reading of the GCC constitutions and the various visions pro-
mulgated in the last two decades shows that they share important aspirations. All 
five nations aspire to become knowledge societies, attain great economic devel-
opment and become leaders rather than followers in the globalized world. In 
their constitutions, they also affirm their belonging to the Arab nation and 
declare Arabic as their official language. The early articles of the constitutions of 
the five GCC countries all make it clear that the modern states are part of the 
Arab nation, linked to its history and cultural heritage through language and reli-
gion. This commitment to the Arab identity is also confirmed in strategic devel-
opments that are outlined in visions and goals for the next decades. For example, 
Sheikh Mohammad, the ruler of Dubai, prime minister of the UAE and one of 
the leading actors in Dubai’s fast- paced development, stated in his book, My 
Vision: Challenges in the Race for Excellence (Al Maktoum, 2006) that in order 
for the UAE to join the developed world, it needs to acclimate itself to the rapid 
changing reality of the world, embrace change and transform its thinking from 
the past to the future to become a leading nation in the twenty- first century. He 
also stressed that the UAE must preserve its identity as a member of the Arab 
nation1 and be guided by its core values, convictions and principles derived from 
belonging to the Arab civilization. The important role given to Arabic as the 
national language is also reaffirmed in the UAE vision for 2021 which asserts 
that “Arabic will re- emerge as a dynamic and vibrant language, expressed every-
where in speech and writing as a living symbol of the nation’s progressive Arab- 
Islamic values” (Cabinet releases, 2010; Youssef, 2010). Projecting into 2021, 
which will mark the nation’s jubilee, the vision identifies several goals. The 
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 following are some of the themes relevant to this study as articulated by the 
UAE government in its vision 2021:
1.4 Vibrant culture: The UAE’s distinct culture will remain founded on 
progressive and moderate Islamic values and endowed with a rich 
Arabic language, to proudly celebrate Emirati traditions and heritage 
while reinforcing national identity.
2.2 We want the nation to draw strength from its traditions of openness, 
peaceful coexistence and understanding. In this way Emiratis will 
always resist the value- flattening effects of globalisation, and will 
always be enriched rather than threatened by their nation’s openness to 
the world.
3.1 The UAE will harness the full potential of its National human capital 
by maximising the participation of Emiratis, encouraging entrepreneur-
ship, and nurturing home- grown public and private sector leaders while 
attracting and retaining the best talent.
(Cabinet releases, 2010)
The same aspirations and challenges are identified by all GCC countries in their 
visions. They all recognize human and social development as prerequisites for 
economic development. The Qatar National Vision (QNV2030) promulgated in 
2008, for example, states that, “Despite rapid economic and social gains, as well 
as political change, Qatar has maintained its cultural and traditional values as an 
Arab and Islamic nation that considers the family to be the main pillar of 
society.” It recognizes that one of the major challenges to achieve its long- term 
goals is to modernize while preserving its traditions under globalization pres-
sures (Qatar National Vision, 2030). The Kuwaiti 2031 vision states as one of its 
aims: “Providing [a] climate for balanced human development, safeguarding 
social values and national identity, preserving the community’s values and its 
Arab and Islamic identity.”2 Similarly, the Bahraini vision 2030 (also decreed in 
2008) focuses on economic development, and stresses “The Kingdom of Bah-
rain’s interaction with the human civilization and its Arab belonging to satisfy 
the requirements of continuous development that conforms with the international 
standards, as stated in the Kingdom’s constitution” (Kingdom of Bahrain).3 
Oman’s 2020 vision focuses on diversification of the Omani economy which can 
be achieved by promoting: 
a Higher Education system that: a) keeps pace with developments and 
changes in today’s world; b) meets the requirements of sustainable develop-
ment in the Knowledge Era, while preserving the cultural identity of Omani 
society; and, c) contributes to the progress and development of humankind. 
(Ministry of Higher Education- Oman)
 To achieve these stated visions, education is expected to be both the engine of 
the desired transformations and the keeper of traditional values and Arab culture. 
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This has led all GCC countries to implement a series of educational reforms 
which are discussed in the next sections.
Educational reforms
Both in terms of their goals and the means used to implement them, educational 
reforms adopted throughout the GCC are strikingly similar in both their under-
lying assumptions and implementations. They share the following underlying 
assumptions: 
1  improving education quality can be achieved through the transplantation of 
the Western university model; 
2  adopting English as the medium of instruction is the most efficient shortcut; 
3  presuming that educational reforms do not negatively affect the Arab- 
Islamic identity of the region;
4  achieving economic development and nationalization of the labor force 
through education can be isolated from other important policies that govern 
employment and social practices.
 These assumed transformative powers of education are consistent with those 
discussed in various international governmental organizations and reiterated by 
successive Arab Human Development Reports (UNDP, 2002, 2004, 2005). 
Higher education reform is envisaged to play the key role in transforming GCC 
societies both economically and socially. It is expected that tribal affiliations will 
become less important; a greater number of more empowered women will enter 
the labor market; and the countries’ reliance on professional expatriate labor will 
be reduced. It is also assumed that all these fundamental shifts in social and eco-
nomic practices will occur while preserving and strengthening Arab and Muslim 
heritage, culture and traditions and protecting the Arabic language in the face of 
English dominance.
Improving education quality by transplanting the Western university 
model
As discussed in Chapter 3, the transplantation of the Western university model is 
part of the globalization of education all over the world. This trend, which has 
been accelerated by the globalization of the economy and, more particularly, by 
the generalization of information technologies, has facilitated global intercon-
nectedness and encouraged the homogenization of higher education. Institutions 
in the periphery tend to adopt Western curricula, Western produced textbooks 
and materials, and patterns of organization and standardization (Spring, 2009). 
There is also homogeneity in the way these institutions submit themselves to 
American and British systems of accreditation agencies to improve their institu-
tions’ and programs’ rankings on the global stage. However, transplanted models 
are also affected by local forces and are born out of political decisions decreed 
208  Higher education revolutions
by local governments that impose their own specific regulations. Naturally, gov-
ernmental interventions shape the actual functioning of the imported institutions 
and as such cannot lead to mirror images of the Western institutions which they 
copy. Local influences have manifested themselves in governance issues, adjust-
ing to students’ competencies, teaching conditions and encouragement of 
research across the GCC.
 In addition to the transplantation of the Western university structure and cur-
riculum which are widespread worldwide, Westernization in GCC higher educa-
tion has gone further by relying on Western faculty and administrators to 
implement and lead their reforms. This dependence on Westerners started with 
private universities and spread to public institutions at all levels. For example, 
most reforms of the primary and secondary educational system were developed 
and supervised by external partnerships and Western consultants. At the univer-
sity level, Arab top executives were replaced by Western administrators in many 
public universities especially in the UAE, and the reforms to revamp educational 
programs in most GCC countries were also led by Western experts and organiza-
tions (Mills, 2008a).
 There are many assumptions that can explain governments’ decisions to rely 
on Western experts to reform education. It is believed that importing Western 
curricula is the most expedient way to respond to globalization’s fast- paced need 
for wide- ranging economic transformations. Policy- makers consider that they 
are in a race against time to join the globalized world and that the fastest way to 
reach development is to import the knowledge and expertise available in the 
developed West. According to a higher education adviser in the UAE,4 given the 
priority of professional education and the constraints of time to accomplish such 
training, it is not realistic to expect university education to accomplish every-
thing in four or five years. This view was shared by other university provosts 
who stated that the main objective of university education is to provide profes-
sional training to young nationals so that they can serve their country. A former 
Zayed University provost pointed out that the university was exploring ways to 
“align and link everything ZU does with national needs,” in order to “support the 
business community and economic development of the country” (personal com-
munication, March 2009). In another interview with New York Institute of Tech-
nology (NYIT) Abu Dhabi dean, it was emphasized that the goal of NYIT is to 
provide professional education that trains students “for a clear career orienta-
tion.” The dean did concede that the issue of contextualizing the curriculum had 
to be resolved in the future. For example, courses on federal taxation required by 
NYIT in New York are irrelevant for business students in the region where there 
are no taxes. The same priorities of preparing graduates for the labor market 
were stressed in interviews in Kuwait with university administrators.
 The second reason often cited to justify the adoption of the Western educa-
tional model in the region is linked to the serious criticisms leveled against the 
Arab educational system in the entire Arab world (Mazawi and Sultana, 2010). 
Drzeniek- Hanouz and Yousef (2007: 8) point out that one of the reasons the 
UAE did not have a better standing among the 40 most competitive economies 
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in the world was due to “low rankings on indicators related to health and educa-
tion when benchmarked against the group of advanced economies.” They 
pointed out that “aside from quantitative targets, the quality of outcomes in terti-
ary schooling needs to be enhanced to reverse the low valuation of educational 
credentials by the private sector.” The World Bank report on education in the 
MENA region levels similar criticisms. Arabic education has become syn-
onymous with rote learning, outdated teaching methods and a teacher- centered 
approach (Boyle, 2006; World Bank, 2009). Its failures are usually attributed to 
its being out of sync with the skills requirements of the modern job market 
because of a curriculum and pedagogy that do not develop the necessary skills of 
flexibility, critical thinking and analysis, and lifelong learning. Since these skills 
are considered to be the hallmark of the Western educational system and the 
reason for the advancement of Western societies, transplanting the Western/
American educational models and importing top executives to lead the reforms 
of the educational system are seen as the solution to what is ailing the Arab 
educational system and a shortcut to producing Arab graduates with the required 
qualifications to spearhead the development of their countries (Drzeniek- Hanouz 
and Yousef, 2007; UNDP, 2003; Mazawi, 2007). It is expected that recruiting 
international consultants, mainly from the United Kingdom, the United States 
and Australia, to direct both public and private institutions will remedy Arab 
education failings and raise the quality of Arab university graduates’ modest 
output as researchers, innovators and producers of knowledge (Bollag, 2006; 
Mills, 2008a, 2008b).
 The nature of the reforms and the short- term failure to change labor market 
outcomes has led many academics and parents alike to question their effective-
ness. They point to the relatively high unemployment rates among national 
graduates and what they consider as young generations’ weakening ties to 
Arabic culture and Arabic proficiency. Mounting criticisms of the direction of 
earlier reforms, particularly in the UAE and Qatar where the reforms were the 
most aggressive, has resulted in the reversal of some of their components such as 
a partial return to Arabic as a medium of instruction in the humanities and social 
sciences and the nomination of national administrators to lead public and even 
some private universities. By April of 2013 sweeping changes in the administra-
tion of UAE public universities were carried out by the new minister of higher 
education. Qatar University also reversed its policy of English medium instruc-
tion by reinstating Arabic in all but hard science colleges (see Chapter 5). These 
abrupt shifts serve to highlight key problems with the reform process: the exclu-
sion and lack of participation of important national stakeholders in the planning 
stages of educational reforms opened the door to criticisms of the reforms. In 
some cases governments reacted by decreeing reversals of parts of the policies in 
unpredictable and unplanned ways, thus creating further instability in the educa-
tional system and resulting in new problems of their own.
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Adopting English as the medium of instruction is a 
pragmatic solution
As discussed in Chapter 8, there has been relatively little attention in official dis-
courses about the implications of a language policy that stresses the need 
for English proficiency rather than a dual language proficiency in both Arabic 
and English (Al Baik, 2008; Al Najami, 2007; Nahyan, 2009).5 The emphasis on 
English as the language of modern education reflects an acceptance of the 
developed/developing binary division of the world and stems from the belief that 
it is possible to catch up to the developed countries by using English to access 
the knowledge available in it (Tikly, 2004; Drummond, 2010; Lewis, 2010; 
Swan and Lewis, 2010). There seems to be little concern about the impact that 
using English to educate may have on the maintenance, let alone the develop-
ment, of Arabic as a language of knowledge in the future, as aspired to in the 
vision statements discussed above. The contradiction between the adoption of 
English as the language of instruction and the declared goals of developing 
Arabic to become the language of twenty- first-century knowledge seems to be 
set aside for more pressing pragmatic considerations. Interviewed university 
executives6 concede that more attention should be given to Arabic culture and 
language in university education. However, they stressed that the priorities in 
education today are to prepare university graduates for a labor market that 
requires English. They shared the opinion that, today, there is a clear emphasis 
in the Middle East on professional education and that to prepare graduates for 
the knowledge society they need to master English, the language of science, 
research, business and technology and develop the skills required in the labor 
market. In effect, this association between English and “useful education” helps 
“standardize Western measures of skill technology, innovation and productivity 
in ways that are quickly recalibrating regional economic and political relation-
ships” (Tikly, 2004: 16). Setting the priorities from this perspective impacts not 
only the neglect of the mother tongue but it also means that students must devote 
more time to learning English and professional skills with very little space in the 
curriculum reserved for the acquisition of local knowledge to ground them in 
their culture and history.
 The consequences of these implemented educational policies are all the more 
important given the demographic makeup of the society and family structure. The 
need to import a large labor force and a reliance on the expatriate experts to build 
infrastructure and lead economic development have seriously impacted GCC soci-
eties’ communication patterns and channels, although to varying degrees.7 The 
influx of expatriates has given rise to globalized urban centers where Western 
culture and the English language have become ubiquitous and their influence ines-
capable inside and outside the home. From a very early age, children watch Amer-
ican programs on TV and are spoken to in English by their parents or their foreign 
nannies at home. Outside the home, English functions as the lingua franca in com-
munication between expatriates from different linguistic and cultural backgrounds 
and with nationals. Western cultural messages dominate the social landscape in 
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shopping malls, restaurants, movie theaters and hospitals. Nationals must know 
some English to obtain even the most basic services in their own countries.8 In 
some cities such as Dubai or Doha public spaces, local culture and language have 
become confined to souks and heritage villages that have been developed to 
represent culture not only for tourists but also for young generations of nationals 
(Khalaf, 2002, 2005).
 Although the impact of globalization is not uniform across the region and 
seems to depend on the degree of integration with the global market and depend-
ence on imported skilled manpower, the infiltration of English into life patterns 
of young generations seems to be similar across the GCC, particularly in urban 
centers. Several studies conducted among university and high school students in 
the GCC reveal that young Gulf nationals and Arabs residing in the UAE, Qatar 
and Oman feel the real impact not only in terms of their linguistic practices 
where English dominates their diverse interactions but also in their thought pat-
terns. The reliance on English for almost everything in their lives has aroused 
concerns and made university students themselves ambivalent about their mother 
tongue (Al- Issa and Dahan, 2011). Such linguistic practices are clearly mis-
aligned with GCC vision statements emphasizing Arabic language and culture as 
an integral part of their identities.
Reforms’ impact on the construction of national identity
Mission statements of GCC public universities and the different types of private 
or branch institutions are similar in their visions and goals although they may 
highlight different aspects having to do with reducing the “flattening effect of 
globalization” on national identity. For example, the more ambitious semi- 
private universities do recognize the need to combine the global with the 
Islamic/historical/cultural/local knowledge in their educational outcomes, 
unlike branch and public universities that tend to emphasize preparing students 
for careers in a globalized world. The larger semi- private institutions also 
acknowledge the value of a liberal arts education model which is generally one 
of the important features of the American- style university education. However, 
the focus on professional education remains dominant in most universities in 
the region. In defense of this professional focus in higher education, one of our 
interviewees stated that “Arabs need to adapt to the global context and not 
allow [their] history to prejudice their outlook on the present environment.”9 He 
went on to explain that in order for universities to provide the desired local 
knowledge, students would have to spend more years in university study given 
their initial low competencies in English and other study skills.10 Similarly, in 
response to a question on how the university is ensuring that students receive a 
liberal arts education when the focus is on professional training, the dean of the 
school of humanities at AUK suggested that their approach is to blend acquisi-
tion of liberal arts education, local knowledge and professional training 
throughout the curriculum. She went on to explain that this blending is accomp-
lished by offering a professional education and targeting problem solving skills 
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to find solutions to local market problems. Such a perspective seems to suggest 
that localizing university education means focusing on professional training and 
providing the skill set in demand by the local labor market.
 Other administrators acknowledged that there is a problem with the way uni-
versity education is presently handling its grounding in the local Arab culture 
and environment. A university provost stated:
Our students have told us they don’t know much about their own history 
and we are trying to respond to that. The question is what minimum level of 
knowledge students should have about their own country and culture 
[emphasis added] and to build that into the general education curriculum so 
that, that level of awareness is assured. Even beyond that, communicating in 
Arabic is something that even our students who have grown up here are not 
able to do effectively in some cases. Increasing the level of sophistication 
and knowledge in the use of communicating in Arabic is an important part 
of what we are trying to accomplish.
(Personal communication, March 2009)
The concerns about how university education can balance between its two goals 
of grounding itself in local culture and preparing students to participate in the 
global economy of their countries was expressed over and over again by univer-
sity professionals (faculty and administrators) interviewed in Kuwait, Qatar and 
the UAE. The pressure to graduate students who can directly enter the job 
market is too great to allow for the allocation of time to a more liberal arts cur-
riculum. This is particularly problematic given the low skill sets that entering 
students bring with them from high schools (see Chapter 5).
 Two further elaborations are in order here. First, what exactly does one mean 
by liberal arts education and, second, what does one mean by grounding in local 
culture? In its definition of the purpose of general education offered in a liberal 
arts approach to education, the Harvard Task Force Report (Harvard University 
College of Arts and Sciences, 2007: 1) states that it should prepare citizens to 
“[E]ngage with forces of change—cultural, religious, political, demographic, 
technological, [and] planetary.” This is generally accomplished by having stu-
dents take general courses in humanities, social sciences, mathematics, composi-
tion and natural science disciplines, before moving on to specialize in their 
particular field (Latzer, 2004). However, in the GCC context, the benefits of such 
program of study are constrained by the relatively low academic English profi-
ciency of freshmen. Depending on their TOEFL scores, students may have to 
spend a year or more in pre- college courses of instruction in order to prepare 
them for the four- year collegiate course of study. Thus, the normal four- year 
course of study for students in the West can often be extended to five, or even 
six, years. The result is that less time is spent on the type of courses that can 
provide students with “the tools to face [the cultural, religious, political, demo-
graphic, technological and planetary] challenges in an informed and thoughtful 
way” (Harvard Task Force, 2007: 1). As a result, general education has to devote 
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more time to developing linguistic proficiency in English to access professional 
level training rather than a more humanistic education.
 UNESCO defines humanistic education as one that promotes critical thinking 
about one’s own society, culture and historical traditions to prepare citizens to 
be active defenders of human rights, equitable societies and the environment 
(Spring, 2009). Offering an education that does challenge the traditional status 
quo is understandably a sensitive route that universities must carefully negotiate, 
and doing it in Arabic might be even more difficult. But preparing graduates to 
make appropriate choices and be critically engaged in the development of their 
societies requires it. In addition, the fact that the majority of faculty are expatri-
ates, with no real job security, often makes them avoid discussing “sensitive 
issues” for fear of being negatively labeled as not respecting local cultures and 
traditions.11
 The GCC states are relatively young nations that have witnessed phenomenal 
transformations during their short history. They are faced with a multitude of 
existential questions which have been further intensified by recent regional 
upheavals. Since the 9/11 events, the region has come under world scrutiny and 
such questions are being debated within prevalent competing paradigms ranging 
from liberal, progressive, conservative to Islamist ideologies. Dominant conser-
vative and liberal perspectives are often at odds over how to reconcile Western 
values and lifestyles brought in by globalization with an understanding of “pro-
gressive and moderate Islamic values [that are] endowed with a rich Arabic lan-
guage, to proudly celebrate . . . [national] traditions and heritage while reinforcing 
national identity” (Cabinet releases, 2010: Theme 1.4). The debates touch on 
issues relating to all aspects of social and political life ranging from environ-
mental and gender issues, morality, cultural affiliation, religious practices, 
Islamic and Western banking systems to political alignments. All of these ques-
tions are regular topics of discussions on TV programs and newspapers in the 
region (e.g., Mathew, 2008; Al Jazeera TV, 2009; Al Arabiya TV, 2009; BBC 
Arabic, 2014). While university education cannot provide a magic solution to 
these issues, it should offer students skills and knowledge to participate in this 
debate and reflect on competing discourses. The evidence from the general 
education curriculum of both private and public universities shows little evid-
ence that this discourse is taking place. A liberal arts education that makes stu-
dents acquire knowledge of their national history, cultural heritage and society 
could enable students “to think and act critically and reflectively outside the 
channels of a career or profession” (Muller, 2000: 41). So far, higher education 
reform has missed the opportunity to use general education to create a new gen-
eration of critical thinkers who can productively construct their own national 
identities and civic engagements.
Defining knowledge in the new mission of the university
In describing what they called the “Education Gospel” Grubb and Lazerson 
(2006) point to the similarities across many parts of the world, from the United 
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States to China, passing through Europe, sharing a common discourse about 
education. This discourse “first stresses the failures of schools and universities 
and then proceeds to reform them with more economic and utilitarian goals” 
(295). There is a widespread acceptance of this gospel by all stakeholders in the 
education process. This doctrine rests on the belief that in light of the “know-
ledge revolution” that has taken place in the last decades, work qualifications 
have also changed with the labor market demanding “higher order skills” which 
can only be obtained through higher education if individuals want to participate 
in the knowledge economy. The framing of the value of education in terms of its 
“economic production function” is widespread worldwide and is attributed to the 
corporatization of higher education (Olssen and Peters, 2005; Spring, 2009). 
Nedeva (2008: 86) observes that the “rhetoric about repositioning universities as 
global players in the ‘knowledge society’ and major contributors to ‘economic 
competitiveness’ and ‘wealth creation’ is widespread both horizontally and ver-
tically.” Horizontally, across nations, university education missions stress their 
role as knowledge producers and the same discourse is held vertically at all 
levels within each nation. IGOs such as the World Bank and the OECD and 
national governments expect HEIs to offer citizens and societies a competitive 
advantage on the global stage. These expectations have affected not only the 
type of skills being targeted but also the mission of the institution itself. The 
emphasis on efficiency, accountability and competitiveness are gradually trans-
forming university education into marketable services and subjecting it to the 
capitalist laws of the market. Such changes are leading many education research-
ers to question HEI’s new role (see, e.g., Epstein, 2008; Dale, 2008; Naidoo, 
2008; Ursin, 2008). For example, Etzkowitz (1998, cited in Nedeva, 2008: 88) 
argues that the growing commercialization of higher education is creating an 
“entrepreneurial university,” which integrates economic development into the 
university as an academic function along with teaching and research. It is this 
“capitalization of knowledge” that is at the heart of a new mission for the univer-
sity, linking universities to users of knowledge more tightly and establishing the 
university as an economic actor in its own right.
 While criticisms of the reframing of the university’s mission to serve this 
“third mission” to respond to corporate funding demands are beginning to be 
heard in the West (Nedeva, 2008; Brown et al., 2008), the rest of the world has 
embraced the university’s new mission and its commercialization as the sacred 
gospel to be duplicated. Universities in the Arabian Gulf and elsewhere have 
approached reforming education from an either- or perspective. The binary 
alternatives of either importing Western curricula and language to close “the 
knowledge gap separating the Arab and Islamic nations from the advancement 
of contemporary global civilization” (Abdallah S. Jum’ah, quoted in Verde, 
2010) or lagging behind is a false dilemma.
 Developing countries’ education may be better reformed if it seriously con-
siders the concerns raised about the corporatization of universities to avoid its 
pitfalls. In addition, an educational system that worked in the West with different 
social and historical configurations may not necessarily yield the same outcomes 
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in a different socio- historical context and a rapidly changing and diversified 
global landscape.
 The fast- paced and dynamic changes of increasingly global economic and 
social structures and knowledge capital require that higher education pay more 
attention to lifelong learning critical thinking skills. For example the World 
Bank (2003) suggests that the new type of learning should “emphasize creating, 
applying, analyzing, and synthesizing knowledge and engaging in collaborative 
learning across the lifespan” (World Bank, 2003: xvii–xviii cited in Farrell and 
Fenwick, 2007: 15). While this may be true, the debate remains about how to 
define a type of knowledge that has local relevance. According to Muller (2000), 
there are two orientations regarding the categories of knowledge. He argues 
against: 
accepted dichotomies between an education for knowledge and an education 
for skills, a curriculum of the past and one of the future, the emphasis on 
understanding or memorization because they tend to “portray the world en 
route from one to the other [and] will certainly not aid our understanding of 
what knowledge and skills our millennial citizen will find most worthwhile.” 
(Muller 2000, 54)
The problems of governance and sustainability
The need to develop a university and college system that addresses local needs 
while providing students with the technical and intellectual means to make their 
way in a rapidly globalizing economy requires us to look at the governance of 
higher education institutions. One cannot develop the humanities and social sci-
entific academic infrastructure to creatively engage students in exploring 
important social and cultural issues without creating an administrative system 
that can unleash the creative scholarly energy of the faculty.
 As we noted in Chapter 6, many of the new private institutions that have been 
created over the past two decades suffer from what we might call a participatory 
governance deficit. In extreme cases, faculty members are employed to teach a 
large number of courses whose syllabi and methods of assessment are predeter-
mined. Sometimes, accreditation demands inadvertently exacerbate this problem 
by insisting on the quantification of educational outcomes. This leads to the 
adoption of standardized tests and limits the ability of institutions to provide 
engaging courses of study. This problem is especially severe for the small insti-
tutions that primarily provide business and information technology degrees. It is 
likely that the very competitive environment that these for- profit institutions face 
make it much more unlikely that their owners will encourage the empowerment 
of their key workers.
 While it is not uncommon for faculty to assist in the management of degree 
programs as well as to evaluate the educational accomplishments of their stu-
dents, it is less common for academic workers in most of the GCC institutions to 
contribute to important decisions on efforts to reform the curricula.12 More often 
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than not, these decisions come from above in unpredictable ways. This is par-
ticularly the case in public institutions that are run directly by ministries of 
higher education or councils under these ministries. Very few universities and 
colleges in the GCC have functioning Faculty Senates. This is partly a result of 
the hierarchical political systems of the Gulf, but it is noteworthy that the newer 
higher educational institutions often have a more disempowered expatriate 
faculty than the older public institutions.
 The elite branch campuses face a series of different issues that call into ques-
tion their long- term ability to integrate the study of local social issues into their 
curricula. In some cases, the campus is required to provide an identical curric-
ulum to that offered by the home campus. This can obviously limit the ability of 
the campus to creatively respond to local student needs. On the other hand, the 
prestigious nature of these institutions allow the campus administrators to limit 
teaching loads and encourage research, and some of these institutions have 
developed impressive research output in the few years of their existence.
 The larger issue these campuses face revolves around efforts to maintain their 
legitimacy as most were created through decisions of a very small group of 
elites. On the GCC side, the ruler must commit to providing a high level of sub-
sidies even though most of the students are not national citizens. On the univer-
sity side, the university president is often responsible for the decision to create a 
branch campus even though the faculty of the home institution might be unen-
thusiastic. It is not at all difficult to imagine a change in university leadership 
leading to a reassessment of a home country’s overseas commitments. Nor is it 
hard to foresee a new ruler in a GCC country re- evaluating the commitment of 
subsidies to an elite university that services a very small number of its own 
national citizens. The isolation of GCC citizens from the educational reform 
process is particularly noteworthy in these cases.
Can education reform alone achieve the nationalization of 
the labor market?
One of the major challenges of the GCC planning authorities has been the effort 
to encourage the nationalization of the workforce. Despite heavy investments in 
education and the various qualitative reforms we have documented, there 
remains an almost total reliance on expatriates in most private sectors of the 
economy. As we have seen, the causes of this mismatch are often blamed on the 
quality of education and the orientation of students in humanities and non- 
scientific degrees that are considered not to be aligned with the required skill sets 
and qualifications demanded by the private sector. The evidence, however, 
points to a different conclusion: in the absence of a strong coordination between 
education, labor and economic policies, this mismatch is likely to continue.
 Most GCC nationals graduating from university seek management positions 
and are unwilling to accept positions that they do not consider prestigious due to 
real social pressure on them. Nationals are expected to be rich and owners of 
businesses rather than mid or low level employees (this is especially true for 
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Kuwaiti, Qatari and UAE nationals). Such attitudes perpetuate the dependence 
on expatriates to occupy these positions, particularly in the private sector. In 
fact, an important outcome of higher education reform is that it has provided 
educational opportunity for expatriate youth and promoted their employment in 
the private sector at lower wages than nationals are willing to accept. Current 
labor laws and regulations end up not encouraging nationals to join the private 
sector who prefer public sector employment because it offers higher pay scales, 
shorter working hours, longer holidays, and retirement benefits. From busi-
nesses’ perspective, there is reluctance to employ nationals because of regula-
tions making it difficult to fire them and the perceptions that nationals either lack 
the needed skills or, just as importantly, the motivation to be productive workers. 
This has often led to the employment of shadow (or phantom) workers doing the 
job of the national in sectors of the economy where the states have imposed 
hiring quotas such as banking in the UAE, Qatar or Kuwait. Hertog reports that 
these hiring quotas
have been difficult to monitor, have led to evasion and in some cases cor-
ruption between businesses and labor administrations. Various forms of 
“phantom employment” of nationals are widespread across the region, and 
quotas have probably increased the informal employment of foreigners.
(Hertog, 2014: 7)
The lesson drawn from this unsuccessful experience has been that quotas have 
failed because nationals do not have the appropriate skills to function effectively 
in a global economy or do not have incentives to do so. Quotas alone cannot 
force businesses to really use labor services of national citizens. Neither can 
expansion of higher education alone make national students seek private sector 
employment.
 The embrace of higher education across the GCC where in some countries 
close to 90 percent of high school graduates apply for tertiary education has led 
some cynics to see in this step a strategy to delay youths from entry into the job 
market and disguise the potential high unemployment rates among the youths. In 
some cases, such as in Oman, the current labor market is unable to absorb all 
tertiary education graduates and the prediction is that a brain drain is underway 
where Omanis are looking for careers in neighboring countries. Recently, 
however, education policies are encouraging vocational training colleges and 
institutes as an alternative to university education, particularly in countries such 
as Oman and Bahrain. The indication is that government policy- makers do want 
increasing numbers of GCC citizens to find private sector employment, but so 
far, national citizens continue to disproportionately work in the public sector for 
relatively high wages, while the private sector largely employs a disproportion-
ate number of expatriate workers at lower wages.13
 In the richer countries (Qatar and the UAE), more than 90 percent of the 
private sector labor force is expatriate, while more than 80 percent of employed 
nationals work in the public sector. National workers in the three lower income 
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countries of the GCC (Saudi Arabia, Oman and Bahrain) are more likely to work 
in the private sector, but only Oman has over the past decade successfully 
reduced the relative presence of expatriates in the private sector and the relative 
number of nationals who work in the public sector (Kuwait may also be meeting 
these goals). The inability and unwillingness of nationals to enter the private 
sector has particularly affected well- educated women who desire to work and 
less well- educated national men. Unemployment rates for female nationals have 
climbed as larger numbers of young adult women improve their educational 
attainment. In the UAE, for example, the percentage of women in the labor force 
who cannot find work is 28 percent. In Saudi Arabia, this female unemployment 
rate is 35 percent (IMF, 2013).
 What accounts for the seeming inability of higher educational reforms to 
transform the labor market? Part of the explanation is linked to recent and trans-
itory trends. In the wake of the recent period of high oil prices, many of the GCC 
states are implementing large physical infrastructure projects that require the 
importation of vast numbers of low- wage workers from South Asia. More funda-
mentally, however, is the continuation of an incentive structure that favors relat-
ively low wage expatriate employment in the private sector and high wage 
employment for nationals in the public sector.
 Given these realities, education reforms alone cannot achieve the goal of 
attracting more nationals to the productive sectors of the economy without policy 
interventions to reform the patterns of job creation in the GCC. There is a need 
for the creation of higher- skilled mid- level job opportunities for the thousands of 
national university, college and vocational training graduates who expect more 
attractive wages than the private sector is presently paying to expatriates. A port-
folio of coherent government interventions to address short- term employment 
constraints could include the introduction of a tax and subsidy program that can 
induce an increase in the relative share of nationals employed in the private 
sector. Such steps must be accompanied by changes in public sector wage- setting 
practices and private sector employment management policies so that wage dif-
ferentials between the private and public sectors decrease. These measures 
should be coupled with what is referred to as “labor market active programs” 
such as the UAE’s TANMIA.14 If these reforms are implemented, then the higher 
education reforms we have documented are much more likely to succeed in 
increasing nationals’ participation in the private sector of the economy toward 
achieving GCC nationalization goals.
Opening the doors to women: a chance for equality?
GCC governments across the region have entrusted education with social devel-
opment and the empowerment of women. But unlike the limited impact that 
education has had in the area of nationalization of the labor force discussed 
above, a major achievement of higher education in the GCC is that it has laid the 
basis for women’s emancipation. Across the GCC the percentage of women 
enrolled in HEIs is equal if not superior to men. This has been possible thanks to 
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the availability of HE education at home as families are much more reluctant to 
send their daughters to study abroad. Literacy rates among females above the 
age of 15 are around 84 percent, and in 2009 more than 60 percent of graduates 
in Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE were women (Al Masah Capital Limited, 2012).
 The personal and social benefits of women’s education are undeniable. 
Worldwide research shows a clear correlation between women’s education and 
health benefits for both females and their children. Increased education of 
women leads to a decrease in child mortality and fertility rates, increase in life 
expectancy and an increase in potential income (Adely, 2009). For most coun-
tries of the GCC, the rapid increase in the number of educated women has 
resulted in gender role imbalances as the percentage of women university gradu-
ates is greater than men’s. Women’s empowerment seems at times to have out-
paced the often paternalistic traditions and expectations which still prevail in 
society (Al- Nasr, 2011).15
 Despite these advances, women’s educational successes have not been paral-
leled by corresponding participation in the labor market. Indeed, women’s parti-
cipation in the labor sector remains well below what one would expect. Despite 
governments’ steps to encourage women to participate in their societies’ labor 
market, out of the 10.2 million literate women above the age of 15 only 3.3 
million are recorded as employed, bringing their participation in the GCC labor 
market to 26.9 percent, compared to 84 percent for males (Al Masah Capital 
Limited, 2012). IGOs have tended to explain this mismatch by invoking the role 
of cultural values and family traditions as a major cause. The questions often 
asked are: how important are Arab cultural and family values in explaining this 
mismatch? What is the role of economy planning and labor policies in women’s 
low participation in the labor market? And, can other reforms in higher educa-
tion reverse this reality?
 There is no agreement as to the role played by culture, family and tradition. It 
is widely presumed that women’s freedom to work outside the home is restrained 
by Arab traditional values in male- dominated societies. These traditions are 
often reinforced by laws that severely limit women’s rights under the guise of 
religion. For example, in most Arab countries, laws still favor men over women 
in inheritance and their ability to make their own decisions relating to marriage, 
divorce and freedom of movement.
 As restrictive as this reality is, Arab women’s legal rights have progressed in 
the last decades. Women’s equal rights to men have been formally recognized in 
most GCC constitutions such as “in Qatar, Kuwait (Kuwait Constitution Article 
29), UAE (UAE Constitution Article 25), Bahrain (Bahraini Constitution Article 
4), Oman (Oman Basic Law Article 17), [and] the Saudi Arabian Constitution 
guarantees ‘human rights in accordance with Shari’ah’ (Article 26)” (Al- Nasr, 
2011: 44). GCC women have also gained some political rights, including voting 
and running for parliament in some countries. There are women ministers and 
municipality representatives in Kuwait and the UAE. Within higher education, 
Sheikha Moza al Misnad of Qatar, the mother of the present- day ruler, is the 
head of the Qatar Foundation, which supervises Doha’s Education City. In 
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Kuwait, Sheikha Dana al Sabah is the founder and head of the Board of Trustees 
of the American University of Kuwait. In the UAE, Sheikha Fatma, the wife of 
the late UAE president Sheikh Zayed, and four women holding ministerial posts, 
are all role models that send powerful messages to GCC women and men.
 GCC women have also made great strides in business. Like in the rest of the 
world they have become entrepreneurs, albeit at much slower rates depending on 
the specific country. Zeidan and Bahrami (2011: 102) report that “Saudi, Bahrain 
and the UAE seem to be at the forefront, while the women of Kuwait, Qatar and 
Oman have not been as active.” According to the authors, women’s participation 
in business activities still face several challenges including access to capital and 
relevant information, and cumbersome and sometimes gender- discriminatory 
regulations, particularly in Saudi Arabia. Other barriers have to do with a lack of 
self- confidence and, more importantly, women’s prioritization of their family 
responsibilities and desires to establish a family and work balance. It is clear that 
such factors limiting labor force participation of women are not unique to Arab 
women but can be found everywhere across cultures (Adely, 2009).
 In an ethnographic study conducted by Adely on Jordanian women and their 
perceptions of paid work outside the home, participants articulated a wide 
variety of reasons for their participation in higher education. For some it was 
seen in economic/financial terms as opening doors for better employment oppor-
tunities, while for others, the reasons were more personal such as improving 
their prospects for a better marriage. Adely (2009) suggested that there are many 
factors that influence women’s decisions regarding education and work that go 
beyond the neo- liberal explanations and stereotypical conceptions of “a patho-
logical” representation of the “Arab family,” “Arab culture” and “Arab men and 
women” prevalent in IGO reports such as the 2005 Arab Human Development 
Report, which tend to perpetuate such discourse on Arab women’s status. Adely 
concludes that such stereotypical representations ignore the rapid changes that 
are taking place not only at the level of the economy but also at the level of cul-
tural beliefs. She writes that:
The AHDR 2005, despite making important contributions to the conceptual-
ization of development challenges in the Arab world, fails to account for the 
range of factors that shape decisions about education, waged labor, marriage 
and family. It oversimplifies the significance of global economic and polit-
ical forces tied to contemporary development projects like formal education, 
and despite giving credence to the importance of developing human capabil-
ities to make informed choices, it continues to rely on assumptions shaped 
by economic determinants and a liberal ideal of progress about what consti-
tutes progress and quality of life. Thus the reader is unable to imagine alter-
nate outcomes or desires.
(Adely, 2009: 117)
It is clear that transformative changes taking place in Arab societies are also 
leading to changes in “Arab family” values, albeit at different rates. While some 
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values, such as parents’ role to decide for their children, both males and females, 
what to study, who to marry and where to work are still current practices, many 
others are in transition. Nonetheless, Arab attitudes toward the value of girls’ 
education have dramatically changed. Across the Arab world, families are 
willing to make great sacrifices to send their daughters to school and university 
when it is accessible to them and they can afford it.
 When it comes to work, there are many other factors that affect women’s 
choices of employment. In a study of women’s perceptions of work, Khalifeh 
(2011) found that interviewed Qatari women felt that both their society and their 
government encouraged them to enter the workforce. They expressed prefer-
ences as to which sectors are better working environments for them based on 
their need to balance work and family. They consider working in the public 
sector safer even though they recognize that work in the private sector leads to 
better pay and better opportunities for career advancement. For them the priority 
is to find a job that allows them to balance between family and work responsibil-
ities, a balance that is possible in careers such as in education.
 One of the accepted economic benefits of women’s paid employment outside 
the home, worldwide, is the liberating force of being financially independent 
which empowers them to be more assertive. In the GCC, there are possible 
explanations as to why employment may not necessarily be perceived as that 
financially liberating force. GCC women can be financially independent without 
having to work. The welfare system in the wealthy GCC states subsidizes basic 
living for all its citizens, making employment for financial needs less of a neces-
sity. It should be noted here that Islam grants wives the right to control their own 
financial resources and makes men alone responsible for household expenditures 
and family support. In addition, many national women can claim unemployment 
to receive supplementary government unemployment insurance. As a result 
many women may choose not to work if the family constraints on their freedom 
of movement are not too onerous.
 The changes described above are not uniform throughout Arab societies or 
the GCC. It is true that there are still family/cultural constraints that do limit 
possibilities for those women who do want to work. Parents of unmarried young 
women do not favor their daughters moving away from home in search of 
employment unless they are in dire need of that extra income. In the GCC, as 
elsewhere, this constraint on women’s mobility is exacerbated by job creation 
spatial patterns. Both government and private industry employment availabilities 
tend to be concentrated in the larger cities such as Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Doha, 
Kuwait City, Manama or Muscat. Educated women living outside of these 
centers are less likely to find work (specifically in the private sector) close to 
home unless they are willing to commute. There are also still cultural restrictions 
on the type of work acceptable for women. For example, women engineers are 
unlikely to be offered or themselves seek work that requires night shifts in manu-
facturing industry, construction sites or offshore oil rigs.
 Socially, prevailing beliefs that male and female spaces should be segregated 
in societies that are male- dominated also limit women’s opportunities to partake 
222  Higher education revolutions
in their own development and the development of their societies. Separate educa-
tional institutions have made it possible for parents to send their daughters to 
school in an environment that otherwise would have kept them at home. At the 
same time segregated schools have perpetuated the mentality that women do not 
belong in public spaces controlled by men. In some contexts such as Saudi 
Arabia, gender segregation has also negatively affected the quality of education 
being delivered and received by women. On the job market, women are encour-
aged to work in domains where there is little interaction with males, such as 
teaching, thus limiting their opportunities for work. Social discourses about 
women’s education tie the benefits of education to their role in the private space 
of the home and family as good mothers and wives rather than direct participants 
in the economic development of their societies. It is often said that by raising 
good citizens, educated mothers are in fact participating in the evolution of their 
societies. In short, through their education women are expected to be enablers 
and supporters of men to carry out their responsibilities. We should be mindful, 
though, that constraints on women are not necessarily unique to the “Arab 
family” or the GCC societies but can be found in all cultures and civilizations.
 Nonetheless, the impressive participation of women in universities and col-
leges throughout the GCC signals a significant shift in the social practices 
throughout the region. Arab/Islamic culture is not static or inherently hostile to 
female empowerment. Most young women and their parents are now firmly 
committed to attaining high levels of formal education. The fact that significant 
increases in education have not yet resulted in sharp rises in labor force parti-
cipation is partly due to the cultural barriers we have outlined in previous para-
graphs. But we should also give due weight to economic factors that have limited 
both the ability and desire of young women to become professional workers. The 
incentive system that channels national workers into the public sector also nega-
tively affects national women’s desire to seek work in the private sector. The 
lack of government employment opportunities combined with lower wages in 
the corporate business world and a welfare system that encourages women to 
stay within the household economy are also responsible for low female labor 
force participation. Higher education attainment is one important factor promot-
ing the increased autonomy and equality of women, but educational reforms by 
themselves cannot be expected to shift the subaltern status of GCC women.
Conclusion
There is little doubt that the road taken by educational policies in the GCC has 
revolutionized the education system in terms of its quantity and quality. There 
are however many questions about where this road is leading to. The determina-
tion of GCC leaders to transform their sheikhdoms into modern societies is 
impressive. They have bet on educational reforms to help them achieve their 
goals of becoming part of the twenty- first-century knowledge societies but in 
following education commodification trends prevalent in contemporary Western 
higher education, they run the risk of missing their goals of becoming leaders 
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rather than followers. Even the embrace of a professional education to enable 
students to enter the entrepreneurial global economy seems to be questionable 
when measured by the actual participation and productivity of national graduates 
in the new knowledge economy of their respective countries. Such shortcoming 
may be the result of a turnkey approach to education that is not rooted in its local 
socio- cultural, historical and economic context. The reforms have considered 
education as “a key site of cultural reproduction” (Phillipson, 2000: 99) where 
authentic individual development is generally secondary. In his critique of this 
perspective, Sing observes that it “is narrowly economic and instrumental and 
often means little more than short term retraining and adaptation. Most govern-
ments are concerned more with national competiveness and economic growth 
than individual development” (Sing, cited in Spring, 2009: 67). GCC educational 
reforms are inscribed in this deeply flawed instrumental view of education that 
too often associates tradition with inertia and “modernity” with progress. As 
Ramadan (2009) points out, all traditions are constructed through movement; 
and modernity is a present tradition that deals with the challenges of con-
temporary times.
 It is the obligation of any national education policy to guarantee its citizens 
the right to their past so that students can learn to critically evaluate their her-
itage and participate in their own social evolution. Rulers expect their univer-
sities and colleges to nurture citizens’ sense of pride and appreciation of their 
cultural heritage. Their effort to construct a contemporary national identity, 
however, is frustrated by the importation of educational systems, curricula and 
academic workers. This can clearly limit the opportunities for students to study 
their own culture and society. A global university should engage students in a 
truly global culture to build a future society that starts with knowledge about its 
own traditions, social dynamics and environmental issues. This knowledge is 
just as essential and urgent as technological and scientific knowledge and can 
provide the tools necessary to “resist the flattening and homogenizing effects of 
globalization” expressed in the UAE charter. In this respect, using Arabic as one 
of the languages of instruction is essential because “when the written language 
becomes a means of representing and problematizing the issues facing the com-
munity . . . [then it serves] as a tool for linking [students’] uses of language to 
their concerns within the local community” (Holmes, 2008: 363).
 To pose the challenge of development as either following the Western model 
or remaining underdeveloped creates a false and unproductive dilemma. The 
universities and colleges of the GCC can offer their students all that is good 
about Western education while at the same time teach them about themselves 
and their environment. Given their wealth, they can afford to do it. It is fitting to 
close this chapter and book with one of the great leaders of the GCC and the 
founder of the UAE when he stated:
I believe that he who does not know his past will not understand the present, 
nor will he be able to prepare himself for the future.
(Sheikh Zayed)16
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Notes
 1 Arab nation refers to the imagined community of all Arab states forming one nation 
as Arabic has two terms for nation, one referring to the nation state, “qutr’ or “dawla,” 
and the other with a more Pan- Arab conceptualization with religious overtones, 
“Umma.” Umma is linked to the past Arab/Islamic empires and later to attempts by 
nationalists such as Jamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and the Baathist movements to 
unify the Arab world.
 2 World Trade Organization (January 4, 2012). Trade Policy Review Report by the 
State of Kuwait.Wt/Tpr/G/258.
 3 Kingdom of Bahrain, Ministry of Education website, available at: www.moe.gov.bh/
en/vision_mission.aspx#.UpxEUiLp0is.
 4 Interview with the higher education advisor to the Ruler of Sharjah, April 10, 2008.
 5 Fears regarding the loss of Arabic among future generations in the Arab world is a 
constant topic of debate in Arab media.
 6 We interviewed provosts and deans from the following universities, American Uni-
versity of Kuwait, Kuwait University, Qatar University, University of Sharjah, Zayed 
University, New York Institute of Technology, Abu Dhabi. We also gathered informa-
tion from colleagues in Texas A&M Qatar, University of Bahrain, the Gulf University 
for Science and Technology, and Georgetown University Qatar.
 7 The five countries could be placed on a continuum with the UAE being the most 
impacted and Oman the least.
 8 See Badry (2011) for a discussion of the impact of global English and globalization 
on UAE identity.
 9 Higher education advisor to a UAE ruler, personal communication, April 10, 2008.
10 When students matriculate into their major after the foundation year, they generally 
have to complete around 12 credits in English composition alone, which limits the 
number of courses they are required to take in their general education component.
11 Discussions on local politics and religion tend to be taboo subjects in class discussions.
12 There are, however, exceptions to this observation. In some semi- private universities 
such as AUS, faculty serve on curriculum committees to make recommendations to 
higher administration for changes or additions to their courses and programs. AUS 
also moved to develop a Faculty Senate and Faculty handbook that provides the 
faculty with many avenues for participating in the governance of the institution.
13 The data analysis in this paragraph heavily relies on a recent report on GCC labor 
markets prepared for the Gulf Cooperation Council by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF, 2013).
14 TANMIA is an effort by the government of the UAE to provide job training that can 
match the needs of the labor market with the skills of potential national citizen 
workers. TANMIA is supposed to supplement and improve on the high level skills 
that national citizens should be obtaining through the higher education system. Other 
countries have similar programs, but some more heavily rely on quotas and adminis-
trative diktats.
15 Such imbalance is sometimes blamed on higher rates of divorce as educated women 
tend to be less submissive. Education of women has also led to profound social 
changes. Young couples are less likely to live in extended family arrangements.
16 Quoted in Codrai (1990).
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